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Political Determinants of Mass Attitudes Toward Globalization and State Retrenchment in Latin America*

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1- Introduction

Latin America experienced a profound economic transformation during the last decades. Most countries in the region abandoned Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies led by heavy state intervention for a set of “neoliberal” economic policies, including privatization, macroeconomic stabilization, and trade openness.¹ The impact of the reforms in terms of economic growth and social welfare has not been as positive as was promised by Latin American policy makers.² Even though the results of these economic policies vary considerably across the region, economic growth remains elusive (Krugman, 1998; Easterly, 2002; Graham and Pettinato, 2003; Lora, Panizza, and Quispe-Agnoli, 2003). The decade of the debt crisis was disastrous, and despite significant economic reform in most countries, growth has remained sluggish. Moreover, as shown in figure 1, countries that had outstanding growth rates in the mid-1960s and 1970s—before the initiation of the reforms—had the hardest time in the 1990s. Not surprisingly, in recent years left-wing politicians have run successful campaigns based on anti-neoliberal platforms.

[Figure 1 about here]

¹ For details of the policies and specific case studies see, among others, Smith et al., (1994), Edwards (1995), IDB-1997 Economic Report (1997), Costin and Vanolli (1998), Lora (2001), Stokes (2001), and Lora and Panizza (2002).

² Some studies that argue that market reforms in Latin America have had a modest though positive impact on growth see Lora and Barrera (1997), Shirley and Walsh (2000), Stallings and Peres (2000), Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderon (2002).

Our goal in this paper is to account for cross-sectional variation in mass attitudes towards neoliberal economic policies in Latin America. We rely on macroeconomic data and a region wide survey conducted by *Mori International* in 1998 in twelve countries.³ Through factor analysis we reduce the survey questions to two meaningful dimensions of neoliberalism, globalization and state retrenchment. Then, using these factor scores as dependent variables, we identify the relevant variables determining citizens' preferences for these two dimensions of market reforms. Our results can account for the fact that the biggest battles in Latin America today are related to the privatization of state owned industries and services, such as gas in Bolivia, electricity and oil in Mexico, or pension and health care reform everywhere, and not so much trade liberalization. In fact, we find rather high levels of support to neoliberalism on the grounds of trade reform and much more opposition to state retrenchment.

We seek to contribute to the existing comparative literature on mass attitudes in two main respects. First, most scholars have focused on the way in which individuals' socio-demographic characteristics translate into support or opposition to trade openness (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2001; Beaulieu, 2002; and Baker, 2003 and 2005). Instead, we seek to assess whether support for globalization and state retrenchment is significantly shaped by politics and political legacies. We ask if mass attitudes toward these policies have a partisan ingredient in terms of citizens' left-right

³ We are grateful to Miguel Basáñez who generously shared the data with us. The countries in our sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela (N=9,975). We excluded Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Panama because significant information on our independent variables was missing for these countries. The survey also included the United States, although we did include this case in the analysis.

positioning, a widely studied topic for advanced economies (Garrett, 1998; Oatley, 1999; Boix, 2000), but scarcely researched for Latin America. We also explore if a country's political legacy –in its particular, experience with a strong labor-based party during the post-war era (Murillo, 2001 and Levitsky 1999 and 2003)– shapes individuals' preferences for economic policies. We expect to find more opposition toward neoliberalism in countries with labor-based party legacy and deeper experience with Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies.

Second, we assess the way in which economic performance affects individuals' preferences toward globalization and state retrenchment. Because economic growth has been disappointing, a myopic retrospective model that asks “what have the reforms done for me lately?” would fail to predict the high support for neoliberal economic policies we observe. Following Stokes (2003), we claim that individuals' assessments of the reforms are constructed according to a more complex learning process where they contrast the economic situation after the enactment of the reforms with the era of recession that triggered the enactment of the reforms in the first place.

The paper unfolds as follows: first, we review the relevant literature on the determinants of citizens' preferences for globalization and state retrenchment and present our hypotheses; second, we present the basic opinions to be analyzed; third, we develop and test our hypotheses on the determinants of support for neoliberal policies; at the end, we state our conclusions.

2- Existing research on support for neoliberal reforms and our hypotheses

There exists a growing literature on citizens' support for neoliberal reforms.⁴ In this section, we review the existing literature explaining attitudes toward neoliberal policies in Latin American and present our hypotheses.

Social cleavages

Most of the literature on mass attitudes toward globalization focuses on social cleavages. The classic work draws from the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, which predicts that a country's abundant factor (labor/capital/land) should support globalization (Rogowski, 1989).⁵ An alternative model, the human capital model, focuses on individuals' skills. High-skilled individuals are more capable of adapting to increased risks associated with international exposure and changing economic opportunities that come with openness. Becker (2003) argues that firms that face declining demand will retain highly skilled employees, while laying-off unskilled labor. A third alternative model is the Ricardo-Viner model, which focuses on sectors. The model assumes that factors can't move across sectors and that a sector that has a competitive advantage will benefit from free trade, while those employed in the disadvantaged sector will suffer.

⁴ The existence of region wide public opinion polls, such as the one we utilize in this paper by *Mori International* and the *Latinobarometro* surveys have helped to assess citizens' position on this issue. There are also works drawing upon specific countries, such as Kaufman and Zuckermann (1998) on Mexico, Stokes (1996) on Peru (1996), Baker (2003) on Brazil, Graham and Pettinato (2003) on Peru, among others. Stokes' (2001) seminal study on policy switching in Latin America during the neoliberal era makes extensive use of public opinion surveys. So does Weyland (1998).

⁵ For simplicity, we omit land as a relevant factor, although the model also provides predictions as to whether the relevant cleavage is land/capital or land/labor. The limitations of our survey, with not enough representation in the country-side, preclude us from testing this possibility more systematically.

Gabel (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), Scheve (2000), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Anderson and Tverdova (2000) and Kramer, Stephenson and Lange (2000) apply these insights to study preferences toward free trade in Europe and the US. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find widespread skepticism among US citizens about globalization. They also demonstrate that these policy preferences cut most strongly across labor-market skills and not across sectors such that less-skilled workers are much more likely to oppose freer trade than their more-skilled counterparts. Less-skilled US workers, they argue, have seen sharp declines in their wages relative to more-skilled workers as a result of globalization. Mayda and Rodrik (2001) report similar results in a study of surveys conducted in 23 Western countries. Hiscox (2003) finds much lower opposition to free trade in the US after using a different question wording. These studies coincide, however, in that the “core opposition to trade liberalization in the OECD economies emanates from less educated or less skilled, blue-collar workers” (Hiscox, 2003: 1).

The predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model and the human capital model are the same for the case of Europe and the US, where the abundant factor is skilled labor. In these countries, low-skilled workers are the scarce factor and should suffer from globalization. However, in Latin America the abundant factor is unskilled labor which means that the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model would predict that skilled workers in the region should oppose free trade, while low skilled workers should favor it. By contrast, the human capital model asserts that low skilled workers should oppose trade liberalization. Selligson (1999) and Wood (1997) find empirical evidence of a positive relation between skill endowment and free-trade approval in Latin America.

In this paper we put to test these theories. To measure skill endowment, we employ alternative methods commonly utilized: education, income and various occupational categories. The Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson model would predict support for globalization from less educated workers and from poorer Latin Americans. By contrast, the human capital model would predict more support for globalization from higher educated workers and richer people. We also employ broader occupational categories, including the self-employed, professionals, and the unemployed, to assess cleavages for free trade and state retrenchment.

Economic Performance

Given that the main intended goal of the neoliberal reforms, at least from the perspectives of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, was to improve Latin American nations' shattered economies, we should expect a strong relation between the level of support for these policies and economic performance (Williamson, 1990 and 1998; Edwards, 1995; Iglesias, 1998).

There is an extensive literature that studies the relationship between economic performance and support for neoliberal reforms that can be classified into three. The first is the naïve economic voting model, which argues that poor economic conditions will lead voters to reject the status quo. This model predicts that individuals will oppose neoliberal reforms if the economy is deteriorating and that they will support these reforms if the economy improves. However, because economic growth in the nineties was disappointing almost all over Latin America, a myopic retrospective model that asks "what have the reforms done for me lately?" would fail to predict the high support for

neoliberal reforms obtained in our survey –e.g., 85 percent reported to support free trade in our survey. Do citizens fail to evaluate these policies on the basis of their impact on economic performance?

The second vision is Weyland's (1998), who employs prospect theory to argue that Latin American voters will support risky neoliberal reforms when they are in the "realm of losses" –namely as they confront economic recession and hyperinflation. Weyland (1998) might be right about the effect of the economic crisis in triggering the *initiation* of neoliberal reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see also Edwards, 1995 and Iglesias, 1998). But the issue at stake in the late 1990s was not whether to initiate a risky economic reform program, but rather to continue to support or turn against it. We thus believe that voters require some reassurance that the reforms are working to continue to support them, although hyperinflation might certainly continue to convince them to turn in favor of budget cutbacks.

The third view is Stokes (1996 and 2000), who argues that voters assess the reforms on the basis of their impact on the economy but in a far more complex manner than that proposed by the naive economic voting model. She posits four alternative modes of reaction to economic deterioration according to whether voters remain optimistic or pessimistic about the future and whether they support or oppose the reforms. Despite a current deterioration in economic performance, voters might continue to support the reforms behaving according to an *intertemporal* voting model where they remain optimistic about the future because they expect things to improve after a temporal decline in economic conditions. Note that the *intertemporal* model generates empirical predictions akin to Weyland's (1998) argument based on prospect theory, although the

logic supporting those predictions is different. In the *intertemporal* model, current economic deterioration generates support for the reforms because it signals that good things lie ahead, whereas in prospect theory current economic deterioration leads voters to embrace the risky reforms because it puts them in the realm of losses. Thus, in the *intertemporal* model, support for the reforms largely hinges on their credibility; in prospect theory, it is based on higher risk propensities caused by economic crisis.

An alternative mode of voter reaction, according to Stokes (1999 and 2003), is the *exonerating* model, where voters support the reforms despite the current economic deterioration because they blame an alternative set of policies for their current economic misery.⁶ Key to this framework is how voters derive their evaluations of the alternatives. To evaluate the alternatives, voters are likely to consider their past political experiences. In this case, to evaluate the neoliberal reforms we argue that voters will consider the performance of the economy prior to the enactment of the reforms and will turn in favor of them if they assess that things were worse then than after the reforms.

Thus our hypotheses about how economic performance shapes support for neoliberal reforms combines insights from these theories. We claim that voters turn in favor or against the different policy dimensions of neoliberalism for different reasons. Inflation influences decisions to support or oppose state retrenchment, while growth and unemployment are more decisive in influencing decisions to support globalization. We claim that high inflation rates will lead voters to embrace neoliberal reforms, and in

⁶ A third model is the *distributional* model, which posits that voters punish the incumbent despite their optimism about the future because they seek to manifest solidarity with other voter groups that have been hurt by the economic reforms. The fourth mode of voter reaction is the conventional economic voting model.

particular state retrenchment, as a remedy for economic mismanagement. To test for this hypothesis, we employ average inflation rates of the period 1995-1997 to better capture inflationary spurs. The higher the inflation rate, the more support for state retrenchment we expect. These arguments are consistent with the predictions of prospect theory.

However, we depart from this approach in predicting a negative relationship between economic recession and support for neoliberal reforms. By 1998, when our survey was collected, voters in Latin America had experienced an average of seven years with market-oriented reforms. Our view is that voters need some reassurance that these reforms are working to continue to support them. Thus, if there is high unemployment or the reforms have failed to generate some form of recovery, voters will turn against them. To test for this hypothesis, we employ the difference in the average growth rate in the period 1990-1997 and the average growth rate during the 1980s. The deeper the economic recession that triggered the enactment of these reforms in the first place *and* the higher the economic recovery, the stronger voter support for neoliberal policies we predict. These arguments are consistent with the *exonerating* model.

With respect to unemployment, we follow Stokes (1999 and 2003) in arguing that voters are generally unforgiving when jobs are being lost. We expect to find strong opposition to neoliberalism, and in particular to globalization, as unemployment increases. To test for this argument, we use the survey's item for self-reported unemployment. This behavior is consistent with the economic voting model.

Figure 2 presents these hypotheses graphically. Preferences for neoliberal policies are a combination of relative growth rates (average growth rates in the 1990s relative to the 1980s) and current inflation (average rates 1995-1997) and unemployment. We predict

strong support for neoliberal policies where the reforms have succeeded in generating high growth rates in the 1990s, relative to the 1980s, and where they are still perceived as necessary to control inflation. Economic growth and the expansion of jobs give credibility to the reforms, whereas inflation makes them still necessary to achieve macroeconomic stability. High growth and low inflation should translate into milder support for neoliberal economic policies. This combination implies that since macroeconomic stabilization has been achieved, individuals will be tempted to switch to a set of less orthodox economic policies. Low inflation and low growth is the worst combination in terms support for neoliberal economic policies. Here the reforms have failed to generate economic recovery and there is no inflation in the present moment to justify the continued use of orthodox policies. When there is low growth in the 1990s, relative to the 1980s, and high inflation we expect to see milder opposition to neoliberal economic policies. Here reforms are perceived as necessary to control inflation, but they are not credible because they have failed to generate growth. If there is unemployment, we predict strong opposition to these policies regardless of growth and inflation rates.

[Figure 2 about here]

Citizens might experience some form of fatigue of the reform effort. To us, reform fatigue means that independent of performance, people should turn against reforms because of the simple passing of time or because reforms have advanced too far. We thus interpret the term reform fatigue in a much narrower sense than previous works (Lora and Panizza, 2002 and Lora, Panizza, and Quispe-Agnoli, 2003). To test for this

hypothesis of reform fatigue, we control for the years elapsed since the economic reforms first began. If there is some form of reform fatigue independent of economic performance, we should find a negative coefficient for years of reform.

Partisanship and political legacies

In many Latin American countries, candidates of the left in many la countries are becoming quite critical of neoliberal economic policies. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez managed to get elected on an anti-neoliberal message. Nestor Kirchner won the presidency in Argentina campaigning against the neoliberal model and the “disastrous” effects of the IMF-imposed policies. Evo Morales in Bolivia campaigned as representing the “victims of neoliberalism”. In Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez also argued that neoliberal reforms had brought “disaster” to his country. Do voters who support left-wing candidates also reject neoliberal economic policies? Do individuals who support right-wing parties endorse these policies?

For Western European countries, Cameron’s (1978) seminal work demonstrated that economic policies responded to the partisan composition of the government: left-wing governments increased the size of government, and right-wing governments reduced it. These partisan differences have remained even after economies became more internationalized (Garrett, 1995; Oatley, 1999; and Boix 2000). Research for the Latin American region on this issue has lagged behind the literature for advanced industrial democracies.

In Latin American, the translation of partisanship into attitudes toward economic policies is far more complex than in Europe. Presidents leading populist labor-based

parties⁷ came to power in Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela in the 1980s and once in office advanced trade liberalization and state retrenchment. These presidents carried out the most important policy turnaround of the postwar era, the dismantling of state led-growth and embracement of neoliberalism. These policies challenged the long-term alliance with their parties' constituencies, most notably labor unions (Murillo, 2001). In a context of economic uncertainty, high inflation and rising unemployment, some of the traditional basis of support of these labor-based parties supported the economic reforms. Stokes (2001) presents convincing evidence of the lack of connection between electoral mandates and incumbents' behavior in office. Her research also points out that citizens' support of neoliberal policies is constructed *ex post*, conditional on the economic effects of those policies. Remmer (2003) also inquires into whether incumbents are punished if reforms do not deliver the expected results.

We should thus find a complex translation of partisanship into attitudes toward neoliberalism. Left-wing voters should oppose neoliberal reforms, but if the president is from their party *and* voters approve of the way he is handling the economy, this will *mitigate* their opposition to neoliberal reforms. This might partly explain why, for example, presidents Carlos Salinas in Mexico and Carlos Menem in Argentina managed to implement far-reaching market reforms despite the fact that their constituencies were left-wing. Our view is not that these parties' supporters just mimicked the policy positions of their presidents, but that their approval of them moderated their opposition to neoliberalism.

⁷ For a definition of labor-based parties see Murillo (2001) and Levitsky (1999 and 2003).

Figure 3 shows how presidential approval interacts with partisanship in shaping preferences toward neoliberal policies. We expect strong support for neoliberal policies when there is high presidential approval and the voter is right-wing. Here support for neoliberal reforms stems both from performance and ideology. The strongest opposition to neoliberal reforms should come from left-wing voters who disapprove of the president. Moderate level of support to neoliberal policies is expected from left-wing voters who approve of the president and from right-wing voters who disapprove of the president.

[Figure 3 about here]

Figure 3 also provides some examples of the joint effects of partisanship and presidential approval on preferences toward neoliberalism. For example, Mexican PRI supporters, in relative terms, stood to the left on the dimension of government retrenchment and were not strong supporters of globalization (Magaloni, 1997). However, PRI presidents since at least Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1985), but particularly Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), stand out in the region as some of the key champions of the neoliberal paradigm, including a deeper integration of the Mexican economy with the US through NAFTA. In our view, PRI supporters might oppose neoliberalism on ideological grounds, but since Mexican presidents advocating neoliberalism were *Priístas*, presidential approval mitigated opposition to neoliberal policies by PRI supporters (see also Kaufman and Zuckermann, 1998). This means that PRI voters during the Salinas presidency should advocate neo-liberal policies on the grounds of their performance. However, the peso crisis of 1994 led voters to evaluate

President Zedillo very poorly during the first three years of his administration. PRI voters in this period should oppose neo-liberal reforms on the grounds of ideology *and* performance. The same logic applies to Argentine *peronist* voters: on ideological grounds, they were on the left and against neo-liberal reforms. However, high approval of President Carlos Menem during his first term in office mitigated these voters' dislikes toward neoliberalism, to become more pronounced as his approval collapsed during his second term.

Existing research on partisanship and voters' evaluations of neoliberal reforms is far from conclusive. Panizza and Yañez (2003) employ individuals' self-reported ideology to assess this question. They demonstrate that citizens in the upper levels of a ten point scale going from left to right were more likely to support neoliberal reforms, although they find no evidence that those in the mid and lower scale reject neoliberal policies. However, the meaning of the 10-point left-right ideological scale for predicting policy divisions has been called into question in the Latin American context (Zechmeister, 2002). Our research explicitly tests the partisan hypothesis by using *reported voting intentions* in our survey. At the time the survey was collected, 41% manifested supporting one of the three main parties in Congress and 59% did not like any of these parties or were independent. Using the *Database of Political Institutions* (DPI) we coded these parties as left, right or center. 29 percent of the respondents reported supporting a left-center party and 13 percent a right-wing one. The appendix provides the list of parties and presidents and their classification in the left-right scale.

Furthermore, political parties should also shape preferences toward economic policies indirectly, by the way in which they shape political institutions, political culture, and the

history of economic policy. Parties, in other words, should have country-level effects, in addition to individual-level effects. Countries with a history of strong labor-based parties governing during prolonged periods in the post-war era have inherited political institutions and cultures that are more supportive of protectionism and state intervention than those prevailing in countries where similar parties did not exist. Countries with labor-based parties have also followed more intensive ISI policies, which generated stronger interest groups capable of resisting neoliberal reforms (Roberts, forthcoming). Thus, *ceteris paribus*, we expect to find more resistance toward neoliberal policies where strong labor-based parties have existed and where industrialization during the era of ISI progressed more.

Figure 4 summarizes these arguments, placing the countries in our sample according to whether they had a labor-based party and whether they became highly industrialized during ISI. Where there is a strong labor-based party legacy and high industrialization, we expect more opposition to globalization and state retrenchment. Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Venezuela fit this characterization. Where there is a strong labor-based party legacy and lower industrialization, we expect milder opposition to neoliberal reforms. Peru fits this category. We expect strong support for neoliberal policies where there is no labor-based party legacy and ISI industrialization policies were not as profound such that there is moderate industrialization. Central American countries and Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay fit here. Finally, we expect moderate levels of support in countries with no labor-based party legacy and high industrialization. Brazil fits here.

[Figure 4 about here]

3. Dependent variables

We explore attitudes toward the two dimensions of neoliberal reforms: globalization—measured by free-trade—and state retrenchment—measured by attitudes toward privatization. In the following paragraphs we describe these variables.

Globalization (Free-trade)

On the globalization dimension, we focus on citizens' attitudes toward free-trade. As we report in table 1, the overwhelming majority of the sample (78 percent) supported free-trade. There is, however, some variation among public attitudes by country. There exist considerable support for free-trade in Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala and Costa Rica. The least convinced about free-trade are Paraguayans and citizens of some of the largest economies of the region: Mexico, Argentina and Chile.⁸ The rankings of Paraguay and Venezuela are unexpected. Opposition to free trade in Paraguay is probably explained by the fact that trade liberalization was more recent in this country.

[Table 1 about here]

Countries' ranking almost replicates when citizens are questioned about their attitudes toward a free-trade zone in the Americas, although the overall support is reduced 9 points, to 69% (Table 2).

⁸ Tables 1-3 present information for countries which are out of the sample we utilize for our regression analysis.

[Table 2 about here]

High support for globalization in 1998—when polls were conducted—is partially explained by the explosion of free-trade agreements in the region. In South America the Mercosur was signed in 1991 by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela and later updated in 1994. The Andean Community of Nations (CAN) established a full free-trade zone in 1993 for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.⁹ Finally, the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among Canada, the United States, and Mexico became effective in 1994.

State size (Privatization)

The second dimension of neoliberal reforms that we analyze is attitudes toward privatization. The survey asked respondents to tell which of the following list of activities should be the property of the government and which of the private sector: oil, electricity, airlines, mines, schools, telephones, water, TV, health care, and pensions. To present the data in a concise manner, table 3 shows two indexes constructed with these variables. The first reflects the extent of government involvement in key industries, and includes all of these variables but schools, pensions, and health care (alpha 0.89). The index ranges from -7 (meaning that all key industries should belong to the government) to 7 (meaning that all should belong to the private sector). The second index reflects the extent of

⁹ The Community goes back to 1969 when the Cartagena Agreement was signed. Other countries, such as Peru and Chile, have joined in and out the CAN.

government control of basic services (alpha 0.80); it ranges from -3 to 3. The table reports both the mean and standard deviations of the indexes by country.

[Table 3 about here]

The average respondent was rather centrist on her attitudes toward government involvement in key industries, and stood more to the left on extent of government involvement in key social services. There is some variation among countries over these indexes. First consider government involvement in key industries. Excluding the United States' public, which is a clear outlier here and markedly to the right of the spectrum, the publics of Ecuador, Paraguay, Bolivia and Guatemala are the only ones for which their mean positions on this index are positive, meaning that they slightly favor private over public control over these industries. The publics in all the other countries, and particularly those of Chile, Dominican Republic and Mexico, in that order, prefer more government involvement in key industries. All over the continent, people prefer that the government controls and organizes basic services such as health, education and pensions. Colombians, Ecuadorians and Venezuelans appear to be slightly more centrist than the rest, favoring mixed control (private/public).

To sum up, there is considerable support for free trade in the region, and less so for privatization, an issue which generates more polarization. With respect to government involvement in key sectors, we find a rather centrist electorate, which tends to favor mixed property over these industries. In the sections below, we analyze these preferences in a systematic way.

4- Modeling preferences for globalization and state retrenchment

In this section, we inquire into the determinants of preferences toward globalization and state retrenchment. We proceed in three sequential steps. First, we reduce by factor analysis the relevant variables in the survey data to some common dimensions on neoliberalism. To maximize the number of observations in our sample, we imputed the missing data, country by country, using *Amelia* (Honaker et al., 2001; King et al., 2001).¹⁰ Once we had our imputed databases (five in total), we then average them to get our final database.¹¹

Second, given that scores from factor analysis cannot be interpreted in a straightforward way, we transform the resultant factor scores for every individual into standardized values using a normal distribution (i.e. zscores) on the basis of the mean and standard deviation of the sample; thus, we are assessing the distance of every individual in sample to the regional average measured in standard deviations.¹² Third, we utilize those standardized factor scores as dependent variables of our regression analysis.

¹⁰ See *Appendix A* for details of the imputation method.

¹¹ Ideally we would have ran our regressions using the five datasets generated by *Amelia* using *Clarify*—which estimates coefficients and standard errors accounting for the uncertainty generated from the imputed observations. However, grouping data by clusters (countries in our models) significantly reduces our degrees of freedom. This circumstance has an effect on the estimation of the F-statistic when the degrees of freedom are smaller than the number of independent variables. Since there are several hypotheses we are testing, we required a number of variables bigger than the number of clusters. *Stata* can compute the OLS regression in this circumstances, although, it cannot estimate the F-statistic, which does not concern us, since estimations with fewer variables in the model report a significant F-statistic and increasing the number of variables in the model cannot reduce its significance level. *Clarify*, however, cannot estimate the regression parameters since the matrix is not positive definite. We, therefore, decided to average the five *Amelia* datasets into a single one.

¹² For every individual i in sample: $(x_i - \mu_{\text{sample}}) / SD_{\text{sample}}$.

The factor analysis we performed produced two different dimensions that we labeled globalization and state retrenchment.¹³ The first factor considers the two questions related to free-trade reported in the previous section plus some retrospective evaluations on the effects of trade. The state retrenchment factor includes the battery of ten different economic activities presented in table 3 where interviewees were asked for their preference of government, private or mixed ownership.¹⁴

Figure 5 shows countries' averages in these two dimensions. The horizontal dimension reflects attitudes toward state retrenchment and the vertical dimension attitudes toward globalization. Only the average respondent of countries in the upper-right quadrant support neoliberal policies in *both* of its two dimensions (Colombia and Costa Rica, which is an outlier on both dimensions, markedly in support of neoliberalism). The upper-left quadrant reflects, in relative terms, support for globalization but opposition to more government retrenchment (Brazil, Guatemala, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile). The lower left quadrant reflects opposition to *both* of the dimensions of neoliberalism (Venezuela, Panama, Mexico, and Argentina). There is only one country in the lower right quadrant, Paraguay, which on relative terms shows more support for government retrenchment but strong opposition to globalization.

[Figure 5 about here]¹⁵

¹³ Correlation between factors is -.003.

¹⁴ See *Appendix B* for the details of variables and factors' output. .

¹⁵ To facilitate the graph view, we omit Costa Rica, located at (2.5,0.68).

The next step in our analysis is to explore the determinants of public attitudes toward globalization and state retrenchment. To explain citizens' attitudes we employ the factor scores described above as dependent variables. Table 4 shows the results of our regression models for globalization and the size of government. The models consider four sets of independent variables: economic performance, partisanship, reforms progress, and respondents' sociodemographic characteristics. In the next sections we discuss our results.

[Table 4 about here]

a) Effects of Economic Performance and inflation

Results in table 4 support our hypotheses of how economic growth and inflation translate into support to neoliberal policies. The higher the average rates of inflation in 1995-97 and the higher the growth rate in the 1990s, relative to the 1980s, the more citizens support globalization. For the state retrenchment dimension, only inflation is statistically significant, however. To interpret the results, Figure 6¹⁶ shows the standardized marginal changes of GDP and inflation over preference for globalization assigning their extreme values—i.e., values for the best and worst performers in our sample in terms of per capita growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. Note that the axes scale being standardized implies that the mean values are at (0,0) and all distances in the graph are measured in standard deviations.

¹⁶ The effect of the marginal changes is normalized: [(what considering the marginal change) – (regression at its mean)] / (Standard deviation of the factor score). Thus, the mean=0 and the SD=1.

[Figure 6 about here]

If a voter lives in a country showing the best performance record, he shows twice as much support for globalization than if his country grew like the worst performer. The effect of inflation is positive both for globalization and state retrenchment but the magnitude of the effect on state retrenchment is almost 20 times bigger. We thus conclude that neoliberalism, on its dimension of state retrenchment, is quite sensitive to inflation and in the expected way. By contrast, support for globalization is almost completely shaped by its ability to generate economic recovery. Our results thus do not support Baker (2003), who concludes that support for free trade is not determined by economic performance. Baker uses per capita growth of the current year and finds, instead, that the *less* a country grew, the *more* voters supported free trade. Panizza and Yañez (2003) and Graham and Pettinato (2003) also contradict Baker (2003). The first study finds that economic growth, measured as the gap between actual GDP and trend GDP, is positively correlated with citizens' approval of market policies. The second one finds tentative evidence of yearly economic growth being positively related to approval for market reforms.

Thus, our results on growth and inflation provide support for Weyland (1998) but only partially. If there is high inflation, voters support state retrenchment, which is seen as a solution to macroeconomic mismanagement. However, our results contradict the notion that economic crisis increases support for neoliberal reform –if the economy is not growing, relative to the 1980s, voters turn against globalization. The regressions control

for the year in which the reform were first enacted. The more time elapsed since the initiation of the reform, the less voters support these policies. The effect of this variable is substantial, particularly on the government retrenchment dimension.

b) Partisanship, presidential approval and populist legacies

We find strong support for our hypotheses of how partisanship and presidential approval shape preferences for state retrenchment and globalization. Left-wing voters oppose neoliberal reforms, but if their party is in control of the presidency, this *mitigates* their opposition to the reforms. To interpret the magnitude of these results, Figure 7 shows the standardized marginal changes of presidential approval and partisanship over preference for globalization and state retrenchment. As the figure shows, voters' issue positions are simultaneously shaped by presidential approval and their own partisan predispositions. The more voters approved of the way the president was handling the economy, the more they supported globalization and the magnitude of the effect is substantial. However, the more a voter approved of the president, the *less* he supports state retrenchment, although the magnitude of this effect is quite small. These results imply that preferences for globalization have a stronger retrospective component –these policies are evaluated on the basis of their performance –while preferences for state retrenchment are significantly more ideological.

[Figure 7 about here]

Differences between right and left-wing voters are quite strong on the dimension of state retrenchment and marginal on the globalization dimension. These results allow us to conclude that there has emerged some form of social consensus among the *parties* in Latin America that globalization might be here to stay – provided, of course, that it is able to generate some economic recovery. However, when it comes to fine-tuning the size of the government and its involvement in key industries and services such as oil, gas, pensions, schools, and health care, there are considerable partisan differences. Those voting for left-wing parties strongly oppose state retrenchment, and those voting for right-wing parties favor it. These results also explain why the biggest conflicts with respect to neoliberalism today are related to the privatization of state owned industries, services, pensions and health care rather than trade liberalization.

To further inquire into the joint effect of presidential approval and partisanship on support for globalization and state-retrenchment, figure 7 also presents results of simulations of our model for four types of hypothetical voters: two left-wing voters and two right-wing voters that differ in terms of their approval of the president. The results of these simulations lend considerable credence to our hypotheses: if a left-wing voter disapproves of the president, her predicted issues positions on the neoliberal dimension fall in the lower-left quadrant, opposing *both* globalization and state-retrenchment. If the same left-wing voter approves of the president, her issue positions fall in the upper-right quadrant, in support of globalization, but in opposition to government retrenchment. Thus, left-wing voters do not give neoliberal presidents from their own party a blank check: they endorse globalization policies but oppose government retrenchment. These results can thus make sense of why presidents elected under the label of left-wing or

populist parties, such as Carlos Menem or Ernesto Zedillo, found more resistance from their own parties to policies of state retrenchment than to trade liberalization policies. Only right-wing voters who approve of the president support *both* dimensions of neoliberalism. Right-wing voter who disapprove of the president support state retrenchment but oppose globalization policies.

A final result that confirms our hypothesis is that citizens in countries with a history of strong labor-parties in government during the ISI era are markedly less likely to support globalization and state retrenchment and the effects are substantial. Furthermore, as expected, the opposition is stronger where ISI progressed the most, as measured by the levels of industrialization in the 1970s.

c) Social cleavages

Our final set of results relate to social cleavages. The coefficients in our regression demonstrate that men, high income and high-skilled individuals favor globalization and state retrenchment. Women, low-skilled individuals, and the unemployed oppose these policies. The finding that sectors of low educational attainment oppose trade liberalization is consistent with what most comparative studies find for Europe and the US as well (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2001; Beaulieu, 2002). Figure 8 presents the standardized coefficients for these variables.

[Figure 8 about here]

Unfortunately, the survey data does not allow us to further disaggregate white and blue collar workers by sector and identify those most at risk among the employed. Yet that the unemployed oppose globalization supports the contention that risk is a decisive factor in explaining opposition to globalization everywhere (see Rodrik, 1998; Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Mares, 2003).

5. Conclusions

In this paper we have analyzed mass preferences for globalization and state retrenchment in Latin America. These policies have been implemented during the last two decades with mixed results. We find surprising high levels of support for globalization and strong opposition to state retrenchment.

We demonstrated that economic performance shapes voters' support for neoliberal reforms. Latin American voters have learned to evaluate these reforms taking into account a long term perspective. The sharper the economic recession in the 1980s triggering the economic reforms and the stronger the economic recovery in the 1990s, the more voters support these reforms. Voters also observe the inflation rate. If macroeconomic stability has been achieved, voters no longer support further state retrenchment. But if inflation is out of control, voters turn to neoliberal reforms as a solution to macroeconomic mismanagement.

We also find that partisanship matters, but in slightly different ways than in advanced industrial democracies. Similar to what happens in OECD countries, Latin American voters who support left-wing parties oppose globalization and state retrenchment and right-wing voters support these policies. However, because left-wing presidents in Latin

America have tended to switch their party platforms, advocating pro-market policies upon assuming office (Stokes, 2001), voters who support these presidents have also switched their policy positions conditional on the performance of these polices. If a left-wing voter approves of the incumbent president, most likely from his own party, he supports globalization. However, we also find that left-wing voters do not give neoliberal presidents from their own party a blank check: although they endorse the president's globalization policies, they continue to oppose government retrenchment. To us these results underscore why Latin American presidents elected under the labels of left-center parties have had a harder time implementing neoliberal policies of state retrenchment even as they succeed in liberalizing trade.

Finally, our results also indicate stronger opposition to globalization and state retrenchment polices in countries with a history of strong labor-based parties that achieved higher industrialization during the era of ISI. These parties generated political institutions that cemented the old alliance of interests and these institutions also must have shaped prevailing political cultures and ideologies. The average voter in Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Chile and Peru was more left-wing that its counterpart in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, or Brazil. The first set of countries had a long history under strong labor based parties (Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, and Peru) or where these parties were serious contenders for national power (Chile). None of the other countries had such type of political configuration.

Our results would predict major reversals to neoliberal economic polices in countries experiencing economic stagnation and high unemployment. They would also be able to predict reversals in countries with strong labor-based parties and where right-wing parties

are weak. However, given prevailing support for globalization among the parties and social groups in Latin America, we believe that the arena of economic contestation in the future will mostly focus on the state size dimension.

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
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Figure 1
Growth in Latin America
 (Sorted by growth in 1990-1997)



Source: World Bank, per capita GDP growth.

Figure 2: The Economy and Support for neoliberal economic policies

		Short-term INFLATION	
		High	Low
Relative Growth Rates (1990s relative to 1980s)	High	Strong Support	Mild Support
	Low	Mild Opposition	Strong Opposition

Figure 3: Effect of Partisanship & Ideology

		APPROVES OF PRESIDENT, WHO FOLLOWS NEOLIBERAL POLICIES	
		YES	NO
VOTES FOR	LEFT	<p>Mild support based on good performance but ideological miss-match</p> <p>PRI voters in Mexico during the Presidency of Carlos Salinas</p> <p>Peronist voters in Argentina during Carlos Menem's first term</p>	<p>Strong Opposition based on poor performance and ideology</p> <p>PRI voters during Ernesto Zedillo's first years and PRD voters</p> <p>Peronist voters at the end of Menem's second term</p>
	RIGHT	<p>Strong Support based on performance and ideology</p> <p>PAN voters in Guatemala</p>	<p>Mild opposition based on performance and not ideology</p> <p>ADN voters in Bolivia</p>

Figure 4: Political legacies of labor-based parties and preferences for neoliberal policies

		Presence of strong labor-based party	
		Yes	No
Industrialization 1970s	High	Strong Opposition Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Chile	Mild Support Brazil
	Low	Mild Opposition Peru	Strong Support Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay

Table 1
Attitudes toward free trade
 (Percentage, sorted by “very good”)*

Country	Very bad	Somewhat bad	Somewhat good	Very good	NA	Total	n
Ecuador	2	8	36	52	2	100	500
Venezuela	6	9	33	48	5	100	1,000
Guatemala	6	5	36	46	7	100	752
Costa Rica	3	4	42	45	6	100	750
Brazil	7	10	29	45	9	100	993
Peru	3	6	47	38	7	100	1,029
Bolivia	5	8	46	36	5	100	751
Dominican Rep.	9	11	33	35	12	100	757
Colombia	4	9	52	30	5	100	1,000
Argentina	6	12	39	29	13	100	1,000
Panama	17	13	29	28	14	100	754
Chile	3	12	52	27	7	100	1,000
Mexico	8	12	43	27	10	100	1,199
Paraguay	4	11	47	20	19	100	479
USA	14	23	37	12	14	100	1,011
Average	5	9	42	36	7	100	12,975

* Question wording: *The country’s economy has become increasingly global and interconnected with other countries throughout the world over the past twenty years. Do you think that this trend toward free trade is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad for the country?*

Table 2
Attitudes toward a free trade zone in the Americas
 (Percentage, sorted by “very favorable”)*

Country	Very unfavorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Somewhat favorable	Very favorable	NA	Total	n
Guatemala	2	4	37	55	2	100	752
Ecuador	4	9	32	49	7	100	500
Brazil	8	7	24	46	15	100	993
Colombia	5	10	34	44	8	100	1,000
Venezuela	10	9	32	42	8	100	1,000
Dominican Rep.	5	9	39	39	8	100	757
Costa Rica	3	5	36	39	17	100	750
Bolivia	4	9	41	36	10	100	751
Panama	7	12	39	35	7	100	754
Peru	5	7	40	34	14	100	1,029
Chile	5	11	43	29	13	100	1,000
Mexico	7	11	39	29	15	100	1,199
USA	5	12	53	26	4	100	1,011
Argentina	11	10	35	24	21	100	1,000
Paraguay	5	10	39	22	23	100	479
Average	8	10	35	34	13	100	12,975

* Question wording: *The presidents of the nations of North and South America have been talking about forming one free trade zone for the whole region. What is your reaction to this idea --very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable?*

Table 3**Extent of government and private sector involvement in industry and basic services**

(less means more government, sorted by mean industry)*

	Industry (Index ranges from -7 to 7)			Basic Services (Index ranges from -3 to 3)		
	Mean	N	Std. Dev	Mean	N	Std. Dev
USA	3.06	430	3.68	.63	464	2.04
Ecuador	.74	474	4.35	-.55	489	2.20
Paraguay	.74	302	4.44	-1.52	394	1.76
Bolivia	.58	703	4.04	-1.42	726	1.87
Guatemala	4.46E-03	672	3.57	-1.70	722	1.79
Venezuela	-.19	898	4.45	-.74	954	2.22
Colombia	-.31	943	4.08	-.93	964	1.96
Brasil	-.39	832	4.79	-1.37	899	2.20
Panamá	-.94	692	3.61	-1.90	722	1.67
Argentina	-1.03	841	4.69	-1.53	912	1.88
Perú	-1.09	941	3.96	-1.36	972	1.80
Costa Rica	-1.27	636	3.05	-1.46	700	1.65
México	-1.58	1100	4.28	-1.61	1135	1.81
Chile	-1.67	915	3.89	-1.73	953	1.78
Dominican Rep.	-1.74	683	4.60	-2.05	714	1.79
Total	-.57	11062	4.27	-1.34	11720	1.98

* Question wording: *For each of the following industries, please tell me whether you think that they should be run by the government or run by the private sector?*

Figure 5




Table 4 - OLS regression model

	Size of Government	Globalization
Sex	-0.0443 (0.0283)	-0.0656*** (0.0177)
School	0.0330*** (0.0045)	0.0184*** (0.0027)
Income	0.0989*** (0.0148)	0.0369*** (0.0081)
Unemployed	-0.0144 (0.0320)	-0.0699** (0.0247)
Blue collar worker	-0.0030 (0.0242)	0.0020 (0.0200)
Approval	-0.0038 (0.0244)	0.0537*** (0.0129)
Year of reform	-0.1424*** (0.0139)	-0.0359*** (0.0067)
Inflation (97-95 Avg.)	0.0075*** (0.0009)	0.0025*** (0.0004)
GDP per capita change (90s-80s)	0.0052 (0.0052)	0.0337*** (0.0026)
Industry share of GDP (70s Avg.)	0.0155** (0.0063)	-0.0065** (0.0025)
Right-party	0.1228** (0.0483)	0.0314* (0.0172)
Center/Left-party	-0.0442* (0.0217)	-0.0159 (0.0131)
Populist party	-0.4759*** (0.0981)	-0.0611*** (0.0164)
Constant	0.4667* (0.2183)	-0.1504 (0.1545)
Observations	8,569	8,569
R-Squared	.066	.091

Note: Regressions are run with robust standard errors corrected for clustering within countries.

P < .1 (*), < .05 (**), < .01 (***)

Figure 6




Figure 7





Figure 8



Appendix A - Variables description, imputation, and regression methods

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Description and source
Globalization	-0.030	0.505	-1.460	0.736	Factor score (See Appendix B).
Size of government	-0.021	0.918	-1.470	2.094	Factor score (See Appendix B).
Sex	0.530	0.499	0	1	1=Women and 0=Men. Recoded. From the <i>Mori Survey (MS)</i> .
School	9.772	3.432	1	16	In years of school 1 to 16 years; Recoded. From <i>MS</i> .
Income	1.775	0.887	1	4	Income level. 1= low, 2=median-low, 3=median-high, 4=high. Recoded. From <i>MS</i> .
Unemployed	0.048	0.213	0	1	Dummy variable. Recoded. From <i>MS</i> .
Blue collar worker	0.134	0.341	0	1	Dummy variable. Recoded. From <i>MS</i> .
Approval	2.822	1.210	1	5	<i>What opinion do you have of (president's name): good or bad?</i> 1=Very bad, 2=Bad, 3=Neutral, 4=Good, 5=Very good. Recoded. From <i>MS</i> .
Year of reform	9.349	1.321	7	11	Years since neoliberal reforms were first implemented (<i>IDB, 1997</i>).
Inflation (97-95 Avg.)	21.053	17.902	1.4	69.9	Average inflation from 1995-1997; taken from the World Bank-World Development Indicators (WDI).
GDP per capita change (90s-80s)	1.612	2.072	-0.927	7.702	Difference between the change on GDP per capita in the 1990s minus the change in 1980s (WDI)
Industry share of GDP (70s Avg.)	34.295	7.186	19.667	44.478	Average industry share of GDP from 1970-1979 (WDI).
Right-party	0.127	0.333	0	1	Party coded as right wing in the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2000). We recoded the Partido Justicialista of Argentina from "right" to "center."
Center/Left-party	0.290	0.453	0	1	Party coded as "left" or "center" in the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2000). We recoded the Partido Justicialista of Argentina from "right" to "center."
Labor-based party	0.426	0.495	0	1	Whether the particular country has had a strong ruling populist party. It includes: Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Chile, and Venezuela.

Sample distribution

Country	Observations	Percent
Argentina	973	11.4
Bolivia	498	5.8
Brazil	666	7.8
Chile	642	7.5
Colombia	956	11.2
Costa Rica	726	8.5
Ecuador	379	4.4
Guatemala	585	6.8
Mexico	1,170	13.7
Peru	753	8.8
Paraguay	465	5.4
Venezuela	756	8.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>8,569</i>	<i>100</i>

Imputation Method

The *Mori* survey contained missing values and “no answers” for many variables. As a more efficient alternative to listwise deletion and to imputation using regression analysis, we opted for the *Emis* logarithm that is implemented by *Amelia* (Honaker et al., 2001; King et al., 2001). The general intuition to prefer *Amelia* is the following: given that, by definition, we do not know with certainty the exact values of the missing points, imputing any single value to the empty cell is arbitrary, in the sense that it does not reflect uncertainty. Thus, *Amelia* does not impute a single observation to an empty cell, but instead it creates a distribution of imputed values for every single cell. As a result, *Amelia* creates n datasets, where n equals the number of different observations in the distribution for every empty cell.

Regression Model

We estimated an OLS regression model with robust standard errors corrected for clustering. The dataset we utilize was created from the average of the five datasets we obtained from *Amelia*. The reason for this choice, as compared to utilizing Clarify to compute the regression from the five *Amelia* datasets, is that by correcting the errors for clustering the model’s degrees of freedom are reduced from 8,569 to only 10—the number of countries in sample. Because we include more than 10 variables in our models, Clarify cannot compute the model since the matrix is not positive definite in this case. This, however, does not imply that the coefficients cannot be estimated; what is missing is the F-statistic since it is estimated using as degrees of freedom: (number of independent variables, number of clusters–1). If the number of independent variables exceeds the number of clusters–1, then, the F-statistic cannot be estimated. To account for this issue we ran a model using only five of the model variables; the F-statistic came about significant. Since adding variables to the model can only keep the same value or increase the value of the F-statistic, we are then confident that it is not an issue with our results.

Appendix B - Factor Analysis

The factor scores we utilize as dependent variables –globalization and size of government– were generated using the average value of the five databases generated by Amelia as the cell observation. The first factor, that we label “globalization”, results from eight questionnaire variables from the *Mori* survey:

- 1- *Since some years ago, the country has increased its trade with other nations. This is a tendency towards “free-trade”. Do you think that “free-trade” is good or bad for the country?*
- 2- *The presidents of North and South America are talking about a free-trade zone for the whole continent. Do you favor or oppose this idea?*

To obtain our “size of government” factor we utilized 10 variables from a single battery of questions. The question was: *Tell me which activities should be owned by the government and which owned by private individuals?: (1) Oil; (2) Electricity; (3) Airlines; (4) Mines; (5) Schools; (6) Phone companies; (7) Water supply; (8) Television; (9) Health care; (10) Pensions.*

Appendix C - Executives and Legislatures

Table 1: Partisanship of President and Parties in the Legislature in Latin America

	President's party	Or.	President	Term begins	1st party in congress	Or.	2nd party in congress	Or.	3rd party in congress	Or.
Argentina	PJ (Partido Justicialista)	C	Carlos Saul Menem	1989	PJ (Partido Justicialista)	C	UCR (Union Civica Radical)	L	FREPASO (Frente por un Pais con Solidaridad)	*
Bolivia	ADN (Accion Democratica Nacionalista)	R	Hugo Banzer Suarez	1997	ADN (Accion Democratica Nacionalista)	R	MNR (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario)	C	MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria)	R
Brazil	PMBD (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro)	L	Fernando Henrique Cardoso	1995	PMBD (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro)	L	PFL (Partido da Frente Liberal)	C	PSBD (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira)	L
Chile	PDC (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)	C	Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle	1994	PDC (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)	C	RN (Renovación Nacional)	R	UDI (Unión Democrática Independiente)	R
Colombia	PL (Partido Liberal)	L	Ernesto Samper Pizano	1994	PL (Partido Liberal)	L	Conservadores	R	*	*
Costa Rica	PLN (Partido Liberación Nacional)	C	Jose Maria Figueres Olsen	1994	PLN (Partido Liberación Nacional)	C	PUSC (Partido de Unidad Socialcristiana)	R	FD (Fuerza Democrática)	*
Ecuador	FRA (Frente Radical Alfariista)	*	Fabian Alarcon Rivera	1997	PSC (Partido Social Cristiano)	R	PRE (Partido Roldosista)	L	DP (Democracia Popular)	L
Guatemala	PAN (Partido de Avance Nacional)	R	Alvaro Enrique Arzu Irigoyen	1996	PAN (Partido de Avance Nacional)	R	FRG (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco)	R	FDNG (Frente Democratico Nueva Guatemala)	L
Mexico	PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional)	C	Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon	1994	PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional)	C	PRD (Partido de la Revolucion Democratica)	L	PAN (Partido Accion Nacional)	R
Panama	PRD (Partido Revolucionario Democratico)	C	Ernesto Perez Balladares	1994	PRD (Partido Revolucionario Democratico)	C	PA (Partido Arnulfista)	R	MPE (Movimiento Papa Egoro)	C
Paraguay	Partido Colorado	R	Juan Carlos Wasmosy	1993	Partido Colorado	R	PLRA (Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico)	L	EN (Encuentro Nacional)	C
Peru	Cambio 90	R	Alberto Kenyo Fujimori Fujimori	1990	Cambio 90	R	UPP (Unión por el Perú)	C	APRA (Partido Aprista Peruano)	L
Venezuela	AD (Accion Democratica)	L	Rafael Caldera Rodriguez	1994	AD (Accion Democratica)	L	COPEI (Partido Social Cristiano)	C	Convergencia Nacional	L

Sources: Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001), CIA World Fact Book, and The Library of Congress-Country Studies. Parties' orientation (Or.) taken from Rosas (2002).

* = Not available.