Early Campaign Dynamics in the 2000 Mexican Presidential Election

By Federico Estévez and Alejandro Poiré, ITAM

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Abstract

By studying the impact of the PRI primary on Mexico’s 2000 presidential election, this paper addresses three important theoretical debates. First, it explores the extent and character of voter coordination in the absence of elite coordination long before election day. It shows that despite stability in the three major available choices, most of the Mexican public had aligned behind two of them at least seven months before the balloting took place. In doing so, the paper’s findings run contrary to theoretical frameworks emphasizing the strategic nature of voter coordination. Second, the paper attempts to contribute to the literature on divisive primaries by looking at the dynamics of open nomination procedures when these are not mandated by law, but endogenous to partisan players themselves. We find evidence of a significant fracture in the PRI’s most committed electorate around the issue of internal party democracy, and stress how candidate selection institutions became the key issue explaining this rift during the primary campaign. Building on these two insights, the paper explains Mexico as a strong counterexample to the conventional wisdom that the defeat of a dominant party requires either strategic coordination among opposition parties and voters, or a formal split from the ruling party, or possibly both. With a robust economy, strong popular approval of the incumbent’s performance, failure by the opposition to forge an electoral alliance, and no major defections from the ruling party, the PRI went on to its first national defeat in seven decades. Early sincere coordination as well as an underestimated fracture in the PRI’s electorate, loaded the dice against the dominant party.
Cuando hoy se dice que debe haber una elección abierta en el partido, me parece que la gente no tiene memoria de lo que nos pasó hace tan poco tiempo, que no recuerda que esos procesos nos desgastan políticamente, nos enfrentan e implican altos costos presupuestales. Estratégicamente es un error.

Francisco Labastida, defeated presidential candidate.  
February 6, 2001

Introduction

A now conventional reading of the presidential election in Mexico is that the winning candidate, Vicente Fox, devised a campaign strategy that generated support among voters otherwise committed to rival opposition parties and candidates. This strategy involved concentrating his message on the opportunity for kicking the PRI out of the presidency and avoiding entangling commitments to non-political issues and ideological statements that might alienate sectors of the opposition bloc. Moreover, a strategy focused on the political dimension of Mexican politics was deemed all the more central to his prospects, given the generally favorable judgment of success for the PRI in orchestrating its bold experiment in party democratization, the presidential primary held in early November, 1999. This primary, which mobilized almost ten million voters, produced a landslide victor in a hard-fought battle, and generated no split or major defections from the party, was not perceived to be particularly divisive. To the contrary, it was interpreted as giving the winner, Francisco Labastida, what appeared then to be an insurmountable lead over his opposition in the polls.

This paper questions both pieces of the conventional wisdom. Instead, we argue that opposition voter coordination in favor of Fox antedated his repeated calls for strategic voting against the PRI and that the primary race was indeed divisive and alienated a significant number of backers of losing candidates on the basis not so much of candidate evaluations as of perceptions of fairness in the selection process itself.

A brief review of the theoretical literature on the two phenomena of strategic voting and divisive primaries is in order.

Strategic Voting

The protracted democratic transition in Mexico has inspired analysts to resolve the puzzle of continued PRI dominance of the electoral system given a deep and permanent split in the ruling party (in 1987), widespread disapproval of national
economic conditions (from 1982 through 1996), and mediocre and often disastrous government performance throughout the period. An early diagnosis (Domínguez and McCann, 1995) of the problem stresses prospective risk-aversion as the culprit (echoed later by Buendía, 1998, and Cinta, 1999). Other answers (Magaloni, 1998 and 1999) favor informational asymmetries that reinforce the PRI’s incumbency advantage and life-cycle economic evaluations that allow heavy discounting of bad economic news. But all attribute to the division among opposition parties, the cushion enjoyed by the PRI in national elections until 1997. The repeated failure of elite coordination, once again present in the 2000 race, not only split the anti-PRI vote but reinforced perverse incentives for opposition parties to attack each other with the same ferocity they directed at the ruling party (Weldon, 2001). Over time, repeated government failures might mitigate the advantage accruing to incumbency, but a divided opposition could not hope to exploit the opportunity with ultimate success.

Lack of coordination among opposition elites could always be overcome, however, by opposition voter coordination from below in favor of one overweening prospect. According to Cox (1997), expectations over election outcomes, updated with newer information as election day approaches, provide the impetus for strategic behavior among those who prefer sure losers but are unwilling to throw away their votes\(^1\). No rationalization of this abandonment of their first preference is needed, only the recognition of certain defeat for the third (preferred) party and the utility of casting a decisive vote for their second preference. Of course, Cox presumes that movement toward a high S/F ratio (i.e., a concentration of preferences in favor of one trailing party over another) implies strategic coordination among voters. A problem of observational equivalence arises to the extent that strategic voting cannot be distinguished from the accumulation of sincere changes in preference (Poiré, 1999). However, it is safe to assert that strategic behavior is likeliest toward the end of an electoral campaign, when information about probable election outcomes is abundant and the voting decision is pressing.

**Divisive Primaries**

At first glance, the PRI’s primary experience in November would never be classified as divisive by specialists in American politics. Americanists tend to consider a primary divisive when the margin between the top competing

\(^1\) Cox expects sincere behavior among voters in multiparty contests (with M=1) when party A > parties B+C, when A< B+C but B=C, and when A=B=C. Strategic behavior is possible in all other scenarios among third party supporters, but more likely the greater the spread between B and C and the smaller the margin between A and B.
candidates is tight, preventing momentum from building in favor of one of the contenders. Since Labastida beat Madrazo by a two-to-one margin on November 7, lack of momentum was not the problem. Of course this first national presidential primary did entail strongly negative campaigns and nonstop mudslinging in the media, with evidence of some voter backlash against the candidates most widely perceived as negative (Estévez and Moreno, 2000). But a landslide victory for one candidate and the lack of any split or important defections after the primary, would by American standards disqualify the event as divisive.

The important point about divisiveness in candidate selection, however, is that intense support for a loser may generate long-lasting alienation from the party’s eventual winner, inducing betrayal through bolting to other parties or abstention on election day (known as the “demobilization effect”). This may be attributable purely to candidate-centered assessments and loyalties, a major drawback for critics of the American primary system since V. O. Key (Stone et al., 1992), but it may also reflect deeper divisions of opinion over salient issues. The other side of the debate emphasizes the positive “mobilization effect” for a political party that stems from partisan participation in the primary process (McCann et al., 1996; and McCann, 2000, for the Mexican case). Indeed, both types of effect may operate simultaneously (Buell, 1986).

One strand of the literature stresses the importance of the divisiveness of one party’s nomination process relative to that of others’ (Kenney and Rice, 1988). In this respect, the Mexican case presents a stark contrast. While the PRI surely benefited from the concentration of media attention on the primary race, geared up party activist participation in preparation for the general election, and gained some increased legitimacy from its effort at democratization, it also took the risk of showing itself to be a far from unified party, particularly when compared to the major opposition parties then engaged in smooth and virtually uncontested nomination processes. In the event, the confrontation between the establishment candidate (Labastida) and the insurgent one (Madrazo) looked very much like the normal, strident electoral contest between the PRI and its opposition (Estévez and Moreno, 1999). The PRI also risked a potential party split if the primary were perceived to be rigged in favor of the establishment candidate.2

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2 In gubernatorial and other local elections, the PRI had accumulated considerable experience with the primary mechanism. At the start of the 1990s, closed primaries were introduced and quickly abandoned when gubernatorial primaries produced a loss in Colima for the candidate of the national party leadership and widespread charges of rigging in Nuevo León, both in 1991. In 1998, gubernatorial primaries were reintroduced, but in the form of open primaries, given the lack of national and local party registries. Starting with the state of Chihuahua and up to the
Caution is urged by Atkeson (1998) in assuming that primary divisiveness can be analyzed apart from other voter evaluations commonly inserted in any model of vote choice, such as retrospective evaluations and assessments of candidate quality. In fact, weak incumbents (with poor approval ratings) or weak candidates (with high negatives) may well spur primary challenges that turn out to be divisive, but would have an important impact on the outcome of the general election regardless of the quality of the primary process. For Mexico, these possibilities were less relevant in late 1999. President Zedillo was cresting near the top of the charts with an approval rating of 68% in October and Labastida’s thermometer scores were even, on average, with Fox’s and superior to those of party rival Roberto Madrazo and virtual PRD candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.

The possibility of divisiveness stemming from the PRI’s primary, then, depends on the presence of issue-voting in the contest or of clear social or regional cleavages girding priísta opposition to Labastida. Otherwise, any demobilization effect would only reflect sour grapes among supporters of losing candidates. While the impact of sour grapes may not be trivial when the general election rolls around, candidate-centered evaluations are much less likely than issue-based divisions or resilient social cleavages to remain a salient concern for losing voter groups eight months later.

**Early Campaign Dynamics**

The early story about the 2000 presidential election revolves around two innovations in Mexican electoral politics. First was the American-style permanent campaign that Fox, then governor of the state of Guanajuato, commenced in the summer of 1997, complete with saturation spots, his own PAC called “Friends of Fox”, and countless soundbites on the nightly news (Shirk, 2000), in order to propel his candidacy within his party and in the broader voting public. Two years later, the high-profile visibility of Fox’s candidacy had crowded out any potential rival from the PAN and engineered a lock on his party’s nomination. On the basis of trends from the series of nation-wide trial heats run by Reforma (Chart 1), Fox had already reached parity with his likely and better-known rivals from the PRD and the PRI by mid-1998. Moreover, his lead over Cárdenas expanded to a two-to-one margin in 1999 and, by the time of presidential primary, ten gubernatorial primaries were held and eight victories produced for the PRI in the general election. The two losses came in Baja California Sur and Tlaxcala, where the primaries were challenged as rigged and open splits allowed the opposition to win the governorship with the aggrieved priístas at the top of the ticket.
the October survey, had ballooned into a three-to-one margin, which he preserved for eight months until election day.

CHART 1 HERE: Trial Heat Trends

The steady erosion of support for Cárdenas commenced after a brief honeymoon as mayor of Mexico City and is attributed to poor performance in office and a vigorous negative campaign by the news media (Moreno, 1999). The embarrassment of a botched election of the national party leadership in the early part of the year and the defection of party co-founder Porfirio Muñoz Ledo in the fall of 1999 may also have damaged his presidential bid (Bruhn, 2000). But Cárdenas’s candidacy was really uncontested within the PRD and no potential rival, including Muñoz Ledo, could dent his advantage with the party faithful.

The second innovation, as already emphasized, came from the PRI. On March 4, the anniversary of the party’s founding, President Zedillo announced before the party leadership his desire for a national primary to decide the presidential nomination. The rules for the primary were announced in May, and shortly thereafter four prominent priísta politicians threw their hats into the ring. Campaign season formally opened on August 1, with saturation spot campaigns from the start from three of the four contenders. Reforma’s trial heats reveal an immediate rise in Labastida’s support (and in Madrazo’s as well). But by late October, a tight two-man race in August had evolved into a clearcut advantage for Labastida, especially among PRI backers, leading on November 7 to a landslide victory for Labastida. At the same time, the news and media attention generated by the primary helped to activate PRI sympathizers and to create a dramatic twenty-point bounce in favor of either of the PRI’s major candidates in the trial heats for the general contest.

CHART 2 HERE: Violin chart for total sample

One of the better pieces of evidence of the impact of the front-loaded electoral calendar on the voting public can be seen in the ideological profiles based on left-right self-placement presented in Charts 2 and 3. In October, the distribution of ideological self-placements was already trimodal, with a mean of 6.7 for the total sample. This is unusually early compared to previous national elections, which elicited trimodal distributions only in the heat of the formal campaign season (Moreno, 1999). The effect of early campaigning by Fox and, especially, of the

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3 The typical distribution in non-electoral years throughout the 1990s was bimodal, with a strong mode in the center-right of the spectrum and a weaker one on the left. In election years, a third mode appears at the far right of the spectrum as priísta supporters are reactivated.
timing of the PRI’s primary clearly reengaged partisan sentiments and polarized a latently tripartite electorate. But more importantly, it also left few segments of the electorate disposable for easy persuasion in later campaigning. Approximately a fifth of the national electorate remained undecided or uncommitted by October, 1999, with easily half of that proportion classified as inveterate non-participants fully alienated from politics.

The meaning of the left-right scale in Mexico is controversial. We follow Moreno (1999) in considering the scale to be a collapsed measure of attitudes toward the two dimensions of Mexican politics first diagnosed by Molinar (1992) and Domínguez and McCann (1995). The dominant dimension is anchored in the democracy question and ranges from preferences in favor of rapid, even radical democratization (on the left) to those in favor of the political status quo (on the right), while the secondary dimension (though hardly negligible) covers the conventional left-right spectrum of economic ideology. In the context of campaign dynamics in the fall of 1999, the distribution of self-placements in charts 2 and 3 indicates an alignment of voter preferences which privileges political issues over socio-economic ones.

CHART 3 HERE: Violin charts for partisan groups

Among the three partisan blocs, the PRI displays the most cohesive electorate, well anchored at the right end of the scale, with all Labastida backers (dominated by PRI partisans) averaging a score of 7.8. Opposition blocs, in contrast, display the catch-all nature of their composition.4 PAN identifiers concentrate in the center-right of the distribution, with Fox supporters at an average score of 6.1, close to the sample mean. The PRD’s disparate electorate clearly concentrates in the center-left of the spectrum, with Cárdenas supporters averaging a 5.3 score. Finally, the mass of independents or non-partisans lie at the center of the distribution, with a mean self-placement of 5.8 and completely confined within the parameters of the PAN’s central quartiles.

To distinguish degrees of partisan attachment, this study uses party ID intensity scales, similar to those employed in studies of American electoral studies and ranging from hard and soft partisans to leaners and independents for each party.5

4 For the catch-all nature of the PAN’s electorate, see Poiré (1999) and Magaloni and Moreno (1999). Similar analyses for the PRD are unknown to the authors.
5 For the American case, Green and Palmquist (2000) summarize the virtues of the intensity scale for the study of partisan dispositions and notes the key ambiguity in the scale surrounding the category of leaners. Are leaners really independents temporarily inclined toward one party or are they closet partisans in denial? Although no easy response is possible, there is little doubt that
The gradation of partisan sentiments allows us to identify with greater precision the way in which partisanship colors voter evaluations. For example, chart 4 displays the mean thermometer differentials between Fox and Labastida and between Fox and Cárdenas for all respondents in October, according to their degree of partisan identification. As one should expect, the means smoothly decrease by degree of partisanship among PRI and PAN backers for the Fox-Labastida comparison and among PRD and PAN backers for the Fox-Cárdenas one. Moreover, across the entire range of partisan attachments, the Fox-Labastida differentials vary as expected from the lowest means, for strong PRI supporters, to the highest ones, for strong PAN supporters, with intermediate scores for independents and PRD supporters. The category of independents, with negligible differentials on average, comes closest to the mean for the entire sample.

CHART 4 HERE: Stakes by party ID

Among priístas, however, there appears to be a clear divide between those favoring Labastida in the primary race and those favoring any of his opponents (labeled MBR in the chart), whose differentials are closer to indifference in the face-off between Labastida and Fox. The comparison between Fox and Cárdenas elicits more surprising judgments. Except for PRD partisans, all segments favor Fox over Cárdenas. Even here, the stakes for Cárdenas supporters are very small and PRD leaners actually favor Fox on average. In the two primary-driven factions of the PRI, it is noteworthy that non-Labastida voters assigned Fox higher mean stakes than did Labastida backers, for every level of partisanship. Among PRI leaners, those opposed to Labastida register virtual indifference with respect to his contest with Fox.

This constitutes preliminary evidence for the two points argued in this paper which are put to systematic testing in the rest of this paper. The first point is that early coordination among opposition supporters and independents and favoring Fox over Cárdenas had already coalesced by October, even among part of the PRD electorate. The second is that a rift within the PRI emerged in the presidential primary whose potential divisiveness is signaled by the low stakes assigned to Labastida by the losing faction. Moreover, approximately 20 percent of priístas favoring anybody but Labastida in the primary indicated they would leaners do exhibit other attitudes and dispositions intermediate between partisans and independents. For applications of this scale to the Mexican case, see Estévez and Moreno (2000) and Estévez (2000). McCann (2000) uses a shortened version of this scale, lumping leaners and independents together.
bolt from the PRI in favor of an opposition candidate. Overall, by October the presidential contest was already a two-man race, despite what would prove to be a vulnerable bulge in Labastida’s lead over Fox in the trial heats.

Data

The data used in this paper come from a national face-to-face sample of Mexicans of voting age, taken during the weekend of October 22-25, 1999. This was only two weeks before the primary took place on November 7. While the poll was mainly intended to address the primary itself, it included trial heats of the potential presidential candidates and their corresponding parties, plus a series of indicators properly suited to our study. The set of variables included in the final model and subsequent analyses are detailed in the appendix (Table A1). These include basic social and demographic characteristics, ideological self-placement, partisan identification measures, presidential approval ratings, candidate feeling thermometers, media exposure and some indicators of opinion about the PRI primary and internal party democracy. We also tested – to no avail – hypotheses on additional social and demographic traits, economic evaluations, democratic values and a wealth of issues.

At least two alternative research strategies could be pursued, one using data from a primary exit-poll (Moreno, 2000), and another using data from a later poll, closer to the general election (McCann, 2000). However, only by using this particular poll can we test hypotheses regarding both early voter coordination and the divisiveness of the PRI’s experiment with open candidate selection. A primary exit poll would prevent us from studying coordination, since selection bias in primary turnout excludes most independents and opposition partisans, and a later pre-electoral poll makes it quite difficult to address early voter coordination (Magaloni and Poiré, 2000).

Hypotheses

We present three major sets of hypotheses explaining presidential voting intention. First, we evaluate some traditional indicators of voting behavior in Mexico, which also serve as controls for the two sets of hypotheses of interest: those concerning the effect of the primary on voter intentions and those

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6 It is only fair to add that a similar percentage of Labastida backers revealed their willingness to bolt a Madrazo-led ticket. This symmetry reflects the pattern of in-group, out-group dynamics advanced by Kenney and Rice (1987) as typical of primary contests. The important difference in the PRI primary is that the alienation of priistas who backed losing candidates is not merely related to candidate-centered loyalties but appears to be issue-based as well, as is discussed below.
addressing voter coordination. We thus present three sets of hypotheses, with their corresponding letters “G” (for general hypotheses) “D” (divisive primary) and “C” (coordination). *Ex ante*, we would expect the following results:

G1: Given the early stages of the presidential campaign, it should be difficult for issues, candidate attributes and other types of voter evaluations to make much of a difference. One implication of this is that we shouldn’t expect to have a very fully specified model of vote choice.

G2: Partisan cues should be most important in determining vote choice. This is especially true for the party intensity scale we present here (Estévez, 2000), which distinguishes among three types of partisan voters (strong, weak and leaners) and independents.

G3: Traditional social and demographic characteristics as well as ideological predispositions should explain an important share of vote choice at this early stage.

G4.1: While issue-voting is expected to be negligible, an important exception should be retrospective evaluations (economic and presidential performance), which are very low-cost information cues and not particularly determined by campaign dynamics (Fiorina 1980).

G4.2: Another exception should be certain political issues, like party democracy in the PRI (if the primary raised their salience), which could have an effect on presidential vote intentions.

C1: Assuming partisan cues have a strong impact on vote choice (G2), we should expect to see most independents and a share of leaners still undecided or uncommitted, and distributed proportionally among the available partisan options. This would imply that most of the coordination among voters, be it sincere or strategic, has yet to take place.

C2: Strong evidence of *strategic* coordination in favor of Fox in October would show the PRD partisanship scale heavily favoring Fox to Labastida. This would imply that PRD supporters were increasingly likely to vote for the opposition candidate most capable of beating Labastida. However, a necessary correlate would be that Cardenas’s evaluations should remain at least as strong as Fox’s.

C3: Finally, assuming C1 to be false, the information presented in chart 4 above would constitute evidence of early *sincere* coordination by many PRD leaners and independents.

7 No direct proof of strategic calculation is possible, since *Reforma*’s October poll does not include questions tapping the assignment of subjective probabilities of triumph for the candidates included in the presidential trial heats.
D1: If the primary generated a rift among the PRI’s electorate, the coefficient of the PRI partisanship scale among non-Labastida primary voters should reveal a demobilizing effect against Labastida in the trial heat. This variable isolates the effect of partisanship among priístas supporting candidates other than Labastida in the primary. A non-divisive primary would show this variable to have a small or null effect against the PRI’s candidate in the trial heat.

Methods

An issue of potential concern with the poll we were using was the presence of missing data in the survey (Honaker, Joseph and King, 2000). This was particularly important with respect to indicators which it is reasonable to expect to be correlated with respondent characteristics. We addressed this problem using King et al.’s algorithm for multiple imputation and model estimation, obtaining the results shown in table 1.

TABLE 1 HERE: Descriptive statistics of the data

The missingness reported here turned out to be enough to force us to drop more than half of the observations for the final model specifications. What the multiple imputation procedure allows the researcher to do is not to “invent” data to appropriately fit our models, but to use the observations for which some cells are missing by imputing the necessary missing data according to the distributional structure of the original data set itself. This prevents the estimation procedure from being biased (Honaker, Joseph and King, 2000).

Model of Vote Choice

There is an on-going debate about the relative merits of using multinomial probit or multinomial logit to estimate the effect of a series of explanatory variables on a multivariate nominal variable as is vote choice (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). The main advantage of the former is that it does not assume independence of irrelevant alternatives, while the latter does. On the downside, the multinomial

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8 Most noteworthy was ideological self-placement, with a response rate of only 69.9% of the sample.
9 The total number of cases used for the final model with list-wise deleted data is n = 1172. Appendix table A2 details this model. It shows biased estimates of at least 3 coefficients which could have significantly altered our interpretation and conclusions.
10 IIA implies that P(A) / P(C) given the choice set \{A, B, C\} is equal to P(A) / P(C) given the choice set \{A, B\}. 
probit specification is somewhat sensitive to the choice of reference categories and computationally cumbersome. This implies that probit should be the model of choice only when the IIA assumption does not hold or when the exclusion of one of the choice categories is the key issue at stake in interpretation (Poiré 2000a). Since neither of these conditions is a major concern in the present case, we used the multinomial logit specification for the statistical models.\(^\text{11}\)

As advanced above, we run this procedure on respondents’ vote intentions for the presidential election in July 2000. Table 2 shows the results for the multiply imputed data, using voting intention for Fox as the reference category.\(^\text{12}\)

### TABLE 2 HERE: Multinomial Logit model for MI Data

This final model is a reduced version which discards a number of variables found not to be significant. Perhaps most important among them is a battery of respondents’ issue positions which included Indian rights, abortion, private property, economic equality, freedom of expression and at least two indicators of democracy.\(^\text{13}\) Current economic and pocketbook evaluations were also discarded as explanatory variables, as were some controls for political culture.

Turning to what the final model does show, it is important to underscore that as expected in our \textit{ex ante} hypotheses, partisan variables are the most consistent determinants of voting intention. It is also true that the information available is significantly better at explaining the Fox-Labastida choice than the Cárdenas-Fox one. In particular, we find that only the partisan variables, income and age (with the young and the rich going for Fox against Cárdenas) distinguish among these two opposition candidates.

When it comes to explaining the vote for Labastida against Fox, the results of the model are more interesting. Early on, the more sophisticated electorate was ready to abandon the PRI candidate. As is shown by the education and media exposure

\(^{11}\) We performed Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests for the IIA assumption on the model presented here, both on the multiply imputed and list-wise deleted datasets. On all of these tests (a total of 24) except 1 –that performed on 1 of the 5 multiply imputed datasets, the assumption of IIA held. Moreover, as the evidence will show, by November 1999 the exclusion of the Cárdenas candidacy was not at all a significant issue at stake, since most coordination had already been achieved.

\(^{12}\) The coefficients and standard errors presented are a weighted average of those obtained in each of the m=5 imputed datasets. Each of these models is run on the full n = 2540 observations. For details see Honaker, Joseph and King (2000).

\(^{13}\) These issues, as well as the left-right positioning scale were also evaluated as issue distances, taking the best educated partisans as a mean party position. None of them turned out to be significant under this coding.
coefficients, the less educated and media attentive electorate was the one most likely to stick to the PRI’s candidate come July. It is also evident that Labastida was able to use the primary campaign to capitalize on his gubernatorial experience in the northwestern state of Sinaloa in the 1980s, prodding northerners to favor him as a regional favorite son against Fox. Additionally, and despite the fact that Labastida consistently shied away from close identification with his former boss, performance evaluations of President Zedillo were already having a significant positive impact on his electoral prospects. Finally, it is also clear that Labastida was the most rightist of the major presidential candidates, with those voters closest to that end of the spectrum favoring him over his centrist rival from the PAN.

With regard to the strategic coordination hypotheses, we do not find evidence supporting the argument that PRD sympathizers might have been willing to favor Fox against Labastida. In other words, for voters whose first preference was Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, there is no evidence that they were more likely to vote for Fox than for Labastida or vice versa. This could actually mean two things. First, it is possible that whatever coordination had been achieved by then was mostly sincere coordination (not based on calculations of electability). Or second, that strategic coordination was still in the making, waiting for the final stages of the campaign to manifest itself. While there is some evidence for this latter argument (Magaloni and Poiré, 2000), it remains crucial to determine the magnitude of early voter coordination. We have already discussed the relatively low likelihood of early strategic coordination from a theoretical point of view. We also find no evidence in support of the hypothesis. While we concede that some additional coordination took place towards the end of the campaign, it appears to be the case that by the time the PRI primary was decided, most Mexican voters were already aligned behind two major options. We will discuss this argument at length in the next section of the paper when we look at independents’ and leaners’ predicted vote intentions.

A striking feature of the model is that while PRI partisanship works properly in explaining Labastida’s support, increasing the likelihood of favoring him in the presidential bid, it had an almost equally large impact in the opposite direction for PRI partisans not voting for him in the primary. This is a key finding of the paper, and will be discussed thoroughly below. But what it tells us immediately is that the PRI primary was not successful in improving Labastida’s prospects across all of the PRI electorate. To the contrary, the nature of the primary campaign itself seemed to push an important segment of priístas out of the party’s folds. The primary in effect divided the PRI electorate into two groups: the victorious labastidistas in the majority and assured loyalists for the rest of the season; and
the losing madracista minority, for whom partisanship would amount to little more than being newly independent voters. This faction would become fair game in the tug-of-war between Labastida and Fox, or would in all likelihood stay home on the second of July (Poiré, 2000b). Further evidence on this point is provided by the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the dummy variable “exit”. Respondents were asked whether they’d still vote for the PRI if their preferred candidate did not win the primary bid. Those who answered they would probably stay home or even bolt to a different party (both exit options were coded 1 in the dummy) clearly disfavored Labastida in the trial heat.

These preliminary findings demand further elaboration. In particular, we are interested in evaluating the extent and rationale for voter coordination, the degree to which the rift within the PRI was electorally damaging for Labastida, the basis of this cleavage, and the implications of all these factors for the general campaign which would formally begin nine weeks after Reforma’s poll was conducted.

**Coordination**

The first issue at stake in evaluating the evidence stemming from the model is whether major voter coordination had already taken place by October and what drove it. As chart 1 above suggests, most of the committed electorate was already behind Fox or Labastida, with 28% and 42% respectively for each of them. Only 11% favored Cárdenas and a sizeable 19% of all respondents did not as yet express a preference.

Chart 5 plots the distribution of party leaners on a simplex of estimated voting probabilities for each of the three candidates. Observation placements within the triangle indicate a respondent’s probabilities of voting for each candidate as estimated by the coefficients obtained in the final model. Thus, a voter in the top vertex would be a sure Fox backer, while one in the center of the triangle would be equally likely to vote for any of the three options. It is important to note in chart 5 that PRD leaners were much less likely to vote for Cárdenas than their counterparts in the PRI and PAN for their respective candidates. Indeed, there were hardly any PRD leaners still clearly loyal to their three-time presidential contender and equal portions of them seemed willing to vote for either of the two major candidates from rival parties.

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14 This and the rest of the triangle plots were elaborated using Nicholas Cox’s triplot programming code for Stata.
The concentration of diamonds around the center of the triangle, together with the clear alignment of PAN and PRI leaners alongside the Fox-Labastida axis, suggests that an important degree of voter coordination had already taken place by late October. This point is further highlighted in chart 6, which shows independent voters in the same simplex by their ideological preference. The disenchantment of PRD leaners with Cardenas is deeper still among independents, virtually none of whom seems to favor the PRD candidate.

Yet another important point is made in chart 6. Most rightwing independents were sticking with the PRI and its candidate, while the center-leftists preferred Fox. This is consistent with Moreno’s (1999) interpretation of the Mexican ideological spectrum as one that fuses economic and political dimensions, with the right representing market-driven economics and authoritarian politics and the left representing statism and democratic politics. It also supports an interpretation of sincere coordination of leftists behind Fox’s centrist candidacy. This point is further underscored in chart 7, which contrasts the ideological self-placement of PRD leaners and partisans.15

Clearly, the PRD base was abandoning Cardenas and shifting towards other more attractive candidates according to their ideological leanings. The leftist ones turned to Fox because they shared the political priority of democratization; the very few rightist ones turned to Labastida in support of his defense of a state-dominated economy.16 In short, our explanation for the demise of the PRD option is straightforward: the erosion in Cardenas’s support was based mostly on voters’ (including many of his fellow partisans) cumulative and sincere dislike for his candidacy rather than on strategic calculations by those who rated him above other options but recognized his lack of competitiveness.17 Cardenas was simply

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15 For clarity of exposition, we exclude centrists from this chart.
16 This, of course, is speculation, but also an educated guess. It was clear from the outset that Labastida did not wholeheartedly embrace the “neoliberal” economic policies of the Salinas and Zedillo administrations. His own academic and professional background corresponded more to the moderate center within the PRI and this might have lured some PRD supporters still nostalgic for the planned-economy that former Coca-Cola C.E.O. Fox obviously abhorred.
17 It is important to recognize that, apart from the feeling thermometer, we do not have appropriate data to test this interpretation. We did test whether Cardenas’s ratings were at all related to voter
unable to capitalize on his high visibility as mayor of the capital. Whether this was in turn the product of a negative campaign by the news media against his city administration, or of errors in communication strategy, or of miscalculated ideological extremism, is beside the point. By late 1999, Cárdenas had lost the favor of the independents that in 1997 had given him his mayoralty and handed his party the second largest caucus in the lower chamber of Congress.

The basis for determining which of the two major candidates could benefit more from voter coordination among independents and leaners does not rely only upon ideological predispositions. Education and exposure to news media also produce strong differentiated effects in this subsample, as seen in chart 8.

**CHART 8 HERE: Independents and leaners by education**

The long-recognized cleavage between poorly educated and well educated Mexican voters (Ames, 1978) would show up in full strength in the 2000 presidential election. By October, 1999, most college-educated independents and leaners were well ensconced in Fox’s electoral coalition, while most of those with little schooling remained within the PRI’s camp. The same pattern holds for the polar sets of the news media exposure scale, shown in chart 9. The most sophisticated and attentive had gravitated toward Fox, while the least attentive to political news stayed with Labastida.

**CHART 9 HERE: Independents and leaners by media exposure**

Charts 8 and 9 together underscore what would become an important challenge, albeit unacknowledged at the time, for the Labastida campaign, especially in the light of the internal rift within the PRI (which we will argue was grossly underestimated). Between December 1999 and July 2000 Labastida would have to mend fences within his own party and at the same time secure the active allegiance of those independents and leaners inclined in his favor. This would be no easy task, since these voters – given their lower levels of education and sophistication – were tougher to mobilize than the independents and leaners on Fox’s side (Poiré, 2000b; Schlozmann, Verba and Brady, 1996).

To sum up, the evidence presented here suggests that large-scale, spontaneous and sincere voter coordination away from the PRD and towards the PRI and PAN had already taken place by October. The basis for this movement was mostly retrospective, with respect to the abandonment of Cárdenas, and ideological and evaluations of public safety problems in the Federal District, singled out by the news media as his principal failure as mayor. This hypothesis was rejected.
social-demographic, with respect to the direction of voter coordination itself. This finding is in stark contrast to a Coxian interpretation of voter coordination as driven by strategic considerations, and sets the stage for the evaluation of strategic coordination during the general election campaign (Magaloni and Poiré, 2000).

**Divisiveness**

We have shown that the PRD base was in disarray at the time of *Reforma*’s survey. This appears to be the case for PRI partisans as well. The evidence in the model suggests that the primary campaign itself generated a disaffected minority amongst PRI partisans. The primary in effect neutralized the positive influence of being a *priísta* amongst those who did not favor Labastida. This is readily seen in chart 10, where weak and strong partisans from the three corners of the spectrum are shown.\(^{18}\)

**CHART 10 HERE: All partisans by intensity**

The triangle again displays the PRD base drifting away towards Fox and Labastida, with strong partisans less likely to wander. It also shows Fox to be in good shape within his own party (Poiré 2000b), especially so among strong PAN identifiers. However, PRI partisans seem to be in worse shape than *panistas*, more dispersed away from their vertex, and not especially more unified than *perredistas*. More telling still, the chart shows some PRI partisans, both weak and strong, with a greater probability of voting for Fox than for their own candidate. Further, while the distinction between strong and weak partisans works well in explaining differential voting intentions within the PRD and PAN coalitions, this is simply not the case for the PRI. The group of PRI identifiers drifting toward Fox is composed of both weak and strong partisans, the latter indicated in chart 10 with small circles.

This division in the PRI electorate is exactly what we would expect from a divisive primary in the American context, even if the dynamics that generated it are somewhat different. The polarization of candidate positions and campaigns alienates a segment of the party’s electorate, regardless of their intensity of identification, and sets the stage for a later rapprochement between the winner and losers. The fact that the split was produced by the primary itself is highlighted very clearly in chart 11.

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\(^{18}\) When the final model is run excluding the interaction term for PRI partisanship amongst non-Labastida primary voters, the coefficient for the PRI partisan intensity scale is substantially smaller than that of the PRD and PAN scales.
We here show only strong PRI partisans by their intended behavior on primary day. Notice how this, the most committed segment of the PRI electorate, was perfectly split in two by the candidate selection process. Those who favored Labastida, assuming victory in the primary to be within their reach, were absolutely certain of voting for him come election day. But anti-Labastida priístas were in invariably less likely to vote for their own party. Again, this made strong PRI identifiers look dangerously similar to relatively uncommitted independents or leaners. Any strategy to bring them back into the fold would have to take into account that they were driven away by the opposition between their candidate and Labastida himself during the primary campaign.

The primary-induced divide in the PRI’s electorate is clear enough. We need to advance a few hypotheses about the reasons underlying the split. Primary campaigns can bring about ideological or policy issue divisions within a party’s bloc of voters (Gerber and Morton, 1999). Splits can also be rooted in the party’s structural base, in regional or socio-economic divisions (Duverger, 1960). Alternately, cleavages can be the result of a more contextual process, triggered for example by a particular candidate’s leadership or image (Weber, 1920). Finally, splits in a party’s electorate can simply represent power struggles over leadership, candidacies and other valuable resources (Michels, 1940; Poiré, 1999).

The data in our model allow us to cast doubt upon some of these explanations. As chart 12 shows, ideological self-placement by PRI sympathizers is consistent with our expectations of the role of partisanship. The stronger the identification, the more extreme and less diverse the placement of individuals.

However, when we plot the ideology of Labastida and non-Labastida primary voters, it is clear that the divide amongst these camps is not ideological, at least as measured by the left-right scale (see chart 13). The median voter in the Labastida backers’ distribution is identical to that of his rivals’, and the dispersion of both groups is very similar.

This is consistent with the evidence shown in chart 10, where intensity of partisanship does nothing to explain the party split. We also looked at the way in which education, income, age, region, media exposure, gender and several
occupational categories determined PRI partisans’ likelihood of voting for Labastida, but these were all unsuccessful predictors of the cleavage in the party.\textsuperscript{19} This might imply that the negativity of the primary campaigns and evaluations of candidate traits were the most influential forces bringing about the wedge.

It is more likely, though, that candidate traits and campaign effects will have a significant influence when they strike a sensitive chord in the appropriate constituency. Perhaps the PRI primary was above all about how a certain set of rules for candidate selection opened up a major struggle for the party leadership. The legitimacy and authenticity of the experiment was questioned for the duration of the process by outsiders and insiders alike. More importantly, a constant theme in Madrazo’s campaign was about how the primary should be used to bury centralized candidate selection (Estévez and Moreno, 2000). From a theoretical perspective, what this argument would imply is that the primary itself was fought on a single issue, that of internal party democracy. On this issue, Labastida represented the \textit{status quo} at the far right of the spectrum, and Madrazo an alternative to his left. The dynamics of the campaign allowed Madrazo to pull the party’s base as far as he wanted and could achieve toward the center-left, seeking also to attract independents and leaners from other parties. In the end, Madrazo’s failure to win the primary is testimony to the fact that PRI identifiers are not exactly centrist folks on political issues. But in the process, he surely split apart the PRI base.

\textbf{CHART 14 HERE: PRI partisans by intensity}

Chart 14 shows PRI partisans by their responses to a question asking whether they thought the primary was a truly democratic exercise or just a façade that allowed Zedillo to impose his chosen candidate. While the split here is not as robust as that based on primary candidate choice, the chart reveals an important explanatory factor behind the party rift. As already argued, Madrazo backers were in favor of a more democratic party while at the same time questioning the current exercise for its lack of fairness and authenticity. Their frustration would only increase as time went by.

This interpretation is consistent with what happened during the general election campaign after the primary. The Labastida camp was not overly concerned with

\textsuperscript{19} It should be clear to the reader that we are not trying to speculate on the reasons behind the likelihood of voting for Madrazo or Labastida in the primary. These have been explored at length elsewhere (Estévez and Moreno, 2000). What we are focusing on is on why this variable has such an obvious influence on voting intentions in the presidential race.
mending fences symbolically or through political horse-trading with the madracistas, further lowering the value of a Labastida presidency for their future within the PRI. This benign neglect only worsened what had begun in the primary itself, as illustrated by chart 15 below.

CHART 15 HERE: Stakes by voting intention in the primary

The lines indicate the distribution of two types of PRI partisans according to their likelihood of voting for Labastida and for Fox. It demonstrates that madracistas were substantially less convinced of voting for Labastida and more favorably disposed toward Fox than labastidistas. This is the fertile land on which disloyal behavior would flourish a few months ahead. Convinced that a Labastida victory would mean a victory for their party but under a leadership they saw as very hostile to their own interests, these partisans were significantly more likely to stay home or to bolt the party come July 2\textsuperscript{nd}.

Some Implications

This paper is organized around two main ideas, both instrumental in the PRI’s apparently paradoxical defeat in 2000. The first is that sincere voter coordination was significant more than eight months before the presidential election took place. The second is that what many interpret as a successful effort by the PRI in overturning seven decades of autocratic candidate selection was a particularly divisive experience for the ruling party.

This section develops some of the strategic implications of the paper’s findings for the later dynamics of the 2000 campaign.

A great deal of ink has been spilled over the analysis of Fox’s campaign strategies in 2000. Special attention has been paid to his pan-ideological stance and his insistent appeals for the \textit{voto útil} (useful, i.e., strategic vote). Indeed, it is hard to think of another presidential campaign that concentrated two to three months of political messages from one of the major candidates on so arcane a topic as strategic voting. If our research is correct about the early timing of voter

\footnote{We find empirical support for this demobilization effect in recent research by McCann (2000), despite the intention of the author to demonstrate precisely the opposite effect. In Table 4 of his article, McCann derives the probabilities of presidential vote choice by primary choice. The evidence he presents for non-Labastida primary voters shows them to be much more similar in later voting behavior to non-participants than to Labastida backers, especially in their lower probabilities of supporting Labastida in July and higher probabilities of abstaining altogether. Caution is in order, however, since McCann analyzes all primary voters and not the PRI subsample with which we are concerned.}
coordination in Fox’s favor, it is clear that the objective of his later calls for strategic voting should have little to do with finding new, calculating converts to his cause. Much more likely is that the Fox campaign was interested in holding on to already converted voters. Given that leftist ideological spots for the Cárdenas campaign commenced in March, followed by ideological attacks on Fox from Labastida in late April, the Fox team almost certainly dedicated itself to shoring up the cross-partisan (and possibly fickle) sympathies attracted earlier to the candidate.

That earlier voter coordination behind Fox’s candidacy has yet to be explained. The simplicity of Fox’s message, asking voters to kick the bums out, made for an easy sell to opposition sympathizers. But the coincidence of Fox’s rise in popularity with Cárdenas’s separate decline appears to be entirely accidental. Perhaps, alongside the capsizing of the Cárdenas bid, any stratagem from another opposition candidate would have floated to the very top. *Fortuna*, of course, is not a virtue to be sneered at. Nor is it one easy to explain.

On the losing side of the election, luck played no role at all. Only two months after Fox’s inauguration as president and speaking publicly for the first time about the reasons behind his historic defeat, Francisco Labastida offered the following reflection upon the primary:

> If a party’s internal contests are not conducted with a great deal of skill, intelligence [and] judgment, and if the consequences are not properly gauged, fractures are provoked like the one we are still dragging behind us. 21

Labastida certainly blamed the primary for generating a rift within the PRI, and he also blamed it for leaving the party penniless for the first few months of the general campaign. He emphatically criticized the primary as one of the major factors behind his defeat and recommended against keeping this candidate selection method in the future. 22

His reflections are somewhat ironic, since there was no indication from his campaign before election day that his team was even aware of the problem generated by the primary. To the contrary, it was clear after the primary ended that the Labastida camp believed that their landslide victory had created enough

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22 Interestingly enough, the data Labastida cites in support come from *Reforma*’s exit-poll on July 2nd, 2000. He repeats the daily’s claim that 52% of Madrazo’s primary backers reported voting for Fox in the presidential race and argues that those votes, had they remained loyal to the PRI, would have sufficed to turn the presidential election around. What he does not mention, however, is that over 40% of Madrazo’s total support in the primary came from *non-priistas*. 
momentum to ignore the madrastas and their grievances in cavalier fashion and still rack up an easy triumph in July. Labastida’s explanation is not convincing since an important rift generated by the primary, if recognized at that time, would have motivated earnest attempts at rebuilding party unity and constant signals of cooperation between Labastida and his rivals from the primary, especially Madrazo.23

Our research shows that Labastida is right on one count: the primary created a major division within the PRI, one that effectively continues to underlie the struggle for control of the party today. This cleavage cuts across most other distinctions within the party base, including social and demographic factors, region, ideology and intensity of partisanship. Why this development went unrecognized and unattended after the primary remains an open question. But the damage inflicted on Labastida’s presidential bid and on the party after his defeat remained.

The more important insights that our research provides are those related to the theoretical questions with which we began. But by establishing that voter coordination and PRI demobilization affected parts of the Mexican electorate by the second semester of 1999, a series of questions arise about the quality of campaign strategies devised in the primary’s aftermath.

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23 It bears mention that Madrazo, for one, certainly reminded the Labastida faction of his grievances. In late May, for example, after the main losing candidate and Labastida ally in the Tabascan primary for the PRI’s gubernatorial nomination, impugned the results as rigged in favor of Madrazo’s favorite, Madrazo defended the election, saying: “The Tabasco primary was just as democratic as the one held on November 7th.” There was no moral high ground in this factional dispute, but there were durable grievances.
**TABLES**

Table 1

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* n = 2540, m = 5

Table 2

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24 All data in this paper is drawn from Reforma newspaper national face-to-face polls. Except for Chart 1, every other figure and table comes from a poll conducted on October 22-25, 1999.
n = 2540, m = 5
Coefficients in \textit{boldface italics} indicate statistical significance at a 0.10 level.
Model’s predictive efficacy is 79.3\% of all cases in the original sample.
CHARTS

Chart 1
Trends in the Presidential Race

Chart 2
The Mexican Ideological Spectrum in late 1999
Chart 3

Whole Sample

Ideological self-placement

Estévez and Poiré, 2001
Ideological self-placement
Voters by partisanship

PID: Independent

PID: PRI

PID: PAN

PID: PRD

Estévez and Poiré 2001
Chart 4
Stakes by Candidate and Party ID
Chart 5

Chart 6
Independents by ideological placement

Chart 7
PRD leaners and partisans by ideological placement

Chart 8
Chart 9
Independents and leaners by media exposure

Chart 10
Estévez and Poiré 2001

P(vote Fox)

Weak Partisans
Strong Partisans

P(vote Cárdenas)

P(vote Labastida)

All partisans by intensity

Chart 11
Estévez and Poiré 2001

Strong PRI partisans by primary vote

Chart 12
Ideological self-placement
PRI Partisans by intensity

Chart 13

Estévez and Poiré 2001
Chart 14

Ideological self-placement
PRI Partisans by primary vote

Estévez and Poiré 2001
Chart 15
Stakes by Voting Intention in the Primary
Density score

PRI partisans and leaners, Estévez and Poiré 2001

- $P(v(Fox))$, Labastida voter
- $P(v(Lab))$, Labastida voter
- $P(v(Fox))$, non Labastida voter
- $P(v(Lab))$, non Labastida voter
### Variable Name and Coding

- **Vote**: Vote Choice in Presidential Election (Labastida PRI, Fox PAN, Cárdenas PRD)
- **Age**: Age in years
- **Education**: Formal education (None, elementary, junior - high, high school, college or more)
- **Income**: Household income scale
- **Media Exp.**: Media Exposure - 12 point scale
- **North**: North Region
- **Left-Right**: Left - Right Ideological self-placement
- **PRI ID**: PRI ID scale (Independent, Leanser, Weak, Strong)
- **PRI non-Lab**: PRI ID scale for non-Labastida primary voters (PRI ID * madflo)
- **PAN ID**: PAN ID scale
- **PRD ID**: PRD ID scale
- **Stakes**: Candidate thermometer differential (1st - 2nd choice)
- **Disapprove**: Disapproves of Zedillo’s performance as president
- **Church goer**: Goes to church at least once a week
- **Exit**: Would stay home or vote against PRI candidate if own favorite not winner
- **Madflo**: Did not plan to vote for Labastida in the PRI primary
- **Demo primary**: Thought PRI primary was an authentic democratic exercise

### Table A2

**Multinomial Logit Model on List-wise Deleted Datasets**

| Variable   | Coefficient/Std Err | P>|t| | Coefficient/Std Err | P>|t| |
|------------|----------------------|-----|----------------------|-----|
| Age        | 0.0002/0.01          | 0.979 | 0.0319/0.01          | 0.001 |
| Education  | -0.2723/-0.10        | 0.007 | -0.0635/0.13         | 0.623 |
| Income     | 0.0230/0.07          | 0.742 | -0.1510/0.09         | 0.090 |
| Media Exp. | -0.0748/-0.04        | 0.044 | -0.0858/0.05         | 0.066 |
| North      | 0.4796/0.23          | 0.022 | 0.2259/0.27          | 0.407 |
| Left-Right | 0.0572/0.03          | 0.087 | -0.0443/0.04         | 0.281 |
| PRI ID     | 1.5557/0.23          | 0.000 | 0.0991/0.36          | 0.784 |
| PRI non-Lab| -0.9945/-0.23        | 0.000 | -0.0367/0.36         | 0.919 |
| PAN ID     | -1.2503/-0.16        | 0.000 | -1.1454/0.21         | 0.000 |
| PRD ID     | 0.2480/0.22          | 0.251 | 1.4967/0.19          | 0.000 |
| Stakes     | 0.0744/0.04          | 0.079 | 0.0368/0.05          | 0.491 |
| Disapprove | -0.7538/-0.22        | 0.001 | -0.3177/0.26         | 0.227 |
| Church goer| 0.2200/0.20          | 0.264 | -0.2475/0.25         | 0.325 |
| Exit       | -0.8418/-0.20        | 0.000 | 0.1504/0.25          | 0.546 |
| Constant term | 1.1186/0.57   | 0.050 | -0.6048/0.72         | 0.400 |

n = 1172  
Initial Log - likelihood = -1183.1192  
Pseudo R2 = 0.4677  
Final Log - likelihood = -629.7158
Coefficients in *boldface italics* indicate statistical significance at a 0.10 level.