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Turnout in Mexico's Presidential Election: Evidence from the Mexico 2000 Panel Study

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0. Abstract[1]

This paper uses data from the First Wave of the Mexican 2000 Panel Study to elaborate a calculus of voting model of turnout that seeks to address two puzzles resulting from the presidential election. Both the low aggregate level of turnout, and its stark partisan pattern run contrary to socio-economic, resource and mobilization models of participation, as well as to typical characterizations of abilities of Mexican parties to drive out the vote. Instead, this paper proposes a modified calculus of voting model which renders the following key results: While Vicente Fox was most likely to be trailing Francisco Labastida in voting intentions four and a half months before election day, he had by then already secured a more solid basis of support among voters identified with his own party than the one the PRI candidate had backing him. Also, the model shows that the greater the expected difference in the utility that a citizen would derive from her top ranked candidates, the more likely that she would actually cast a ballot. Likewise, the greater *political engagement* of a voter, as explained by his interest in politics, political knowledge, media exposure and the exogenous influence of party mobilization, the more likely that he would cast a vote. Mexicans with a greater level of trust in their peers were more likely to participate, and younger people showed a lower propensity to turn out, *ceteris paribus*, as were citizens living in an urban setting. The paper discusses the substantial implications of these findings for our understanding of the 2000 election in Mexico, and of electoral behavior more generally.

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1. Introduction

Five decades ago, in his classic A Revised Theory of American Party Politics, Sam Huntington (1950) argued that electoral campaigns in close congressional districts looked more like fights about turning out each candidate's core basis of support than contests about persuading the largest amount of voters in favor of one's candidacy. In other words, and against the classical convergence argument espoused by Downs (1957), close bi-partisan races would produce polarized candidacies to the extent that it would be more profitable to ensure a "high degree of support from a small number of interests" than a "relatively low degree of support from a large number of interests" (Huntington, 1950:671 in Fiorina, 1974:20-21).

What I find illuminating about this insight is not the spatial pattern of competition it implies, but the way in which it underscores what is a categorical imperative for the office-seeking politician. Indeed, turning out the vote is a very costly and highly uncertain endeavor (Aldrich, 1993). Calculus of voting models suggest that by increasing the stakes faced by citizens in an election it is possible to improve their likelihood of participation. According to Huntington, for candidates to boost their chances of victory it is essential that they can count on every one of their core backers on election day, and this is achieved by generating a "high degree of support" among them. In other words, before you start preaching to the skeptics, the converted must be safe in their faith to have a better shot at electoral victory.

The presidential election of Mexico 2000 seems to present us with a classical example of what I here call a *Huntingtonian* logic of turnout. To the surprise of most politicians and pundits, Vicente Fox ended the quasi-eternal monopoly of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) on the Mexican presidency by a stunning margin of nearly 7 percent points over Francisco Labastida. More surprising perhaps was that in the most democratic, contested and closely reported election ever to take place in Mexico's history, voter participation (65% of eligible voters) did not even surpass the standard set by the 1991 *congressional* election (66%).[2]

[2] I have elsewhere argued (Poiré 2000a) that the very high relative level of turnout in the 1994 presidential contest is explained by the significant changes in the instrumental value of the vote most Mexican citizens experienced prior to August 21st, 1994. Massive efforts at voter registration, coupled with the first significant step towards the complete withdrawal of the government from the electoral authority, plus an important media campaign convincing citizens that their vote would be effectively counted in election day, contributed to what is arguably the highest historical change in voter's perception of the effectiveness of their ballots in our country. From this perspective, elections after that are more "politics as usual" at least with regards to institutionally determined changes in the subjective probability of a vote effectively deciding an election. Thus, ebbs and flows in turnout are explained by a different dynamic after this alleged tipping point.

[Figure 1 here: Turnout in Mexican Federal Elections]

This paper uses data from the First Wave of the Mexican 2000 Panel Study (conducted in February) to elaborate a model of voter participation that seeks to elucidate the following questions: To what extent can the classical socio-economic status (SES) model of political participation predict turnout in Mexico? How pervasive *in principle* is the effect of voter mobilization on turnout in Mexico, and how effective, if at all, was this instrument during the 2000 campaign? More generally, can we provide a coherent logic solving the puzzle of a relatively low level of turnout in July 2000 other than simply calling all previous election results suspect of fraud and ballot inflation?

The model and methods presented here make Huntington's insights worthy of revision even fifty years later. While Vicente Fox was most likely to be trailing Francisco Labastida in voting intentions four and a half months before election day,[3] he had by then already secured a rock-solid basis of support among voters identified with the National Action Party –even more solid than the one the PRI candidate had backing him. These findings stem from a calculus of voting model which also renders the following compelling results: the greater the expected difference in the utility that a citizen would derive from her top ranked candidates, the more likely that she would actually cast a ballot. Also, the greater *political engagement or dispositions* of a voter, as explained by his interest in politics, political knowledge, media exposure and the exogenous influence of party mobilization, the more likely that he would cast a vote. Also, citizens with a greater trust in their peers were more likely to participate. Finally, younger people showed a lower propensity to turn out, *ceteris paribus*, as were citizens living in an urban setting.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly points out the main theoretical alternatives explaining turnout while offering a basic sketch of voter participation in recent Mexican elections. Section 3 sets up the hypotheses tested here through a brief theoretical discussion of the merits of rationality-based accounts of turnout. Section 4 describes the instrumentation of the model and its main results, and section 5 concludes with a summary of arguments, implications of the findings and some avenues for future research.

2. Turnout in Mexico: theoretical overview and the puzzle of 2000.

The standard SES model of political participation would stress the importance of income, education and highly valued occupations in explaining turnout.[4] In accordance with classical modernization theory, participation is the result of a more general phenomenon of social and economic change which brings along voters' willingness and ability to take part in the electoral process. In principle, this would suggest the presence of higher levels of turnout in urban than in rural communities, given the higher levels of education, income and occupational structure to be encountered in the former ones. Figure 2 shows how turnout was distributed among rural and urban districts in Mexico 2000.

[Figure 2 here: Total Vote by Type of District]

While it is the case that the mean number of voters was higher in urban districts (around 70% of the 300 single-member congressional districts) than in rural ones, the relative distribution does not suggest massive differences in participation during the recent presidential contest. What the aggregate levels of turnout do suggest is that the preexisting correlation between partisan support and participation accentuated from 1997 to the 2000 election. Table 1 shows that in general Fox's Alliance for Change was most successful in high turnout districts, be them rural or urban. Third-time-in-a-row presidential hopeful Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and his Alliance for Mexico were most successful in medium turnout urban districts and low turnout rural districts, and Francisco Labastida and the PRI garnered most of their congressional seats out of low turnout rural and lowest turnout urban districts.

[Table 1 here: Summary Statistics: Turnout in Mexico 2000]

The positive correlation between participation and Fox share of the vote and the negative one with PRI shares is not a new phenomenon. Figures 3 and 4 plot the share of votes received by each party or coalition during the 1997 and 2000 *congressional* elections as a function of the total number of ballots cast in each of the 300 districts. As it can be readily seen, the PRI had already shown better results in low turnout districts by 1997, and this correlation (-.64) was basically maintained during the 2000 contest (-.53). The same is true in the case of the Alliance for Change votes,[5] where the (.46) pair-wise correlation increases

[3] Aggregate data from the First Wave of this Panel showed him at least 9% points behind among eligible voters.

[4] As summarized by Dennis, 1991.

[5] In order to make the comparison more accurate, I aggregate the PVEM votes to the PAN votes for the 1997 election.

to (.56). The charts do indicate, however, the failure of Cárdenas to maintain some important gains among high-turnout districts,[6] which explains the change from a statistically null correlation in 1997 (.05) to a negative one (-.26) in 2000, much like its parent organization, the PRI.

[Figures 3 and 4 here: Partisan Voting in 1997 and 2000]

Regardless of the multiple interpretations to be made about these data, what is important to stress here is the clear partisan patterns present in the phenomenon of turnout. Clearly, there is something about the way in which partisan competition shapes voters' decisions that cannot simply be explained by a socio-economic status model. This same criticism applies to Schlozmann, Verba and Brady's "resource model" of political participation (SVB, 1995). For these authors, participation is primarily a function of the resources a citizen has to undertake political activity. From this perspective, time, money and civic skills are the key to understand most modes of political participation, perhaps with the exception of turnout, which happens to be a low-cost activity better explained by "interest"(SVB, 1995). The only way to make the above charts consistent with an interest-based interpretation of turnout is to assume that different partisan strategies have a systematic impact on the political interest displayed by various types of voters. Once we do this, however, we are abandoning SVB's basic turnout model. Alas, what the immediate shortcomings of these two main models suggest is the need to have a careful understanding of exogenous influences on a citizen's willingness to vote.

A potential path of research would utilize a classic "mobilization" perspective on turnout (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993), where a voter will be more likely to participate depending on parties' overall capacities and abilities to lead them to the precincts in various ways. This interpretation, though, would certainly not bode well with the substantial differences attached to PRI's and PAN's typical mobilization structures. If this were the main rationale behind turnout, the prevailing myth of the *mapache*[7] or more generally of the alleged might of the PRI's canvassing armies, would lead us to expect this party's share of the vote to be positively correlated with turnout. Likewise, a catch-all, cadre-based party like PAN should not show a positive correlation between success and participation.

It might still be argued that the failure of PRI to get its electoral machinery to work, combined with the success of the Amway-inspired *"Amigos de Fox"* organization to supplement PAN's mobilization efforts explained the outcome of the 2000 election. However, two clear enough facts seem to undermine this

[6] Almost all of them in Mexico City and its surroundings.
[7] Spanish for raccoon. Pejorative way to indicate a fraudulent grass-roots electoral strategist.

interpretation: first is that the relationship between turnout and vote share for PRI and PAN were set long before *Amigos de Fox* was even created, as figure 3 above shows. Despite this, others still argue—very much in a conspiracy theory mode—that the PRI's failure in July 2000 was in part caused by the reluctance of the federal government in general and president Zedillo in particular to throw their political—if not financial—support behind the PRI's machinery. However, right before the beginning of the presidential campaign, this party had already developed and tested a pretty impressive organizational structure through the conduction of a national open primary to select their presidential candidate. There is, to be sure, enough anecdotal evidence indicating that one should be cautious to accept PRI's claims about having involved almost 10 millions of citizens in their candidate selection process. But it's also the case that through this effort, and especially given the particular rule chosen to select the primary winner,[8] the party was able to test-drive and arguably tune-up a massive mobilization effort like never before.

In general, then, the puzzle of turnout in the last presidential election of the twentieth century in Mexico leads us to abandon relatively orthodox interpretations of participation. In doing so, it compels us to provide a *political* rationale behind the patterns described above. Following Huntington's insights about the dynamics of what were increasingly becoming media-based, candidate-centered elections in post-WWII United States, this paper lays out a calculus of voting model for Mexico's media-based, candidate-centered post-authoritarian electoral politics.[9] In this context, explanations about turnout need to account for the exogenous effect of parties and candidates' notorious efforts to ensure the high degree of support among their followers that may guarantee that they'll take the time in election Sunday to cast a ballot in their favor.

3. Theoretical Setup

There are three main debates to which this paper aims to contribute. First and foremost is to specify the empirical basis on which the fight for turnout was conducted in Mexico's historical 2000 presidential contest. In doing so, it will illustrate how a model might help bridge an important gap in the theoretical literature on turnout. Thirdly, it offers a set of hypotheses for solving some of the crucial empirical mysteries of this election: the reasons behind the relatively low

[8] Whoever won a plurality of the 300 districts would be nominated by the party, regardless of national vote share.

[9] This should not be taken to mean that Fox's victory is the inauguration of democratic electoral politics in Mexico. While this is not the subject of the current research, it is my position that at least since 1996 we can call Mexico's federal electoral arena fully democratic. It is also true, I believe, that Mexico's post-authoritarian era is inaugurated by the electoral success of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas' Frente Democrático Nacional in July 6th, 1988.

turnout across the board, the partisan patterns underlying participation, and more specifically the identity of what pollsters call the "likely voter," namely the subset of the eligible population who will effectively turn out to vote on election day.

I follow Aldrich (1993) and a prior paper on turnout in Mexico (Poiré, 2000a) to specify a basic "calculus of voting" model, to which complementary and rival hypotheses will be appended. The simple model implies estimating a voter's costs and benefits of participating as determined by the typical formulation:

$$R = PB - C + D$$

Where R stands for the net rewards of participating, P depicts the subjective probability of a voter casting the decisive ballot, B represents the net benefit a voter obtains for choosing one government over other, C the costs of turning out to vote and D a 'civic duty' or simple 'consumption' component.[10]

Starting from this simple formulation, we argue that variation in a voter's propensity to vote will be an increasing function of changes in her perceived net benefits, which are in effect a function of a set of social and demographic characteristics, partisan and candidate evaluations, retrospective evaluations and campaign effects as represented by the *P, B, C* and *D* terms above. The dependent variable we use in the study is a respondent's self-placement in a zero to ten scale, where 10 means that the respondent is positive that he'll participate on election day, while 0 means complete certainty of non-participation.

[Table 2: Probability of Voting, Summary Statistics]

Table 2 highlights the non-trivial puzzle presented by a sizable share of respondents who report a maximum probability of participating and will still not vote.[11] This paper does not directly propose a method for sorting out the "likely voter" from a representative sample of the eligible electorate. Yet it is important to keep in mind that this is one of the main surprises of the recent electoral season, since most pre-electoral polls overestimated turnout—typically in favor of Labastida—by a fair share (Moreno, 2000). A separate research topic to which the conclusions of this paper will surely be of use is to provide a consistent method for estimating turnout from exit and pre-electoral polls. This task is all the more

[10] Past research (Poiré, 2000a) provides solid theoretical and empirical grounds to predict turnout using a modified version of the rational-choice heuristics in Mexico.

[11] The distribution of the dependent variable also brings about an interesting methodological challenge, which is coped with by through a tobit specification, but could be further explored in a future iteration of this work.

interesting in cases where participation is likely to be heavily driven by partisan patterns, as was apparently the case in Mexico 2000.

What the previous discussion implies, more generally, is the possibility of using a *calculus of voting model* as the best heuristics available to account for the strong campaign and partisan influences that become readily apparent upon simple examination of the data.

4.1 Estimating a Dynamic Model of the Calculus of Voting

This section discusses the main components of the model of turnout developed in this paper, describing each of the variables used in the different statistical specifications. I should start with a note of caution. Despite the exhaustive and systematic effort to come up with a 'perfect' instrument, it is particularly difficult to measure one of the key variables at play—likelihood of casting a decisive vote—in the calculus of voting model, given the items included in the First Wave questionnaire.[12] The survey does, however, allow us to accurately account for most of the other variables of interest to this study. More importantly, the panel design will allow us to track changes at the individual based on the results provided by this 'benchmark' effort. In other words, if we can come up with a fair representation of the specific mechanism driving Mexicans' decisions to turn out to vote using the February data, we will be able to extend these findings to account for the influence of various exogenous factors through the course of the campaign *at the individual level.* The development of this '*dynamic'* model of turnout should become an important contribution to the understanding of Mexican politics in particular, but also of political participation in a broader, comparative perspective. I now turn to the explanatory variables used.

I measure the 'Civic Duty' component of the model through two items: first is whether the respondent thinks that Mexico is a democracy or not, and second is whether the respondent thinks that "generally speaking, people can be trusted," as opposed to "you can't be too careful." Both of these measures allow

[12]The study design was carried out by the project participants in a number of meetings and permanent electronic communication. Surveys were properly tested before being taken to the field by *Reforma* pollsters, and subsequent waves of the study incorporated adjustments suggested by the campaign itself or by the relative success of certain questionnaire items. Particular credit should be given to Chappell Lawson and Alejandro Moreno for their joint intellectual and organizational leadership all through this project. The Mexico 2000 Panel Study participants are, in alphabetical order: Miguel Basáñez (MORI International), Roderic Camp (Claremont McKenna College), Wayne Cornelius (UCSD), Jorge Domínguez (Harvard University), Federico Estévez (ITAM), Joseph Klesner (Kenyon College), Chappell Lawson (MIT), Beatriz Magaloni (Stanford University), James McCann (Purdue University), Alejandro Moreno (ITAM and Reforma), Pablo Parás (MORI Mexico), and Alejandro Poiré (ITAM and Harvard University). See Appendix for a complete description of the questionnaire items used in this study.

us to capture a part of an individual's attachment to the norms of democratic participation. To be sure, the second one is a standard indicator of a "civic culture," and is here assumed to indicate a higher predisposition to enjoy participation *per se*, as a consumption-type reward.

Nonetheless, a citizen's categorization of Mexico as a democratic regime can indicate a couple of other things, which should be kept in mind. First, while most of the formal characteristics of a procedural democracy[13] have been present in Mexico since the 1997 congressional election, it has long been a tenet of non-PRI politicians and intellectuals to associate the concept of democracy with presidential turnover. Thus, it is no surprise that this variable is determined by an individual's party identification,[14] and its effect could be misinterpreted if PID is not eventually controlled for. Moreover, and as previously shown (Poiré 2000a), voters who assert they live in a democratic setting might attach a higher marginal effectiveness to their vote. In other words, this variable could also be thought of as a proxy, albeit a remote one, for likelihood of casting a decisive ballot. These considerations notwithstanding, I here argue that deriving an intrinsic benefit from casting a ballot should be conditional on the assumption that this ballot is meaningful, alas on the system as a whole being democratic.

It is often argued that the (until recently) insurmountable electoral strength of the PRI rested on a vast and complex structure devoted, by legal and otherwise means, to drive out the vote across every corner of the country. More generally, convincing comparative analyses (Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies, 1998) show the impact that successful mobilization strategies can have in turnout. Polls and pollsters have long been challenged by this topic. It is certainly not easy to measure the extent and effectiveness of mobilization through a face-to-face individual poll, but it is neither impossible. In this case, I construct an index of "party contacts," and interpret it originally as a "cost diminishing mechanism."[15] The general argument behind this idea is that party mobilization—independent of its content—serves the purpose of reminding the voter about the occurrence of an election, about the offices that are to be elected and the identity of at least one of the candidates that will be running, about the date of the election itself, and a variety of information bits that reduce the marginal cost of casting a ballot. In short, party contacts—via mail or personal ones—confront a voter with a set of

[13] To distinguish it from what Linz and Stepan (1996) call a *consolidated* one.

[14] In the database used for this study, around two thirds of *priístas* think Mexico already is a democracy, while only one third (roughly) of *panistas, perredistas* and independents agree with that statement.

[15] The index is built from two items in the survey: whether the respondent had received political propaganda from the party and whether she or he had been personally contacted by a party representative.

assets that reduce the informational investment needed to decide about and eventually cast a vote (Downs, 1957).

Alas, some demographic variables might also be construed as "cost diminishing" indicators. The "resource model" espoused by Schlozmann, Verba and Brady (1995) actually uses these indicators (formal education and income, for example) as proxies for the resource stock that an individual brings to the participatory arena. While these authors show that these resources do not bear so much on the likelihood of participation, they tend to agree with the classical *Socio-Economic Status* (SES) model of participation in the key role these variables play in terms of defining the opportunity cost of different types of participation. To put it shortly, older age, higher income, better education and certain types of socialization (voluntary associations, participatory church practices, etc.) may indicate lower marginal costs of engaging in political participation more generally and turnout specifically. This research is thus far agnostic with regards to this theoretical debate, and has already shown the need to go beyond its basic implications. In other words, questions about the social and demographic cleavages explaining turnout in Mexico, will be addressed by our results. This will be done by including indicators for voters' level of formal education, a proxy for household income, whether the locality is rural as determined by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), and whether the respondent was catholic.

In order to control for a typical result in turnout studies, I include a battery of items measuring a voter's political interest, information and awareness. These items include a simple index of political knowledge, an index of the frequency with which a respondent reads about or discusses politics, a couple of variables measuring the level of interest in politics in general and in the presidential campaign in particular, a measure of exposure to political advertisements in the radio or in TV, plus an indicator of the frequency with which the respondent normally listens to radio or TV newscasts.[16] The basic hypotheses would suggest each of these indicators to be positively correlated with turnout.

I have elsewhere (Poiré 2000a) criticized the literature's inability to provide a mechanism by which "political interest" is translated into political participation and specifically into turnout. It is also important to understand the forces behind variation in levels of "interest" beyond an individual's education and socialization. Arguably, politicians and their teams pursue what they think are optimal electoral strategies focusing and deviating the public's attention to and from whatever issues they think might be more productive. Thus, political knowledge, awareness and interest should not only be highly correlated amongst them, but subject to exogenous influence during the course of a campaign

[16] See Appendix for details.

(Alvarez, 1997). If this is the case, we should be able to construct a composite measure of *political engagement* based on these variables and—if it turns out to be a good predictor of turnout—trace its development over the course of a campaign. I will here offer a potential method for implementing this suggestion.

The key hypothesis to be derived from rational-choice interpretations of turnout is that, *ceteris paribus*, a citizen is more likely to vote when the electoral stakes she faces (*B*) are higher and the likelihood of her vote being decisive (*P*) is the greatest. Surely, one crucial question is whether voters in Mexico were influenced by this kind of considerations when deciding to participate. In the eyes of many observers, from very early on the election was perceived as one of the most competitive ones ever. Unfortunately, the first wave of the Mexico 2000 Panel Study does not include a good enough measure of the likelihood of casting a decisive vote. The best we can do is to select those voters who were not 'certain' about the fate of their preferred candidate. Thus, I use a dummy variable indicating those respondents who said their chosen candidate "could win" or "could lose" the presidential election, separating them from those who thought their candidate was certainly going to win or lose the election.

Also, if it is true that voters were led to the precincts at least partially by what they thought was at stake in the election, it is imperative to understand carefully what were the calculations underlying these expected stakes, and perhaps more importantly, whether these were higher for a particular subset of the electorate. This is exactly what Huntington's quote points towards: to come up with a measurement of the 'stakes' of the election is to assess the degree of support that candidates are eliciting from the electorate. Should this basic insight be right, the higher the difference in utility derived from a citizen's first preference relative to her second's, the more likely she will go vote.

To save the reader any more suspense, this research shows that even before the juicier parts of the campaign were to develop, PAN identifiers had higher expected stakes than PRI identifiers and these were higher in turn than those of PRD partisans. Paraphrasing Huntington, in the early stages of the close presidential contest of 2000, Fox was ahead of Labastida in securing a high degree of support among the admittedly narrower set of interests that his core constituencies represented. This is a first potential explanation underlying the larger rates of participation of Fox voters in July 2nd, 2000.

The adequate construction of a variable measuring "electoral stakes," however, is somewhat complicated. Following the classic calculus of voting model, all we need to provide is an expected utility differential between the respondent's two top choices (Downs, 1957). To do this, we need measures of the expected utility derived from each electoral option. The best solution is to provide an expected utility model which fulfills two alternate goals: first is to predict as accurately as possible the actual vote choice of the respondent; second is to

provide an analytically compelling substantive basis for such calculations. Accuracy is important to the extent that we wish to use the predicted probabilities of a multinomial logit model as expected utilities derived from each of the candidates. The better predictions we get, the more we are accurately estimating the 'stakes' or 'relative degree of support' for each of the respondents. Provision of a substantively interesting basis for these expected utilities is all the more important in our effort to understand how these stakes might be shaped by different exogenous influences over the course of the campaign. The simplest choice would be to create these utility differentials based on candidate feeling thermometers. Yet, this decision would imply separating the expected utility measurement from the respondent's actual vote choice, and it would leave the researcher at a loss for the rationale underlying variation in these thermometers. The methodological challenge is to produce the "best possible" multivariate specification of respondents' voting choices, both theoretically and analytically, making use of precisely those variables that best explain a voter's preferences, while accurately portraying the alleged mechanism influencing them.

As a first cut, I have decided to implement a specification of the expected utility model that provides for highly adequate predictive accuracy, while including the most analytically important indicators.[17] This "simple" expected utility model of candidate choice is made up of candidate traits and evaluations, partisan evaluations and identification and a set of retrospective evaluations. While most of these measures are very straightforward, the specification does include a constructed index of favorable personal qualities of the candidates.[18] Table 3 presents the results of the multinomial logit model used to estimate respondents' expected utility derived from each candidate. It should be kept in mind that this model is not intended to provide a the 'best' theoretical explanation of vote choice, since this is not the main task of the current research. But it certainly does include indicators for the main underlying forces shaping electoral decision. It should also be mentioned that the specification used is able to correctly predict almost 90% of the cases included, with particularly high rates for Fox (89.9% and Labastida (92.0%) voters.[19]

[Table 3 here: Multinomial Expected Utility Model]

[17] Future iterations of this work can certainly alter the specification of the expected utility model, yet keeping in mind the predictive and substantive mandates I mention above.

[18] See Appendix.

[19] A number of different specifications of the expected utility model were used before arriving at the present one. None of these alter any of the substantial findings of the paper. See Table A1 for model's predictive efficacy.

The construction of the utility differentials, or "electoral stakes" is done by selecting a respondent's two highest ranked choices and obtaining the absolute value of the difference among them. Obviously, the expected utility model predicts that a voter will cast a ballot for whoever produces a larger benefit, and this information allows us to show the following breakdowns. Table 4 presents summary measures of the expected utilities derived from the model and the utility differentials constructed from them.

[Table 4 here: Summary Measures of Expected Utility and "Stakes"]

The reader should stop to notice two important facts about Table 4. First is that on average, Mexicans tended to expect a higher return from a Labastida government in February (0.46) with Fox trailing closely behind (0.41). Second is that the expected utility model produces a relatively skewed distribution of "stakes" or utility differentials (overall mean of 0.75, median of 0.89). However, the distribution of stakes or of the 'degree of support' is not homogeneous across respondent's predicted vote choice. The median Fox voter perceived the stakes of the election to be slightly higher (0.91 to 0.89) than the median Labastida voter. Thus, should this variable have an effect on turnout, it could indicate that Fox voters would be easier to convince to go cast their ballots than Labastida and Cárdenas (median of 0.85) ones.

A more dramatic effect can be seen when displaying voters' predicted utility differentials across partisan identification. To be sure, candidates tend to elicit highest degrees of support from partisan voters, and thus *all* partisans were seeing the campaigns as clear-cut decisions between good and evil, black and white, with few shades of gray. However, it seems clear that even by February, the otherwise non-commited and volatile *panista* voters (Magaloni and Moreno 2000, Poiré 1999a, 2000a, 2000b) had heavily thrown their support behind the man on the boots. Table 5 shows summary statistics for estimated electoral stakes by PID, also depicted on figure 5.

[Figure 5 here: Stakes by Candidate, Partisans]
[Table 5 here: Electoral Stakes by Partisan Identification]

The peak in the upper-left corner of figure one shows the greater density of *panista* voters in the extreme of the distribution relative to *priístas*, and especially *perredistas*. As can be seen in table 5, both the mean and the median level of support for their candidate was higher among *panistas* than among PRI identifiers. This finding is very consistent with previous work on the PAN voter, suggesting its high reliance on a candidate's ability to solidify preferences during the course of a campaign (Poiré 1999a). More importantly, if turnout in the 2000

election was partially explained by what voters perceived was at stake in their choice, what this evidence suggests is that four and a half months before election day, Fox had already succeeded at amassing the most solid, albeit still not the largest, coalition of core supporters.

Figure 6 below also shows that Fox had started to make gains among the substantial group of independent voters.[20] It separates respondents according to their stated vote choice and graphs the density of expected utility differentials. While Fox's degree of support was bullet-proof among *panistas*, it also looked stronger among independents than the support enjoyed by his two main rivals. The extreme case is Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, whose February independent supporters saw really little difference between him and whoever was ranked second in the respondent's preferences. But the graph is suggestive as well with regards to Labastida voters. While the stakes faced by independents willing to vote for Fox were somewhat uniform along the 0 to 1 scale, the vast majority of independent *Labastidistas* were facing pretty slim electoral stakes.

[Figure 6 here: 'Stakes' by Candidate, Independent Voters]

4.2 Model Specification and Results

The model of turnout I seek to construct uses the respondent's answer to a question about likelihood of voting on a 1 to 10 scale as its main dependent variable. Given the large number of respondents placing themselves at the high extreme of the scale as seen on table 2 above, OLS regression will tend underestimate the size of the estimated coefficients (Kmenta, 1997). The typical correction for this problem is to use a maximum likelihood tobit estimation technique, which is only appropriate when we can safely assume that the model's error is normally distributed –assumption which is confirmed in our final specifications.[21] Another potential solution would be to create a dummy variable where all respondents placing themselves on the highest end of the scale would be coded as '1' and all other as '0', but this would imply losing variation in our dependent variable which might come handy in the estimation process. Before I present the model and its results, I briefly summarize the explanatory variables and their hypothesized effect on turnout.

Calculus of Voting Variables

[20] The distribution of Party ID in the survey was: 39.1% PRI, 22.1% PAN, 8.8% PRD, 29.5% independents.

[21] Figure A1 shows the distribution of the residuals from the instrumented model, which is admittedly not centered around zero, but clearly normally shaped.

- Electoral 'Stakes': estimated utility differential, hypothesized to have a positive effect on likelihood of turnout.
- Likelihood of a decisive vote: candidate not sure winner or loser. Hypothesized to have a positive impact on turnout.

Civic Duty Variables

- Mexico is a Democracy: positive effect on turnout.
- People can be trusted: positive effect on turnout.

Cost Diminishing Variables

- Contacted by the PRI, PAN or Alliance for Change, PRD or Alliance for Mexico: higher likelihood of turnout.

Interest / Political Sophistication Variables

- Frequency with which respondent talks about and/or reads about politics: index with a positive effect on turnout.
- Index of political knowledge: the more knowledge, the more likely participation is.
- Respondent has seen TV ads: increasing likelihood of turnout.
- Index of TV and radio news exposure: should increase likelihood of turnout.
- General interest in politics: dummy variable for somewhat or very interested, positive effect on electoral participation.
- Interest in the presidential campaign: dummy variable for somewhat or very interested, positive effect on electoral participation.

SES Variables

- Education: formal schooling, positive effect on turnout.
- Household income: proxied by number of light-bulbs in the household, positive impact on likelihood of voting.
- Rural locality as determined by IFE: negative impact on turnout, as predicted by the resource model of participation.
- Age, continuous variable. Increasing likelihood of participation.
- Catholic respondent, increasing likelihood of voting.

[Table 6 here: Calculus of Turnout, Saturated Tobit Model]

A number of important positive and negative results stand out from what I have called the saturated tobit model of turnout shown in table 6 above. I mention them almost in passing in order to devote more careful attention to a more parsimonious, 'instrumented' model below. First and foremost, the expected stakes of the respondent's vote had a significant effect in the expected direction on turnout. Another confirmed hypothesis has to do with the important role played by political engagement, as gauged primarily by a respondent's tendency to read or speak about politics. The expectation about older people being more

likely to participate also rings true in the data, as does the classic political culture argument indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of the "people can be trusted" variable.

In terms of negative findings, the likelihood of casting a decisive vote does not appear to have an effect, although this might have more to do with the poor instrumentation of the variable. Conceptualizations of regime status also had no discernible effect, as did most of the interest and sophistication variables. Surprising negative results, however, include the null impact of religion, education and income on voting, especially the two latter ones. Another interesting outcome to which more time is devoted below is the positive sign of the rural coefficient, which does not indicate that we should expect higher turnout in towns than in cities, but that holding all other variables constant, the urban citizen had a lower propensity to vote than the rural one. Finally, it seems clear that parties' mobilization efforts were still not having any effect in driving out the vote, and if they had any it was on the wrong direction, in terms of Fox's written propaganda and personal representatives. This counterintuitive result, however, could be due to an improper theoretical formulation, which I address in the 'instrumented' specification below.

More generally, the results from table 6 suggest that different theoretical arguments can account for turnout during the 2000 election. Rationality took part, as did political culture and to certain degree interest or awareness and some social and demographic indicators. It is nonetheless quite astonishing that only one of the political sophistication / interest variables turns out to be significant, and that it appears to carry substantial weight. As suggested above, all of the variables in the 'Interest / Sophistication' battery as well as those in 'Cost Diminishing' subset are highly correlated with a respondent's disposition to read and talk about politics. In fact, we can produce a simple model of *political engagement*, explaining an individual's eagerness to talk and read about politics. This exercise is carried out in table 7, and the results are quite satisfactory.

[Table 7 here: A Model of Political Engagement]

Each and every one of the cost diminishing and interest and sophistication variables turn out to be appropriate predictors of frequency to speak and read about politics. It can thus be possible to use the predicted values from this OLS regression as a summary measure of *political engagement*. This instrumentation makes sense not only from a practical point of view (it allows us to exclude the inefficiency-generating instruments from the final model, while taking into account their indirect effect on turnout). I here argue that this method makes perfect theoretical sense. Three of the variables explaining *political engagement* are measures of an individual's pre-dispositions or *ex-ante* likelihood to be

attentive to the information distributed by all types of political agents during a campaign. These include general interest in politics, overall exposure to radio and TV news and level of political knowledge. Two other variables measure events which are in principle exogenous to an individual's interest or prior dispositions towards politics, yet potentially having an important effect in her perceptions and misperceptions about politics (Alvarez, 1997). These are written or personal contact by each of the main parties and exposure to political advertising on television. Finally, while interest in the presidential campaign can be an indicator of an overall measure of *political engagement*, we can presume that this type of interest is logically prior to the actual undertaking of talking and reading about politics.

This allows us to propose a simple model of engagement which seemed to be at work among the Mexican electorate around February 2000, and which could explain overall variations in political information, interest and awareness through the development of the campaign. This model posits that an individual's overall *political engagement* can be construed as an estimated value of his pre-dispositions (political knowledge, media exposure and overall interest in politics), plus a series of campaign effects (party contacts, TV advertisements and interest generated by the campaign). Interpreted in this way, this model provides a mechanism through which political engagement might change over the course of the campaign, and finds its theoretical reference in the vast literature suggesting campaigns seldom *persuade* yet often *influence* voter's perceptions and dispositions towards politics in a particular election. While a more elaborate theoretical and empirical discussion of these concepts is certainly granted, I leave such endeavor for future research. I here argue that a model of engagement thus developed lets us account for one the most plausible impact that the strategies pursued by politicians have on a voter, namely that upon his overall dispositions towards the political events confronting him. The impact caused upon candidate and party evaluations will be captured in the model by the estimated degree of support or stakes perceived by voters.

Armed with the neat results obtained in the model of political engagement presented above, we are now able to introduce a more parsimonious model of turnout for the 2000 Mexican election.

[Table 8 here: Calculus of Turnout, Instrumented Tobit Model]

Again, the absolute value of the electoral stakes faced by the citizen has a positive and significant effect as predicted by the calculus of voting model. This finding is yet another building block in the edifice depicting the Mexican voter as a reasoning decision-maker (see among the most recent contributions Buendía 2000, Sánchez Gaspar 1999). But it is not only important for its ability to salvage

a particular theoretical argument. It provides us with a specific mechanism underlying voter calculations with regards to their turnout decisions. While other theories of turnout should be surprised by the relatively low levels of turnout shown by the Mexican electorate, and their partisan patterns, my findings suggest that turnout has more to do with the logic and substance of political entrepreneurs' efforts and how these are perceived by the electorate. In particular, the statistical confirmation of the *Huntingonian* argument explains the higher propensity to vote for Fox supporters, as suggested by the aggregate evidence presented in section 2.

But not only rational choice theories have their day in explaining voter turnout in Mexico 2000. The results suggest a revival of a classical political culture argument, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of the "people can be trusted" variable. This is also a novel finding, which should stir some additional research oriented towards the social and organizational basis of political trust (Putnam, 1994).

Social and demographic characteristics present us with a mixed bag of results: while they fail to support an SES model of participation (null effect of education or income), they confirm the important role age plays in facilitating turnout. This is arguably due to a lower opportunity cost of voting among older people or a more solid socialization with the democratic practice of keeping a valid voting card and sparing the time to queue and cross out a symbol in a set of ballots every so often.

Quite strikingly, voters in rural locations tended to be more likely to vote, holding all else constant, than their urban counterparts. For example, a young urban Mexican who evaluated Fox and Labastida as fairly equivalent choices with Cárdenas lagging behind, who happened to be relatively distrustful of people and uninterested and uninformed about politics is clearly not very likely to turn out to vote. However, an individual of the same characteristics is more likely to cast a ballot if living in a rural area. This finding seems counterintuitive, especially after reviewing the evidence offered in section 2 above –where I show that in general there was a higher turnout in urban than in rural districts.

Table 9 would suggest that the slightly higher levels of urban turnout are a possible combination of the following factors: more efficient urban mobilization strategies, thus generating higher levels of *political engagement*, and higher levels of *political engagement* as explained by information, awareness and interest in politics. The higher average expected utility differential for rural voters, however, runs contrary to such a prediction.[22]

[22] The possibility of significant measurement error in the rural subset of the sample did not seem to be a problem upon preliminary review.

[Table 9 here: Mean Values of key Explanatory Variables by Type of Precint]

A simple answer is provided to such a conundrum from SVB's resource model of participation: spare time. Arguably, rural location is a good proxy for the opportunity cost of turning out to vote by unit of time. Surely, Sundays might be busier days in the city than in the country, which would turn this structural factor into evidence favoring both a pure calculus model and a resource model of turnout.[23] Even in the absence of a more elaborate explanation for this result, the evidence provided above can confidently reject the stereotype of rural participation as mainly driven by massive, often illegal mobilization. Moreover, we have already shown that if mobilization had any effect on turnout it was an indirect one, through *political engagement or dispositions*, and not a direct one – at least not at this early stage of the campaign.

Finally, catholic voters were not particularly more likely to go vote than the rest of the population. Mexican churches still trail their American counterparts in their ability to instill the civic skills or sense of duty that would explain a higher level of turnout (SVB, 1995).

To summarize, the instrumented model proposed in this paper shows:

- Voters who supported their candidates by a larger margin were substantially more likely to turn out.
- The fact that his preferred candidate's fate was uncertain did not influence the respondent's propensity to vote.
- Voters' perceptions about the democratic status of Mexico's political system were insignificant in explaining turnout.
- Participation was a positive function of voters' overall trust in people.
- Higher degrees of political engagement, as estimated through interest in politics generally and in the campaign in particular, as well as through their level of political knowledge, exposure to the news media, and TV advertisements and partisan contacts had the effect of increasing the likelihood of a voter participating on election day.

[23] If this explanation is incorrect, two alternative rationales could underlie the positive and significant coefficient of the rural variable. First, it could be argued that voters are being driven to the precincts by at least some considerations *completely absent* in this model which are correlated with population density as indicated by the rural variable. Alternatively, it could be that the calculus of voting of urban and rural subsets of the population does incorporate the elements depicted here but in a substantially different manner, i.e. with coefficients showing different signs, significance and/or magnitudes. Should the latter be the case, it could be easily tested with an interactive specification of the model, to test for the possibility of a different calculus being performed by the city voter from the country voter.

- There is no discernible direct effect of education, religion or income on propensity to vote.
- Older voters, as well as those living in rural areas, were more likely to vote, arguably due to their lower opportunity cost by unit of time.

5.1 Conclusions I: Implications

I shall concentrate my conclusions about the theoretical and empirical implications of study of turnout around three points. First, this paper has shown that the reasons behind voter turnout in the presidential election of Mexico 2000 were largely instrumental. That is, citizen evaluations of the relative merits of the choices presented to them had a key role in sorting out who would eventually go vote and who would stay home. In fact, a substantial portion of Fox's success was derived from his greater ability to "sing to the choir" of his core basis of support and use that as the foundation of a coalition that eventually included a large enough share of non *panista* voters. Likewise, by the time the data used in this survey was gathered, Labastida was still leading among eligible voters, but his core supporters were not as convinced of his candidacy as were Fox's. While the model presented in this paper presumes that these trends should respond to campaign events and dynamics, it clearly lays out the pretty leveled benchmark in which the two main political forces found themselves competing for the vote in February. It can then provide a basis from which to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of the strategies designed and carried out by the Labastida and Fox war-rooms.

This interpretation also suggests that structural explanations of the vote must find their beginning and end within the confines of age and type of locality where the voter lives. Moreover, the stereotype of rural voters as being mostly driven to the booths through clientelistic or corporatist networks finds no single piece of evidence supporting it in this study.[24] While partisan mobilization was clearly important in determining a voter's degree of political engagement and thus indirectly in his predisposition to vote, it is crystal clear that we must cease to think about turnout in Mexico as the pure result of a sophisticated battle between different brands of political machines. This is not to demerit the enormous value of political mobilization for electoral purposes (Bruhn, 1999). But candidate-centered, media-based elections are here to stay, and recent developments in the way in which parties—especially the PRI—are selecting candidates,[25] can only suggest that this Huntingtonian logic of competition for turnout is likely to be a key feature of our future electoral landscape.

Finally, the relative theoretical shortcomings of rationality-based models of turnout (Aldrich, 1993; Green and Shapiro, 1995) should not force the researcher to shy away from their potential contributions. In particular, it seems to be the case that Mexicans are substantially prone to behave rationally when it comes to deciding whether to vote or not (Poiré 2000a), and that these 'rational'

[24] A control for being a union member was employed in various specifications of the turnout model and never came out as a significant predictor.

[25] See Morton 1998, Poiré 1999b for an elaboration of these points.

forces work along others in explaining the dynamics of the vote in this country. The turnout model proposed in this paper provides a specific theoretical mechanism that coherently combines voter characteristics with politicians' influence to explain under which particular conditions we are likely to expect a citizen to cast a ballot.

5.2 Conclusions II: New Questions

This research is then a first cut at establishing the basis for voter participation in Mexico 2000. It attempts to provide some answers to a set of very relevant puzzles, but especially aspires to generate new questions which should improve our understanding of electoral behavior in Mexico and more generally. Let me point out three and elaborate on a fourth one. First I would inquire about the social and/or political determinants of interpersonal trust, as well as the specific mechanism which translates trust into willingness to vote, beyond what simple 'social capital' models would argue. Also, the higher propensity to vote found in rural dwellers is a pretty robust finding subject to careful theoretical and empirical discussion. Thirdly, professional pollsters might try to translate—or challenge, as may be the case—the findings of this paper into instruments for determining *ex ante*, and with a theoretically consistent story, what the likely voter is for a particular election.

Finally, and returning to the insight that organizes this research, I would ask the following question: should we expect the polarization logic laid out by Sam Huntington to play a role in candidates' efforts to generate higher levels of support? The Mexico 2000 Panel Study certainly lends itself to addressing this question. If this is the case, we would see two phenomena evolving as the campaign did, assuming (and testing, of course) issue positions to be a substantive part of a citizen's evaluation of a candidate: first, the positions of candidates on some key issues should be diverging as election day drew nearer, and second, this polarization should increase the degree of support and eventually the likelihood of turnout among supporters of each political option.[26] Regardless of the specific answer to the "Huntington question," this line of inquiry should aim to provide us with systematic cues for understanding issue dynamics and coalition politics in the Mexican political system of the twenty-first century.

[26] I am currently working on a part of this project with Beatriz Magaloni.

Tables*

Table 1 **Summary Statistics: Turnout in Mexico 2000**				
	Mean Number of Votes per District	***By Winning Party or Coalition***		
		Alliance for Change	PRI	Alliance for Mexico
Urban	128,168.2	140,505.2	109,935.4	127,794.0
Rural	114,053.6	131,758.4	106,330.3	102,311.2
Total	124,041.9	138,552.0	108,655.0	122,962.2

Table 2 **Probability of Voting, Summary Statistics**			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	% responding '10'
Likelihood of Voting (0 to 10 scale)	8.805	2.50	71.5

* All survey data in these tables comes from the First Wave of the Mexico 2000 Panel Study. Aggregate data is from the Federal Electoral Institute.

Table 3
Multinomial Expected Utility Model
(Multinomial Logit Coefficients)

	Fox / Labastida	Cárdenas / Labastida
Candidate Evaluations I: Personal Traits		
Vicente Fox	1.2013***	0.2529
Francisco Labastida	-0.9898***	-1.1395***
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas	-0.1504	1.0970***
Candidate Evaluations II: Feeling Thermometers		
Vicente Fox	0.1718***	0.0593
Francisco Labastida	-0.3243***	-0.1307
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas	0.0157	0.1907*
Retrospective Evaluations		
Personal Economy Improved	0.2143	0.8044*
National Economy Improved	-0.2110	-0.5377
Approve Zedillo's Performance	0.4122	-0.0762
Partisan Evaluations: Feeling Thermometers		
PAN	0.2853***	-0.1658*
PRI	-0.2131***	-0.1875**
PRD	0.1070	0.1704*
Party Identification		
PAN	2.0916***	0.9146
PRI	-2.0280***	-1.8456***
PRD	-0.2629	2.7791***
Constant	-0.3652	-1.0702
N = 1267		
Initial Log Likelihood = -1224.3714		
Final Log Likelihood = -389.36354		

*** Significant at the $p < 0.01$ level
** Significant at the $p < 0.05$ level
* Significant at the $p < 0.10$ level

Table 4 **Summary Measures of Expected Utilities and "Stakes"**			
	Expected Utility for Candidate	***Electoral Stakes by Predicted Vote***	
	Mean, Std. Deviation	Mean, Std. Deviation	Median
Vicente Fox	0.4180, 0.403	0.7467, 0.307	0.9129
Francisco Labastida	0.4620, 0.415	0.7636, 0.293	0.8992
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas	0.1199, 0.259	0.7401, 0.284	0.8580
Total		0.7541, 0.298	0.8993

Table 5 **Electoral Stakes by Partisan Identification**		
	Mean, Std. Deviation	Median
PAN Identifiers	0.9049, 0.163	0.9681
PRI Identifiers	0.8555, 0.198	0.9413
PRD Identifiers	0.7579, 0.276	0.8764
Independents	0.4528, 0.319	0.3993

Table 6
Calculus of Turnout, Saturated Tobit Model

	Coefficient	Std. Error	*p-value*
Calculus of Voting Variables			
Expected Utility Differential	1.9714**	0.8297	0.018
Candidate not sure winner or loser	-0.3113	0.5005	0.534
Civic Duty Variables			
Mexico a Democracy	0.1000	0.4795	0.835
People can be trusted	1.5858**	0.6993	0.024
Cost Diminishing Variables			
Contacted by PRI	-0.3094	1.5977	0.847
Contacted by PAN / AC	-5.1074**	2.0815	0.014
Contacted by PRD / AM	-1.0512	2.5130	0.676
Interest / Sophistication Variables			
Frequency talking, reading politics	7.8413***	1.8948	0.000
Political knowledge	0.3203	0.8473	0.706
Has seen TV ads	0.9193	1.3256	0.488
TV, Radio News Exposure	0.1510	0.1663	0.364
Interest in Politics	0.3526	0.6189	0.569
Interest in Campaigns	0.6412	0.5898	0.277
SES Variables			
Education	-0.3063	0.2820	0.278
Household Income	0.0085	0.0418	0.838
Rural Locality	1.3332*	0.7325	0.069
Age	0.0432**	0.0177	0.015
Catholic	-0.2123	0.7764	0.785
Constant	7.0341	1.7473	
N = 896			
Ancillary Parameter	5.3842	0.2921	

*** Significant at the $p < 0.01$ level
** Significant at the $p < 0.05$ level
* Significant at the $p < 0.10$ level

Table 7 A Model of Political Engagement			
	OLS Coefficient	Standard Error	*p-value*
Cost Diminishing Variables			
Contacted by PRI	0.0463	0.0263	0.079
Contacted by PAN / AC	0.1087	0.0440	0.014
Contacted by PRD / AM	0.1010	0.0381	0.008
Interest / Sophistication Variables			
Political knowledge	0.1122	0.0115	0.000
Has seen TV ads	0.0433	0.0197	0.028
TV, Radio News Exposure	0.0057	0.0026	0.029
Interest in Politics	0.1270	0.0095	0.000
Interest in Campaigns	0.0834	0.0095	0.000
Constant	0.2040	0.0124	0.000
N = 1635			
R^2 = 0.348			

Table 8 Calculus of Turnout, Instrumented Tobit Model			
	Coefficient	Std. Error	*p-value*
Calculus of Voting Variables			
Expected Utility Differential	2.3091**	0.8326	0.006
Candidate not sure winner or loser	-0.3334	0.5031	0.508
Civic Duty Variables			
Mexico a Democracy	0.2487	0.4834	0.607
People can be trusted	1.4193**	0.6968	0.042
Political Engagement			
Estimated frequency talking, reading politics	8.3287***	2.3694	0.000
SES Variables			
Education	-0.0635	0.2550	0.803
Household Income	0.0231	0.0423	0.585
Rural Locality	1.2508*	0.7436	0.093
Age	0.0552**	0.0179	0.002
Catholic	-0.2266	0.7858	0.773
Constant	6.3721***	1.6331	0.000
N = 897			
Ancillary Parameter	5.5245	0.3007	

Table 9
Mean Values of Key Explanatory Variables by Type of Precinct

Variable	Rural	Urban	Total
** Expected Utility Differential	0.807	0.744	0.754
People can be Trusted	0.146	0.146	0.146
Age	39.27	39.24	39.25
** Estimated Political Disposition	0.284	0.363	0.350
** Contacted by PAN / AC	0.013	0.023	0.021
** Contacted by PRI	0.040	0.056	0.052
Contacted by PRD / AM	0.019	0.027	0.025

** Difference in means or proportions is statistically significant at the 95% level, two-tailed test.

Table A1
Predictive Efficacy of Expected Utility Model*

	Observed Behavior			
Predicted Vote	Fox	Labastida	Cárdenas	*Total*
Fox	**89.91**	6.79	13.99	*541*
Labastida	8.41	**92.02**	9.79	*601*
Cárdenas	1.68	1.19	**76.22**	*125*
Total	535	589	143	1267
Overall Predictive Efficacy: 89.42%				

* Numbers are column percentages.

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Figure 1


Turnout in Mexican Federal Elections
% of Eligible Voters
80
60
40
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
MMH
mid-term
CSG
mid-term
EZP
mid-term
VFQ

Figure 2


Total Vote by Type of District
Urban
Rural
Total
Fraction of Districts
.2
.1
0
50000
100000
150000
200000

Figure 3


Alliance for Change 1997
PRI 1997
Alliance for Mexico 1997
Vote %
.75
.5
.25
0
35000
150000
Total Votes
Partisan Voting in 1997

Figure 4


Alliance for Change 2000
PRI 2000
Alliance for Mexico 2000
Vote %
.75
.5
.25
0
50000
200000
Total Votes
Partisan Voting in 2000

Figure 5



'Stakes' by Candidate, Partisans

Figure 6


.15
Density
0
0
.5
1
Independents for Fox
.15
Density
0
0
.5
1
Independents for FLO
.15
Density
0
0
.5
1
Independents for CCS
'Stakes' by Candidate, Independents

Figure A1


Distribution of Instrumented Model Residuals
.2
0
Fraction
-10
0
5
Residuals

Figure A2


Total Vote in Districts by Winner
ALIANZA POR EL CAMBIO
ALIANZA POR MEXICO
PRI
Number of Districts
24
0
50000
100000
150000
200000

Appendix
Questions drawn from the Mexico 2000 Panel Study, translated by the author.

1. Can you tell me your date of birth, please?
   Year ___

3. How interested in politics would you say you are?
   1. Very Interested
   2. Somewhat interested
   3. Not very interested
   4. Not at all interested
   9. Do not know (DK)/Did not answer (NA)

4. In particular, how much are you following the political campaigns for the oncoming elections - Very much, somewhat, a little, nothing?
   1. Very much
   2. Somewhat
   3. A little
   4. Nothing
   9. DK/NA

6. In a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means that you definitely won't vote in the next presidential election and 10 that you will definitely vote, please tell me how probably will you vote in this presidential election?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

9. How probable is it that your preferred candidate will win the next election? Would you say that…
   1. He will certainly win
   2. He may win
   3. He may lose
   4. He will certainly lose
   9. DK/NA

20. In the last weeks, have you seen TV ads from the different political parties or candidates? (Yes) From whom?
   A. Francisco Labastida
   B. Vicente Fox
   C. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas
   D. Another _____
   E. PRI
   F. PAN
   G. PRD
   H. Alliance for Change
   I. Alliance for Mexico

J. Another _____

29. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful?
1. Most People can be trusted
2. You can't be too careful
9. DK/NA

46. I will ask you your opinion about the political parties and the presidential candidates. In this scale 0 means that you have a very bad opinion and 10 means that you have a very good opinion. If you don't have an opinion just tell me and we can move forward. What is your opinion of...?

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
PRI											
PAN											
PRD											
Francisco Labastida											
Vicente Fox											
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas											

47. Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the way Ernesto Zedillo is doing his job as President?
1. Strongly approve
2. Approve
3. Neither approve nor disapprove
4. Disapprove
5. Strongly disapprove
9. DK/NA

48. Generally speaking, would you say that Mexico is or is not a democracy?
1. It is a democracy
2. It is not a democracy
9. DK/NA

49. During the last 12 months, would you say that your personal economy has improved, has worsened, o has remained the same?
1. Improved a lot
2. Improved somewhat
3. Remained the same
4. Worsened somewhat
5. Worsened a lot
9. DK/NA

50. During the last 12 months, would you say that the national economy has improven, has worsened, o has remained the same?
    1. Improved a lot
    2. Improved
    3. Remained the same
    4. Worsened
    5. Worsened a lot
    9. DK/NA

61. What is your religious affiliation?
    1. Catholic
    2. Protestant
    3. Other
    4. No religious affiliation
    9. DK/NA

63. What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
    1. No formal education
    2. Complete Primary School
    3. Complete Secondary School: technical/equivalent
    4. Complete High School: technical/equivalent
    5. College
    9. DK/NA

68. Between all the people within household, how much do you earn per month? (Mexican pesos)
    1. From $0 to $1,000
    2. From $1,001 to $2,000
    3. From $2001 to $4,000
    4. From $4,001 to $6,000
    5. From $6,001 to $8,000
    6. From $8,001 to $12,000
    7. From $12,001 to 16,000
    8. From $16,001 to 20,000
    9. More than $20,000
    99. DK/NA

*Rural locality was coded according to the sampling point.