# Documentos de Trabajo en Ciencia Política

WORKING PAPERS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Catching All Souls:
Religion and Ideology in the PAN

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Abstract

The organization closest to being a Christian Democratic party in Mexico has been the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). However, they have never been formally affiliated to the international Christian Democratic movement until recently, when they joined the International in late 1998. This chapter focuses on the electoral profile of PAN voters according to the core principles of Christian Democracy. The findings show that PAN supporters are clearly pro-democratic and religious, but are ideologically dispersed in economic and cultural terms. At the mass level, the PAN is not an ideologically coherent party. This presents a major dilemma: while party elites seem to be relatively coherent and compact in ideological terms, at the mass level, PAN supporters define a catch-all party.

Síntesis

En México, la organización política más cercana a lo que sería un partido Demócrata Cristiano es el Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). Sin embargo, este partido apenas recientemente se ha afiliado de manera formal al movimiento Demócrata Cristiano en 1998. Este capítulo se enfoca en el perfil electoral de los votantes panistas en relación con el núcleo de los principios de la Democracia Cristiana. Los resultados muestran que los partidarios panistas son claramente pro-democráticos y religiosos, pero son ideológicamente dispersos en términos económicos y culturales. Al nivel de electorado de masas, el PAN no es un partido ideológicamente coherente. Esto presenta un dilema aun mayor para el partido: mientras que las élites partidistas parecen ser relativamente coherentes y compactas en términos ideológicos, en el nivel de masas, los partidarios panistas definen un *catch-all party*.

The organization closest to being a Christian Democratic party in Mexico has been the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). However, they have never been formally affiliated to the international Christian Democratic movement until recently, when they joined the International in late 1998. This chapter focuses on the electoral profile of PAN voters according to the core principles of Christian Democracy. The findings show that PAN supporters are clearly pro-democratic and religious, but are ideologically dispersed in economic and cultural terms. At the mass level, the PAN is not an ideologically coherent party. This presents a major dilemma for the party: while party elites seem to be relatively coherent and compact in ideological terms, at the mass level, PAN supporters define a catch-all party.

The chapter relies on empirical evidence from the 1995 World Values Survey (WVS). We use the Mexican sample, which is a national representative sample that consists of 1,511 cases. The data are available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. Question wording and variables are shown in an attached appendix (Not offered yet in this draft).

In the chapter we discuss, first, that the electoral historical performance of the PAN place this party as one of the three main political forces in Mexico. Secondly, we assess the voters' characteristics in terms the core principles of CD ideology. Thirdly, we develop a multivariate model of party support in order to test the importance of such principles in party choice and the bases of political cleavages. Finally, we discuss the ideological dispersion within each of the three major parties' and in what sense PAN should be defined as a catch-all party.

Electoral Geography of PAN

Founded in 1939, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) is the oldest opposition party in Mexico. Other parties that were founded at the time of greatest PRI hegemony have all disappeared. During decades, the PAN faced the formidable competition from the

PRI in municipal, state and federal elections, notwithstanding frequent frauds and very unequal access to resources: financial, organizational or of access to government support and the media. Nonetheless, the PAN made steady inroads in the Mexican electoral arena. From obtaining a meager 5 percent of the national vote in the first federal midterm elections it participated in during 1942 (Lujambio, undated:20), the party advanced to 7.6 percent in 1961; 17.5 percent in 1982; all the way to 26.1 percent in 1997.

The early figures were probably tainted by electoral fraud, but they also reflected the overwhelming dominance of the PRI. According to Lujambio (undated), the PAN was not able to present candidates for Congress in all the federal electoral districts until 1979 (although in 1967 it reached almost all, but then collapsed to two thirds in 1976). At the municipal level, also according to the study by Lujambio (undated) the PAN used to present candidates only in around 10 percent of the municipalities, until the 1980s when it hovered around 40 percent; and it is only very recently that it is able to present candidates in virtually 90 percent of the municipal races. This implied that during the 1940s the PAN won two municipalities; ten during the 1950s; 20 in the 1960s; 33 in the 1970s; 91 in the 80s; and more than 600 in the 1990s (see Lujambio, undated: cuadro 1; and PAN, Balance 1996-1999).

According to the latest PAN figures, by February 1999 the party controlled 287 municipal governments and six governorships (Aguascalientes, Baja California, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nuevo León and Querétaro). Among the municipal governments, this includes 13 of the 20 most populated cities, and 12 capital cities. Due to the urban bias in PAN municipalities, 35.8 percent of the population lives under PAN governments (counting both state and municipal population in those states not under a PAN state government). 287 local deputies in the states belong to the PAN, while the party has at the federal level 119 deputies and 31 senators (PAN, Balance 1996-1999).

But perhaps the most telling characteristic of PAN electoral support is the way in which its popularity spread across the country throughout the decades, which

reflected a transformation from a party appealing to only some disgruntled voters, into a "catch-all" party. As Map 1 depicts, in 1961 the PAN had a reasonable basis of support only in the Federal District, Baja California and Chihuahua; and moderate support in the traditional Cristero regions (Michoacán, Aguascalientes, Colima and Jalisco) and few other states (Morelos, Campeche and San Luis Potosí).

[Map 1 around here]

The Federal District and the Cristero states are precisely the same that Frank Brandenburg (1955) had identified as those where the PRI faced the greatest challenge, in the first case because of a risk of splits and in the second due to the strength of the sinarquista movement, which the PAN seemed to effectively channel. In fact, it is in the Cristero regions that the PAN obtains its first electoral successes at the municipal level (León 1946 supporting the Unión Cívica Leonesa, Quiroga 1946 & 1950, El Grullo 1948, Tzintzuntzán 1950, Teocuitatlán 1952; see Lujambio, undated: p.23 and Gutiérrez Madrigal, 1991). Support in Baja California and Chihuahua is attributable to switches of PRI militants, unhappy with governor Braulio Maldonado and the municipal president of Ciudad Juarez (Loaeza, 1991:298), in addition to some inroads made at the municipal level. In the local elections preceding 1961 in both Baja California and Chihuahua, the PAN benefited from PRI splits, but suffered massive electoral frauds. San Luis Potosí reflects the popularity of Salvador Nava and the Alianza Cívica Potosina.

In the 1970 federal elections, as Map 2 reveals, support for the PAN had increased substantially in most states. Baja California and the Federal District were still the regions with greatest support, followed by Guanajuato. The support in that state is surprising given that at the local level the PAN was not presenting candidates for the governor or municipal president post during those years, as a protest for electoral fraud (Lujambio, undated: p.44 and cuadro B).

[Map 2 around here]

The Bajío states still show an important support, but they are now joined by Nuevo León, Yucatán, Puebla, Durango and the State of Mexico. During those years the PAN was able to win congressional districts reaching the Chamber of Deputies elected from those states (13 deputies in the Federal District, 3 in Jalisco, 2 in the State of Mexico, 1 in Puebla and 1 in Guanajuato; see Gutiérrez Madrigal, 1991:211). Yucatán became during the 1970s a symbol of the repression the PAN faces when its alleged victory in the 1969 governor race is not recognized, and the army takes to the streets of Mérida (Lujambio, undated: p.43).

The 1980s are a time of recovery for the party, after a deep crisis in 1976, when no candidate competed for the presidential race. As Map 3 shows, there would seem to be a certain regionalization where the PAN becomes a party of the North, with an additional traditional stronghold in the Bajío, and very weak support in the Gulf and the South. The 1980s are particularly significant for the PAN, however, not because of electoral victories, but due to the enormous fraud carried out in Chihuahua in 1986 and the emergence of a new generation of PAN militants, mostly coming from the North, who exposed a more pragmatic attitude towards electoral competition.

[Map 3 around here]

As map 4 depicts, by the late 1990s PAN support is quite evenly spread across the country, except for states in the South where the party often obtains less than ten percent of the vote. However, it should be noted that even in those Southern states the PAN has been able to win important municipalities, including capital cities, as in the case of Tuxtla Gutierrez or Oaxaca. This distribution of support testifies to the success of the strategies followed by the so called "neopanistas" from the North.

[Map 4 around here]

This even spread of support at the national level can be clearly seen by calculating an "effective number of states" in which the party has representation. Using the same logic as the Laakso-Taagepera index N for the effective number of parties (which is the inverse of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of industrial concentration), Diaz Cayeros and Martínez (forthcoming) calculate the effective number of states according to the percentage of votes a party obtains from each region. This index is an imperfect measure, because there is no reason to expect a baseline of an even distribution of votes from each state, given that states differ in size; but it provides a very clear image of how the PAN has spread around the country. The "effective number of states" where the PAN had an electoral presence has grown from a little below four in the 1960s to more than sixteen in the 1990s. The evolution of this index is shown in figure 1, together with the overall percentage of vote the party has obtained in the federal elections. Clearly there has been an increase in both electoral support and its spread across the country.

[figure 1 around here]

PAN voters and Christian Democratic Ideology

This section seeks to determine whether PAN supporters can be distinguished by a set of traits commonly associated with Christian Democratic ideology. We define Christian Democratic ideology as a commitment toward democracy and private initiative linked with a set of Christian moral values that command a person's political and social behavior beyond the private spiritual sphere. This is a loose definition of Christian Democratic ideology that, we believe, can encompass the programmatic stands of political parties, both in Europe and Latin America, that call themselves Christian Democrats and are, nonetheless, quite different from each other.

Thus, in our view, a typical Christian democratic voter would meet the following set of characteristics:

1. Be committed to democracy as opposed to authoritarianism.

Christian Democratic parties in Europe and Latin America have all been committed to constitutional democratic governance. These parties constituted in Europe an opposition to communism and fascism, and in Latin America, alternatives to military governments.

The PAN in Mexico has had a long trajectory of opposing the PRI. The PRI was neither communist, nor fascist, nor a military regime. However, it did present traits of authoritarianism which became accentuated as the party became more entrenched in power (Weinert & Reina, 197x).

In a system where elections were frequently held, opposition parties did exist. But until the late seventies, the PAN was the only independent opposition party within what should be more properly labeled an hegemonic party system. The Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) and the Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM), were so called "satellite" political parties, directly sponsored and financed by the hegemonic PRI to create a token-image of democracy. They did have some electoral victories recognized by the PRI at the local level, but they would consistently endorse the PRI presidential candidate, and would give up electoral victories, as in the case of PARM's Jorge Cruickshank who exchanged a governorship for a Senate seat.

The PAN, instead, was committed in its statutes to "the establishment of democracy as a form of government" (Art. 1st, IV), which reflected the belief that Mexico was not a democracy so long as the PRI did not allow for clean elections. Since the PAN won recognition of its first electoral victory in 1946 (the municipality of Quiroga, Michoacán), it always kept a firm position against the practice of electoral fraud, it so much suffered from (See Lujambio, undated). Since the PAN was founded, a sharp divide split the party defined in terms of strategy. Competing within the context of an authoritarian regime, PAN politicians debated whether they should participate in elections that were regarded as mostly fraudulent or instead

abstain from participating so as not to endorse what was regarded as a token democratic system. Once it became clear that defeating the PRI was possible, namely after voters started to retreat from the PRI due to the economic recession of the early 1980s (Magaloni, 1997), those for participating in elections clearly won the debate.

Thus, in more recent years the PAN has played a crucial role in Mexico´s democratization. The transition to democracy in Mexico has been unique in that it has taken place in the electoral arena and through the party system (Magaloni, 1997). As the opposition party with the longest trajectory, the PAN has hence been one of the key players in Mexico's protracted democratization. Since the early 1980s, the PAN began to defeat the PRI in some local elections, particularly in the North. One can confidently argue that Mexico's democratization started at the local level, namely in municipal and state elections, slowly propagating to the national level (see also Lujambio, undated). Till today, the PAN has won seven gubernatorial elections, namely Chihuahua, Baja California, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Aguscalientes, Querétaro, and Nuevo León, and has governed most of the important capital cities in Mexico. The PAN has also played a crucial role in redrafting Mexico's electoral laws by participating, in coalition with the PRI, in all of the electoral reforms taking place since the early 1990s. The PAN traded its support for president Carlos Salinas' economic reforms (see below) for, among other things, important electoral reforms that included the establishment of the Federal Electoral Institute and of an Electoral Tribunal Independent from the government.

At the mass level, PAN voters oppose the political *status quo* and stand for democratization (Magaloni, 1997; Moreno, 1998). Using the 1995 WVS we can determine whether PAN supporters are also more committed to democracy, regarding the virtues of this form of government more highly than PRI supporters do. Table 1 reports several questions that seek to determine respondent's evaluations of democracy and its relationship with voting intentions. It should be noted that there appear to be no differences between PAN and PRD supporters on their assessments of democracy. PRI supporters, on the other hand, appear to be slightly less supportive of this form of government. However, the differences between ruling and opposition

party supporters appear to be weak. This might result from the timing of the survey. Even though it was a central cleavage in by the mid-nineties, the so-called regime-cleavage in Mexico had ceded prominence to other increasingly salient cultural issues becoming more important in the party system (Moreno, forthcoming). The last row of the table reports the mean position of party supporters on a "democracy index", which is constructed using all five questions and ranges from 5 to 20 (alpha = .48). PAN supporters seem to be slightly more committed to democracy. Differences in means are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.

[Table 1 about here]

2. Lean towards the right by supporting capitalism and private property as opposed to communism and a statist economy.

While European Christian Democracy began as a Catholic reaction to liberal anti-clericalism of the nineteenth century (Kalyvas, 1996), its Latin American counterparts, which emerged only in the twentieth century, "was initially a response to problems created by capitalist industrialization, especially the threat of Marxism" (Hawkins, 1998: 3). Thus, Christian Democratic economic ideology, both in Europe and Latin America, has represented a right-wing option in that it has opposed not only communism but also an indiscriminate expansion of the state. Christian Democracy, nonetheless, claims to be a "middle way" between communism and orthodox free-market economics. It adopted a program of socioeconomic reform based on Catholic social doctrine that grew out of two papal encyclicas: Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadregessimo Anno (1931) (Hawkins, 1998: 3).

Thus, Christian Democrats supported welfare policies and a subsidiary economic role for the state in improving living conditions for workers and ensuring that everybody is protected against economic destitution. But unlike Social Democrats, they believe that private initiative should be the core of every economic system. The

state, that is, should promote industrialization and economic development by supporting private entrepreneurs, not replacing them.

The PAN was founded partly as a response to president Lázaro Cárdenas´ economic reforms, which included the nationalization of the oil industry, a far-reaching agrarian reform, and the expansion of the role of the state in regulating every aspect of economic activity. Manuel Gómez Morín, a key founder of the PAN, belonged to a liberal generation that believed in private property and a clearly limited role for the state. Thus he regarded Cárdenas´ economic polices as dangerously socialist. Moreover, as president of the National University, Gómez Morín had opposed the government program of a "socialist education". What the Cardenista government labeled "socialist education" included not only the responsibility on the part of the state to provide free education to every Mexican but, mainly, the government's responsibility to define the curricula, write and distribute the textbooks which would teach and propagate "socialist" values. According to the Constitution, education, moreover, was meant to be secular and the church and religious organizations were prohibited from imparting it.

In its statutes the PAN clearly states that state activity should be subordinated to the "Common Good", as opposed to the Cardenista rhetoric that stressed the role of the State as the guarantor of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or the rule by the "masses" (Gutiérrez Madrigal, 1991:24). Moreover, the party's Principles of Doctrine explicitly state that "doctrines that place the solution to social problems in the class struggle are false, inhuman and contrary to the most fundamental laws of social life. The conception of the State as an instrument of the struggle at the service of any class, whichever it is, for the destruction or domination of other classes, is monstrously unjust and antisocial" (Principios de Doctrina, entry: Estado).

The Principles of Doctrine consider that "private initiative is the source of social improvement" (entry: Iniciativa); that "private property is the most adequate means to ensure national production and constitutes a support and guarantee for the dignity of the person, and the existence of the fundamental human community, the family" (entry: Propiedad); that "peasant families, including ejidatarios, should be allowed to

obtain, in full property, the land they are able to make produce efficiently" (entry: Campo); and that "the state has authority, not property, in the national economy" (entry: Economía).

Throughout the decades, legislators from Acción Nacional presented over 300 initiatives in the Lower Chamber of Deputies seeking to restrict the role of the state in the economy. This stands in contrast to other opposition parties, primarily the PPS, which since its foundation in 1947 sought to expand the economic role of the state. The PAN also opposed consecutive changes to the constitution that enhanced the role of government and public enterprises in economic activity, most notably the "rectoría económica del estado" included in article 25 of the constitution, and the bank nationalization of 1982.

More recently, the PAN became a crucial collaborator in implementing the market-oriented reforms that have so deeply transformed Mexico's economic landscape. In the 1988 presidential elections, the PRI lost, for the first time in its history, the qualified majority in the Lower Chamber of Deputies needed to reform the constitution. Since president Carlos Salinas needed to reform the constitution in order to carry out key aspects of his economic agenda, he sought the collaboration of the PAN in the legislature to enact constitutional changes that would enable him to, for example, privatize the banking system and restructure agricultural property rights by allowing for the privatization of communal land tenure. During those years, the PAN also formed a congressional coalition with the PRI to modify constitutional article 130 that had prohibited religious education in Mexico and the participation of the church in politics. PAN´s support for Carlos Salinas´ market-oriented reforms, including the privatization of sate owned enterprises, trade liberalization, and deregulation of economic activity was unquestionable.

In fact, during those years many PAN politicians themselves used to claim that the president had actually stolen their party's economic platform and was implementing most of the economic policies and reforms the PAN had long ago proposed. PAN's crucial role in economic policy making has enhanced since the 1997 mid-term elections, when the PRI lost the majority in the Lower Chamber of

Deputies. Since those elections, PAN and PRI legislators have twice formed a congressional coalition to approve the annual budget. In both occasions, the PAN has obtained important concessions from the government, particularly having to do with transferring more resources to states and municipalities, in the context of the decentralization of public finances.

At the mass level, there is a debate on whether PAN supporters stand to the right of the PRI (see Magaloni, 1997 and Estevez and Magaloni, 1998) or if they are positioned at the center of the economic left-right dimension (see Moreno, 1998 and Moreno, forthcoming). In any case, as shown in Magaloni (1997), PAN supporters tend to mirror the economic policy stands of PAN politicians: they favor privatization of state owned enterprises; trade liberalization and deregulation of economic activity; an economy mostly dependent upon private initiative; and they oppose tax increases to alleviate poverty and an increase in social subsides (see also Estevez and Magaloni, 1998). The 1995 WVS did not include questions that explicitly dealt with the type of economic and fiscal issues included in Magaloni (1997) and Estevez and Magaloni, (1998). Nonetheless, it included some questions that reflect economic ideology. Figure 2 shows the mean position of PAN, PRI and PRD supporters on the economic issues included in the 1995 WVS. The mean position of PAN supporters is always to the right of PRD´s. This means that the PAN is the option for right-wing opposition voters. Nonetheless, as opposed to PRI voters, answers in this survey seem to indicate that PAN voters are more centrist (see below).

[Figure 2 about here]

3. Tend to be religious persons

As said above, Christian Democracy began in Europe as a Catholic reaction to liberal anti-clericalism of the nineteenth century. As such, they captured the support of practicing Christians and religious organizations that organized, mostly at the local level, to resist the expansion of the national state into the localities, the secularization

of education and the intrusion of the state into family and communal life. As Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue, the "decisive battle came to stand between the aspirations of the mobilizing nation-state and the corporate claims of the churches [...] but the fundamental issue was one of morals, of the control of community norms. This found reflection in fights over such matters as the solemnization of marriage and the granting of divorces, the organization of charities […] However, the fundamental battle between Church and State focused on the control of education" (p. 15).

In Mexico, the fundamental battle, that of the control over education that Lipset and Rokkan talk about, extended beyond the 19th century well after the Mexican Revolution, in the 1920s and early 1930s. The development of public education under centralized secular control began in the early 1920s. The Constitution forbade the Church to participate. The national state authorities were thus to gain direct control over the children's education without consulting the parents and explicitly excluding their spiritual authorities. This generated bitter opposition from Catholics, many of whom found refuge in the PAN, which emerged in the defense of freedom of religious education.

The PAN did not find it easy to define itself a Christian Democratic party because of the implications of being associated with the Catholic Church. Gómez Morín was quite explicit in his rejection of Christian Democracy, considering it "a confessional international movement that is not fit for the Mexican experience of deep anticlericalism" (quoted in Loaeza, 1999:289). Nonetheless, the PAN was indeed associated since its founding with catholic organizations, such as the Catholic Association of Young Mexicans (ACJM), Catholic Action and the National Union of Head of Families and progressive catholic students. Furthermore, González Luna, the co-founder of the PAN, explicitly embraced Christian Democratic doctrine. González Luna had refused to join the Cristero movement or sinarquista activities, because he rejected violence and clandestine political activity. However, he presided over the Asociación Católica de la Juventud Mexicana of Jalisco, which was devoted to promoting the social doctrine of the church. Thus, the party was characterized from

the very beginning by a tension between a more secular liberal wing and a more dogmatic catholic one.

To a large extent, Gómez Morín's unwillingness to embrace Christian Democracy must have been related to the fear of criticism from the left. He was a friend of Rafael Caldera and followed the evolution of Christian Democracy in Chile and Venezuela (Loaeza, 1999:289). But the vocal criticism of Vicente Lombardo Toledano from the PPS, who attacked the party for being associated to the most counterrevolutionary reaction, linked to the conservative forces of the church, was probably too much of a burden for the electoral success of the party. In a country where the 19th century had witnessed bloody conflicts to separate church and state, and the Cristero war of the 1920s was still a fresh memory, it was not easy for the party to define itself as Christian. In fact, Lujambio (undated) argues that the "Catholic Era" of the party, from 1950 to 1962 when the party was headed by men with "impeccable catholic credentials" (Juan Gutiérrez Lascuraín, Alfonso Ituarte Servín and José González Torres) and Efraín González Luna ran for the presidential race, became increasingly more ideological and aggressive in its discourse towards the regime, receiving in exchange greater electoral frauds (Gutiérrez Madrigal, 1991 provides a similar interpretation). Such strategy proved to be a hindrance for electoral success, and hence was changed for a more pragmatic leadership in the years that followed.

However, the party did uphold religious freedom as one of the basic elements of its doctrine: "religious freedom, of belief, practice and teaching, must be real and fully guaranteed in Mexico, and any direct or indirect persecutory measures must disappear from the laws and the activities of the State" (Principios de Doctrina, entry: Libertad). Furthermore, the party anticipated with a bill introduced in 1987 the reforms that would lead to the normalization of relations with churches and the Vatican in 1991. Finally, the party has explicitly rejected abortion and cloning, and seeks freedom of (religious) education in its 1994-2000 political platform (La Fuerza de la Democracia, 1994: paragraph 81).

Does PAN draw support mostly from practicing Catholics? Employing survey analysis, Dominguez and McCann (1995) found that PAN is not a confessional party.

This finding is not that surprising considering that for a long time only one party, the PRI, actually existed in a mostly catholic country. In other words, the PRI itself received the support of Catholics, hiding its anticlericalism so as not to alienate voters. Nonetheless, we will show below that there is a religious cleavage in Mexico that manifest in the division of the opposition: PAN supporters, that is, are more religious that PRD voters, although they cannot be distinguished from PRI voters on the ground of their religious beliefs.

We employ again the 1995 WVS to support this finding. The data is presented in table 2, which shows the relationship between several religious beliefs and practices and voting intentions. The last row of the table presents mean party positions on a religious index that combines all the questions reported in the table. The index ranges from 0 (not religious) to 10 (very religious) (alpha = .86). It should be noted that while most voters tend to be very religious, PAN and PRI supporters are definitively more religious than PRD voters. Differences of means are statistically significant at the 95 confidence level (two-tailed test).

[Table 2 about here]

4.   Hold conservative moral values, often connected with the Christian doctrine.

Moral values in Christian Democracy often stress the family and the notion of respect for the person as a primary requirement to achieve the "Common Good". This is coupled by appeals to the social doctrine of the Church that allows for state action seeking to ensure respect for the person and the family. The notion of person considers an inherent dignity and spiritual destiny that must be fulfilled, while the freedom and the material goods are means to do so. The family is the essential unit of the community, which in a conception of "subsidiarity", can be assisted in those things that it cannot achieve by itself by the larger units. The subsidiarity principle establishes "that the greater and more perfect society should not do what the minor one can and should do, except if the later is unable to do it, in which case the

intervention of the former is justified, only to the extent that it promotes that the minor society shall reestablish the possibility of carrying out by itself its goals" (Breve Historia del PAN, p.4). The logic of subsidiarity is supposed to apply also to levels of government, hence an emphasis in local government and federalist traditions. Respect for family and person get translated into conservative moral values to the extent that this is linked to opposition to abortion, freedom of religious education, and a quest for the preservation of family values. Such conservative moral values often find their most immediate reference in positions upheld by the Catholic Church.

The PAN has been regarded, at least by political analysts, as a conservative party on issues such as abortion, sexual liberty and family values. PAN's record at the local level gives some credential to its conservative reputation. For instance, The PAN of Baja California modified the state constitution to forbid abortion even when the life of the mother is in danger. PAN in Nuevo León is also proposing similar constitutional changes. Moral issues, nonetheless, have only recently started to get some minor prominence in Mexico´s political landscape, political parties starting to mobilize them in electoral campaigns.[1] Are PAN supporters as conservative as PAN politicians? Can PAN voters be differentiated on the basis of conservative moral values upheld by the Catholic Church? The 1995 WVS allows us to answer these questions, since it included items dealing with moral-type issues such as attitudes towards abortion, sexual liberty, divorce, prostitution and homosexuality.

In table 3 we present the mean party position on each of these moral issues. Questions were phrased on a 1 to 10 scale where 1 means the respondent thought that something (e.g., abortion) was "never justifiable" and 10 "always justifiable". Thus, the closer to 0 a party's mean position is, the more conservative it is. The table also presents a liberal-conservative index which combines answers to these five questions.

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[1] For instance, during the 1997 mid-term elections, PRD accused PAN of being far too conservative, for, among other things, having forbidden the exhibit of Wonder Bra billboards, naturally of blouse-less women, in the cities of Guadalajara and Monterrey.

The index ranges from 5 (extremely conservative) to 43 (extremely liberal) (alpha = .73).

[Table 3 about here]

The first thing to note from table 3 is that Mexicans tend to be rather conservative regardless of party. Nonetheless, PRI supporters, not PAN voters, tend to be the most conservative. The average PAN supporter seems to be more liberal than their party elites. For instance, in a recent survey of party delegates carried out by *Reforma* newspaper, 70% of PAN delegates say that "abortion should never be allowed". A similar question was applied to the national public and only 36% of PAN supporters gave the same answer.

A Model of Party Support

In order to systematically tests our hypothesis thus far, this section presents a multinomial logit analysis of party choice. We seek to determine, first, the extent to which PAN supporters can be differentiated by the four set of characteristics that, we have argued, define the ideology of a typical Christian democratic voter. Second, whether these four issue cleavages - attitudes toward democracy, economic positions, religiosity, and moral values – get manifested into Mexico's party system. The dependent variable is party choice. The independent variables are the democracy, religiosity, and moral values indexes, the economic issue positions, and conventional socioeconomic variables which we use as controls. Results are presented in table 4.

[Table 4 about here]

The first thing to note from these results is that all four issue cleavages get translated into the party system. That is, the democracy, religiosity and liberal-conservative indexes are statistically significant and also most of the economic issues, though these reach a lower confidence level. This confirms the findings in some

earlier work (Magaloni, 1997; Moren, forthcoming). We argue that Mexican voters are divided not only along a political dimension but, in addition, on religious, economic and moral grounds.

The results presented in table 4 show that PAN voters tend to be more religious, more conservative and more rightist than PRD supporters. PRI voters are also more religious, conservative and rightist than PRD's but, unlike PAN voters, they tend to be less committed toward democracy. Thus, within Mexico's party system, PAN supporters do seem to meet some of the traits of typical Christian Democratic supporters in that, unlike PRD voters, they are positioned to the right in the economic dimension, tend to be more conservative and religious, and like the PRD, favor democracy over authoritarianism. It should be noted that PAN supporters share all of these traits with PRI's, except for the last one.

In order to get a sense of the range of effects of these variables, table 5 presents the probabilities of voting for each of these parties at different levels of the independent variables. We underscore four aspects of these results. First, the effect of the democratic index is of the same magnitude and positive for PAN and PRD. Conversely, the index affects PRI vote negatively and quite strongly which means that there is an important political cleavage in Mexico in which both opposition parties stand on one side, supporting democracy, and PRI voters on the other. Second, PAN voters are conservative in that as the liberal index increases the support for this party drops. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the effect does not seem to be that strong compared to how moral values impact support for PRI and PRD. This means that with respect to moral values PRI is the conservative option, not PAN, and PRD is the liberal one. Third, an important and unexpected result is that religiosity impacts PAN positively and twice as much as it impacts PRI. Religiosity also impacts PRD support quite strongly and in the opposite direction. This means that there is a religious cleavage in Mexico, dividing in particular opposition party supporters between themselves, PAN receiving support of religious voters and PRD of non religious ones. Finally, the economic issues do not seem to impact PAN vote considerably,

which might indicate either that this party receives support from voters positioned all over the political spectrum or right in the center of it. Nonetheless, economic issues do impact PRD and PRI considerably and in the opposite direction.

A Catch-All-Party?

We have been able to show that several cleavages divide Mexican society and get translated into its party system. Religiosity and political attitudes toward democracy affect PAN support strongly. Nonetheless, the economic and moral cleavages seem to affect the support for PRI and PRD the most and only mildly that of PAN's. This might indicate, as said above, either that PAN receives support from voters positioned at the very center of the political spectrum on these dimensions or that PAN is a catch-all-party, receiving support from voters positioned all over.

To test for these hypotheses we performed a factor analysis, including all the items discussed thus far but the religiosity and democracy ones. As expected, the factor analysis revealed two dimensions: an economic and a moral one (results are reported in the appendix). We then plotted the mean position of each party's supporters on the two issue dimensions according to several sociodemographic variables such as levels of education, social class, and profession. Results are shown in figures 3, 4 and 5. In the appendix we report the sociodemographic composition of each party.

[Figures 3, 4 and 5 about here]

As shown in figure 3, the PAN does seem to be a catch-all-party: it receives support from voters scattered all over the political spectrum along the economic and moral values dimensions. The higher the level of education, income and social class, the more liberal and rightist PAN supporters are. Conversely, the lower the social class, education levels and income, the more leftist and conservative PAN voters get. Housewives and workers are among the most conservative. PRD and PRI do not seem to be catch-all-parties. PRD voters are generally positioned on the upper left

quadrant regardless of class and income. Hence, PRD seems to be a typical left-libertarian political party (Kitschelt, 198X). The PRI is the exact opposite: most of its voters are positioned in the lower right quadrant regardless of sociodemographic traits.

Given these results, the disconnection between PAN elite and supporters seems to be particularly striking. PAN elite is positioned on the lower right quadrant (rightist and conservative), an empty space in terms of PAN's own mass support. The dilemma PAN politicians seem to face is that their conservative position on issues such as abortion and sexual freedom tends to alienate the support from the upper class, professionals, and students, but their rightist position on economic issues alleniates the lower class and housewives. These results seem to provide an explanation as to why PAN politicians have consistently refused to define clearer positions on the issues.

Conclusions

We have shown that PAN supporters are clearly in favor of democracy and tend to be religious, but are really heterogeneous in economic and cultural issues. The party has a core of right-wing and liberal supporters among professionals, the upper class and highly educated voters. It also draws support from a core of left-wing conservative supporters who tend to come from the lower educated, lower income classes and housewives. This presents a major dilemma for the party: it cannot define itself on the issues without alienating a wing of its supporters. While party elites seem to be relatively compact in ideological terms, at the mass level, PAN supporters define a catch-all party. Thus, at the mass level PAN could not really be defined as a typical Christian Democratic party.

Table 1: Political issues and democracy index (%)

	PAN	PRI	PRD	All	
In a democracy, the economic system runs badly					
Agree	28	33	21	46	
Disagree	30	31	22	54	
Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling					
Agree	28	34	22	53	
Disagree	32	27	22	47	
Democracies aren't good at maintaining order					
Agree	28	35	22	41	
Disagree	62	54	59	59	
Democracy may have problems but it's better than any form of government*					
Agree	29	30	23	76	
Disagree	29	34	17	24	
Would you say having a democratic political system is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad form of government?*					
Very good and fairly good	30	30	21	79	
Very Bad and fairly bad	28	34	22	21	
Democracy Index Range 5 to 20 20= very democratic	13.79	13.28	13.50	14.21	Alpha: .48

All questions where asked in a 1 to 4 scale, where 4 is the more "democratic" answer.
*Reversed from actual scoring to make a more democratic answer closer to 4.

Table 2: Religious Attitudes (%)

	PAN	PRI	PRD	Total	
Would you say you are?					
A convinced atheist	23	20	39	6	
Not a religious person	29	26	23	29	
A religious person	28	34	19	65	
Do you believe in					
God	29	31	20	94	
Life after death	30	33	18	67	
People have a soul	29	33	18	76	
Devil exists	30	31	19	58	
Hell	30	32	20	58	
Heaven	29	33	19	74	
Sin	28	33	18	79	
Do you get comfort and strength from religion	29	33	18	82	
Religiosity Index Range 0 to 10 10=very religious	8.21	8.25	7.45	8.01	Alpha: .86

Table 3: Mean position of party supporters on various moral issues and liberal-conservative index

	PAN	PRI	PRD	All	
Homosexuality	1.90	1.63	1.91	1.78	
Prostitution	1.77	1.62	1.87	1.74	
Abortion	1.63	1.48	1.89	1.62	
Divorce	4.48	3.32	4.40	4.09	
Sexual liberty	2.15	2.13	2.18	2.15	
Moral Values Index Range 5 to 43 43= very liberal	15.55	13.80	16.49	15.39	Alpha .73

Note: Means in rows one to four are obtained from questions on a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 means respondents thought a statement (e.g., "prostitution") was "never justifiable" and 10 "always justifiable". Means in row five come from a 1 to 3 scale, where 1 means a respondent tends to disagree and 3 to disagree with the statement "individuals should have a chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted".

**Mean position of party supporters on various economic issues**

Figure 2

Table 4. A Model of Party ideologies (multinomial logit analysis)

	PAN versus PRD	PRI versus PRD
Constant	-2.36	.39
	(1.25)	(1.23)
Democracy Index	-.01	-.11**
	(.05)	(.05)
Religiosity Index	.22***	.16**
	(.05)	(.05)
Moral Values Index	-.02*	-.05***
	(.01)	(.01)
Income Equality	.07	.08*
	(.04)	(.04)
Govn´t or private property	.08*	.06
	(.04)	(.04)
Govn´t versus individual	-.019	-.09**
economic responsibility	(.04)	(.04)
Attitudes toward	.08*	.12***
competition	(.05)	(.05)
Education	.07	-.13*
	(.07)	(.07)
Self-imputed social class	-.10	-.08
	(.15)	(.06)
Income	.029	.08
	(.06)	(.06)
Housewife	.09	.13
	(.40)	(.39)
Student	.15	.02
	(.42)	(.44)
Unemployed	-.41	-.78*
	(.43)	(.44)
Professional	-.50	-.07
	(.42)	(.44)
Manual Worker	-.20	-.40
	(.31)	(.31)

N=524
LL –519.10
Chi 2(30)=87.47
Prob. Chi ^{2}>.0000
76% predicted correctly

Table 5: Predicted probabilites of party support

	PAN	PRI	PRD
Democracy Index			
Minimum	25	59	16
Maximum	39	30	31
Difference	*14*	*29*	*15*
Liberal-Conservative Index			
Minimum (conservative)	35	59	15
Maximum (liberal)	26	21	44
Difference	*-9*	*-38*	*29*
Religiousity Index			
Minimum	36	17	47
Maximum	46	37	17
Difference	*10*	*20*	*-30*
Incomes More Equal			
Minimum (left)	30	40	30
Maximum (right)	33	49	18
Difference	*3*	*9*	*-12*
Private versus Govn´t Ownership			
Minimum (left)	29	44	27
Maximum (right)	36	46	18
Differnce	*7*	*6*	*-9*
Attitudes Toward Competition			
Minimum (left)	30	34	36
Maximum (right)	31	50	19
Difference	*1*	*16*	*-17*
Govn´t versus Individual responsibility for economic proivision			
Minimum (left)	35	37	28
Maximim (right)	27	55	18
Difference	*-8*	*18*	*-10*

Note: predicted probabilities come from evaluating multinomial logit model of table 5.
All variables except for the variable evaluated are set to their mean value.