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Abstract

We investigate bill passage by party factions in Uruguay and show that those joining cabinet coalitions earn policy influence. The policy advantage of coalition is therefore not collected by the president alone, as often implied: partners acquire clout in law-making and use it to pass bills of their own and to strike deals with outside factions. Analysis of all bills initiated between 1985 and 2005 reveals that the odds of passing a bill sponsored alone by a majority cabinet faction was about 0.5, up from about 0.15 otherwise. Contingent upon the cabinet status of factions involved, the odds of co-sponsored bills conform well to patterns expected by a view that policy rewards are a fundamental part of the politics of coalition in presidentialism.

Keywords

intra-party democracy, party factionalism, policy goals, presidential cabinet government

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Introduction

What drives parties to join coalition governments? Do they strike deals in order to maximize their policy preferences or do they simply pursue office benefits? The scholarly literature has shown that both components drive party behaviour in parliamentary democracies. Yet, there is no evidence of presidential democracies where coalition governments have become a regular practice. The article addresses this lacuna in the literature and provides rich evidence for the Uruguayan case since the democratic restoration.

Recent work has shown that, with divided government, presidents worldwide are keen to buy support for their legislative programme by offering cabinet and sub-cabinet appointments to members of opposition parties (Cheibub et al., 2004) and factions (Morgenstern, 2001). Yet insufficient attention has been given to the currency with which the president's partners are paid back for their support. As in Riker's (1962) classic study of coalition, much of this discussion has developed with an assumption that those accepting the president's offer are simply office-motivated, and that it is the executive who reaps the policy benefits of the partnership.

We ask if there is also some policy advantage to be earned by those who coalesce in a presidential cabinet. This possibility is most obvious when the cabinet acquires majority status thanks to the support of opposition parties or factions. The coalition is then in a position to cartelize the legislative process, excluding outsiders from access and thus keeping all policy gain for themselves (cf. Cox and McCubbins, 2005; McCubbins and Thies, 1997). The price tag that a party or faction puts on its contribution towards attaining this status may very well include using some of the cartel's power to pass legislation of direct interest to core constituents.

It is unclear, however, if partners can agree to support each other's agendas as they support the president's. In exchange for office benefits, a partner is willing to support the president's otherwise unacceptable policy. Yet partners, unlike the president, have no such sweeteners to compensate support. Can parties and factions who coalesce in the cabinet trade policy favours in order to accrue policy gains?

Inspection of the fate of more than 5000 proposals made in the Uruguayan assembly between 1985 and 2005 suggests that they can. By joining a majority cabinet, a party faction more than tripled the probability of passage for bills it sponsored in the assembly, leaving it between 0.4 and 0.6, no longer needing co-sponsorship with other factions to achieve success. Initiating bills solo is important for factions' credit-claiming strategies in a system such as Uruguay's strongly promoting intra-party competition. Factions lacking this advantage trade favours by co-sponsoring with other factions with resources for bill passage. The evidence reveals that by co-sponsoring with a cabinet faction, those out of it could double (or more) the odds of passing legislation. Probability went from 0.175 (± 0.025) to 0.35 (± 0.1) when the cabinet coalition failed to command a majority in the assembly, and from 0.25 (± 0.05) to 0.625 (± 0.125) when it did. Participating in coalitions in Uruguay can benefit the president's coalition partners beyond the direct pay-offs they extract from the president himself.

The article proceeds as follows. Sections 1 and 2 expand the present discussion, reviewing presidential cabinet coalitions and policy gain, respectively. Section 3

introduces the case study of Uruguay, where same-party factions face conflicting incentives to distinguish electorally from each other while, at the same time, requiring some cooperation to pass laws. Multi-faction cabinets have been one form of cooperation. Section 4 presents bill co-sponsoring, another form of factional cooperation, and produces a set of testable hypotheses. Section 5 discusses complications for hypothesis-testing and Section 6 estimates a model of the probability of bill passage. The results corroborate 10 out of 12 hypotheses, letting us conclude that policy is one currency of exchange systematically used in Uruguayan coalitions. Section 7 briefly analyses content in a sample of bills to corroborate our interpretation of the patterns uncovered. Section 8 concludes.

I. Coalitions in presidentialism

Parties and their factions are goal-oriented actors, but what exactly the goals are remains a matter of debate in the rational choice camp. Party motivation is usually treated in one or more of three separable ways (Strøm, 1990): the pursuit of votes (cf. Downs, 1957); the pursuit of office (cf. Riker, 1962); and the pursuit of policy (cf. Laver and Shepsle, 1990).

Motivation assumptions lead analysts to different, often contradictory, conclusions about party or faction behaviour. In one model assuming office orientation, a small, extremist, party appears as a cheap provider of seats missing for a winning coalition. If policy orientation is emphasized instead, extremism is very likely to render the party in question unacceptable to other partners. And a party or faction fearing electoral retribution for being too cosy with adversaries in the cabinet will be inclined to reject, or quit from, a policy-compatible deal; hence the interest in verifying the empirical content of the different models of coalition behaviour.

Cheibub et al. (2004) have shown that coalition cabinets have been common worldwide since 1945. Their study of 33 presidential democracies focuses on 218 'episodes' where party seat-shares remained unchanged in the assembly. In 97 episodes, or 45 percent of all, no party enjoyed majority status by itself. And in 52 of those, a coalition cabinet was present during all or part of the episode. So presidents who seek support are keen to follow the coalitional approach: coalition cabinets are found in more than half of non-majority episodes, and about a quarter of all episodes.¹

Latin American presidents are keener to follow this approach than their peers elsewhere. In a study of the 106 cabinets that 59 presidents appointed in 13 democracies of the Americas in the 1980s and 1990s, Amorim Neto (2006) found no fewer than 77 cases of coalition, putting the share at three-quarters of the cabinets in his sample. In a region where legislative multipartism looms large (Mainwaring, 1993), presidents attempt to broaden the base of their support in the legislative arena by giving the opposition a share of cabinet appointments. Consistent with this view, Cheibub and colleagues (2004) found that coalition cabinets worldwide become likelier the more fractionalized the legislature.

There is evidence that the strategy works: presidents get policy rewards for giving up offices. In a study of voting behaviour in the Brazilian Congress between 1989 and 1998, Amorim Neto (2002) found that rewarding all cabinet parties with shares of portfolios proportional to the seats that each contributed to the coalition (the so-called Gamson's

law; see Carroll and Cox, 2007) significantly improves the chances of passing the president's legislative programme. Controlling for the electoral calendar and the ideological make-up of the cabinet, the better a party is paid off in portfolios, the more its legislators support the president's agenda in roll-calls. And the better the coalition approximates Gamson's law, the higher the unity legislators belonging to those parties manifest. Preliminary evidence for the Uruguayan case points in the same direction (Buquet et al., 1998).

2. Policy gain

In light of these findings, we ask: do partners also receive a slice of policy reward for their willingness to coalesce? Or is it presidents who reap all the policy benefits of coalition? The literature has a strong tendency to approach the question of presidential coalition from the executive's perspective only. But does the increased unity attributable to cabinet coalescence result only from partners supporting the president's programme (in exchange for office payments), or is part of it due to their support for parts of each other's programme as well? If so, then the binding agreements that the president strikes with parties X and Y also bind parties X and Y to a visible extent (see Amorim Neto, 2002: 51).

There are two types of policy gain for partners. One comes through moderation of the president's proposals, so they reflect the partner's preferences to some extent. In a spatial model, this would appear as a proposal situated a bit away from the president and towards the partners' ideals.² The other comes by log-rolling among coalition members, granting each partner the right to pass some of the laws demanded by core constituents, so that all have something to parade at election time. In log-rolling, each partner earns something at the expense of others in the coalition, but all are presumably better off in the aggregate, as in distributive models of the US Congress (cf. Weingast and Marshall, 1988).

Achieving policy gain one way or the other involves a trade-off. By letting partners fine-tune a compromise acceptable to all, moderation makes for more efficient outcomes (cf. Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006). But log-rolling makes it far easier to claim credit for delivering – an important consideration in systems where party partners are also rivals in the electoral arena, as in Uruguay. And log-rolling is much easier to observe empirically than moderation. We simply need knowledge of which bills belong to each partner (in Section 4 we rely on bill-sponsoring to determine this), so that we can follow their fate in the legislative process. Before discussing the attractiveness of this approach, we open a digression to introduce our test case and its attractiveness.

3. The factional vote in Uruguay

Until a coup in 1973 inaugurated 11 years of autocratic rule, Uruguay was among the most stable democracies in Latin America. As a result, it developed highly institutionalized parties. Jointly, the Blanco (aka Nacional) and Colorado parties used to win over 90 percent of votes, placing Uruguay among the world's two-party democracies (Duverger, 1951). The 1960s saw a third party, the Frente Amplio, gradually increase its share of votes

and seats, undermining party dualism. Since then, no party had won an outright majority in the assembly until the 2005 general election, when the Frente Amplio also won the presidency for the first time and brought unified government back to Uruguay.

Deep factionalization, however, renders Uruguayan parties quite singular in comparative perspective and their business in the assembly attractive for study. Organized factions are present, and persistent, in all three parties. Factions maintain a label, have formal hierarchies and the most important antedate political parties themselves, having histories that go back to the mid-19th century (Buquet et al., 1998; Caetano et al., 1988). Inter-faction tensions are such that, even when a party has won a majority of seats, the Uruguayan party system has remained squarely on the highly fragmented camp.

A connection has been established between sub-party tensions and the electoral system, the so-called double-simultaneous vote. Until a reform in 1996, each party would present multiple tickets in the general election. At the top of each ticket appeared the name of one of the party's many presidential hopefuls, followed by slates of Senate and Chamber candidates to be elected by proportional representation. Voters, endowed with a single vote, would have to choose one of the fused ballots offered by the party. Systems like this one, where voters have the ability to distinguish between co-partisans, make it impossible to campaign solely on the party label, and therefore provide strong incentives to cultivate the vote at a level other than the party (Cain et al., 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995). The introduction of presidential primaries in 1996 changed the system without altering its central traits. Parties, since then, present a single presidential candidate for the general election whom all the party factions endorse. But they still pit fused lists of Senate and Chamber candidates against each other in the general election, thereby preserving the fundamental sub-party tensions of the past intact.

The electoral connection is also affected by entry rules. Where party leaders control access to the ballot, the political fortunes of members with static ambition depend on good behaviour towards the party. Where members can secure a place on the ballot despite leader opposition, fellow partisans compete for access and are therefore even more pressed to cultivate a personal vote. Uruguayan party leaders do not control access to the ballot, but faction leaders do (Moraes, 2008). As a result, members pursue neither partisan nor personal reputations: they have incentives to contribute to the maintenance of the faction's reputation. All this can be encapsulated under the rubric of a 'factional vote', which ought to systematically drive lawmakers' behaviour.

For these reasons, we adopt the sub-party perspective, coining our argument in terms of factions, not parties, from here on. Our use of concepts such as system fragmentation is not standard, applying factions instead of parties proper. But 'faction' can always be replaced by 'party' in the argument, so our claims are applicable and equally valid for more standard party systems.

A remarkable picture of the Uruguayan party system emerges in Table 1 when factions are the units of analysis. The effective number of factions in the assembly was never less than 6.6 in the period.³ The largest faction, Batllismo Unido, did not reach 35 percent of the assembly, and it was exceptional because the two main Colorado factions – Foro Batllista and Lista 15 – ran a united list for the 1984 election, the first after the return to democracy. Average faction size in the period was 9 percent, with a standard deviation of 8 percent.

Table 1. Factions' legislative weight and cabinet representation 1985–2005

Faction	Assembly seats			Cabinets and seats they control							
	85–90	90–95	95–00	00–05	San I	Lac I	Lac2	Lac3	San2	Bat I	Bat2
Colorados											
15	–	1/2	2	15	–	yes	no	no	yes	yes	yes
BU	34	–	–	–	yes	–	–	–	–	–	–
C94	–	4	4	–	–	yes	yes	yes	yes	–	–
FB	–	5	24	18	–	yes	no	no	yes	yes	yes
UCB	6	9	1	–	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	–	–
Other Colorados	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
all	(41)	(30)	(32)	(33)							
Blancos											
CHW	–	–	9	–	–	–	–	–	yes	–	–
H	6	25	13	18	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
MNR	8	11	2	–	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no
PLP	21	1	–	–	no	yes	yes	no	–	–	–
PN	–	2	6	–	–	–	–	–	yes	–	–
other Blancos	–	2	1	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
all	(35)	(39)	(31)	(22)							
Frente Amplio											
1001	4	10	2	1	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
AP	–	–	–	5	–	–	–	–	–	no	no
AU	–	–	16	8	–	–	–	–	no	no	no
MPP	–	2	2	5	–	no	no	no	no	no	no
PS	2	5	7	14	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
VA	2	3	2	4	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
other Frente Amplio	2	1	2	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
all	(10)	(21)	(31)	(40)							
Partido Gobierno del Pueblo [†]	11	8	1	–	no	no	no	no	yes	–	–
other factions	2	1	4	4	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
total	100%	100%	100%	100%	40%	68%	51%	38%	63%	52%	33%
Effective parties	2.9	3.3	3.3	3.1							
Effective factions	6.6	7.7	9.5	8.5							

Source: Moraes (2008). President's faction in boldface.

[†] Split form Frente Amplio and ran on its own in 1994, then with Colorados in 1999.

In these conditions, not even the president's faction, which always got a seat premium in the period, could command a majority. So unless some factions cooperated, this meant that the legislative agenda remained open for all, giving rise to all sorts of bargaining complications (Cox, 2006). Without a supporting majority, the Chamber President, replaced every year, has no agenda power. Chamber Presidents have to respect the chronological order of reported bills when scheduling the Order of the Day (Reglamento, 1991: arts. 43, 144). The Order, however, can be amended by majority vote on the floor, stopping ongoing debate at any time to place some proposal next in the Order (arts. 47–50). Bills pushed backwards for six consecutive sessions lose their place in subsequent Orders and are *de facto* killed (art. 43).

Rules like these set the incentive to form multi-faction coalitions in order to cartelize the agenda (cf. Cox and McCubbins, 2005), and the cabinet has been a focal point for coordination. As shown on the right side of Table 1, all presidents in the period appointed members of factions other than their own to the cabinet. With the exception of Sanguinetti's first cabinet (lasting throughout his first term and denoted San1) and Batlle's second cabinet (Bat2), members of Blanco and Colorado factions were jointly present in the cabinet. Because the factional vote puts pressure on all factions to reject invitations to join the cabinet, or, if they accept, abandon it before the term expires (Altman, 2000; Morgenstern, 2001), presidents got enough partners on board to secure majority status less than eight of the 20 years (Lac1, San2 and Bat1). Lacalle's administration was especially susceptible to the coalition-shaking effect of the factional vote.

4. Sponsoring and co-sponsoring legislation

Factions care about controlling assembly seats, won as reward for legislation targeting new streams of benefit (or protecting existing ones) to the societal interests they represent. Given their small size, this requires vote-trading with other factions. We look at the credibility problems this raises elsewhere (Magar, 2010) and direct attention in this section to credit-claiming and how sponsoring and co-sponsoring between factions help achieve it.

Sponsoring legislation lets members take positions dear to constituents cheaply and regardless of whether or not the bill makes it out of committee, gets a spot on the agenda, or is eventually approved (Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996; Schiller, 1995). Rules in fact subsidize this task in Uruguay: a summary of every bill introduced is published in the legislative diary and made web-accessible at Chamber's expense (Reglamento, 1991: arts. 37, 138).

Empirical work has shown that sponsoring in the US Congress is likelier among precisely those members who are more eager to prove their worthiness as representatives: junior members, members of the minority party and electorally vulnerable legislators (Campbell, 1982; Wilson and Young, 1997). Co-sponsoring patterns have provided evidence that legislative procedure in general, and agenda-setting in particular, strongly reduce the dimensionality of policy in the US (Talbert and Potoski, 2002); and that candidates in Chilean congressional elections bid for votes in auctions where ideological reputation is the currency (Crisp et al., 2004a).

To see the attractiveness of sponsoring and co-sponsoring for empirical analysis, consider the value of legislation for a faction. Faction f 's pay-off U for bill b can be expressed as:

$$U_f(b) = V_f \times \text{passes} + F_f \times \text{noticed} + S_f$$

where V_f is the net value of the bill for f 's constituents, F_f is the net value of carrying actions in favour of the bill and S_f is the net value of sponsoring the bill. V_f is the crucial component of utility for the sake of re-election, a stream of benefits to constituents net of costs – goods traded for votes, the very essence of representative democracy. But in order to accrue these net benefits, bill b needs to pass. And in the event it does, f still needs to credibly claim credit for delivery. This is easier done if benefits are targetable, if policy consists of delivering private goods or local public ones when constituents are geographically concentrated (Cox and McCubbins, 2001). Goods any less private in nature complicate credit-claiming, in which case the next component of utility gains importance: taking actions in favour of the bill. The most obvious is voting in favour of final passage, but actions include public statements publicizing the bill's benefits and desirability, work in committee to secure a report, persuading the opposition and so forth. As before, for F_f to be of value, the favourable vote/actions must be observable to constituents. A condition not always met, especially where roll-call votes are not used systematically (as in Uruguay; see Carey, 2009; Morgenstern, 2003).⁴ In which case the third component of pay-off becomes crucial: sponsoring legislation.

We assume that whenever a faction is willing to sponsor a piece of legislation that faction is also willing to take future actions to pass the piece in question because it is beneficial to core constituents. In other words, our approach is that $S_f > 0 \rightarrow V_f > 0$ and $S_f > 0 \rightarrow F_f > 0$ always hold true.⁵ This has an important implication: if sponsoring b indicates that one faction is willing to support bill b in subsequent steps – including voting favourably – then co-sponsoring acquires the form of a credible commitment by all signatory factions to support a piece of legislation. Co-sponsoring is thus one form of inter-faction cooperation capable of overcoming problems of opportunism raised by the factional vote. Co-sponsoring increases a bill's base of support and so improves its odds of passing.

If co-sponsoring were costless, factions would always seek ways to add bill signatories, since piling enough sponsoring factions would guarantee the bill's success. But co-sponsoring is rarely costless, especially in a system promoting the factional vote. Co-sponsors inevitably dilute efforts to 'peel off pieces of governmental accomplishment for which [you] can believably generate a sense of responsibility' (Mayhew, 1974: 53). If co-sponsoring were pure exercises in position-taking, as it is conventionally treated in US writings and applications to Latin America, this trade-off would largely disappear; adding more signatures to a hopeless bill increases the drama of having a larger group arrested by the powers that be. But a comparison of six Latin American democracies has in fact shown that co-sponsoring is less prevalent in systems where members of the same party compete electorally against one another (Crisp et al., 2004b), hinting that the game does not revolve around position-taking only, but also around credit-claiming.

Table 2. Co-sponsoring and cabinet status hypotheses

Faction's cabinet status	Partner out of cabinet	Partner in cabinet	Partner is pres. fac.
HYPOTHESES			
<i>In majority</i>	=	=	=
<i>Out of majority</i>	=	+	+
<i>In minority</i>	+	=	+
<i>Out of minority</i>	=	+	+
TEST RESULTS (see Section 6)			
<i>In majority</i>	= ✓	= ✓	= ✓
<i>Out of majority</i>	- ✓ [†]	+ ✓	= ×
<i>In minority</i>	+ ✓	+ ×	+ ✓
<i>Out of minority</i>	= ✓	+ ✓	+ ✓

+ expect a higher probability of passing compared to bill sponsored solo.

= expect no change compared to bill sponsored solo.

† see text.

In line with this logic, co-sponsoring in Uruguay typically involves fewer factions than needed to secure passage, even if first impressions suggest the contrary. Excluding executive-initiated bills (that are never co-sponsored), proposals in the period had 4.4 co-sponsors on average and a standard deviation of 6 – hardly as small as the factional vote suggests. But looking at their factional affiliations we see that this is more apparent than real: two out of three of those bills were, in fact, introduced by members of the same faction. Yet there remains one-third for which cross-faction support was sought after. And given that adding co-sponsors dilutes the value of S_f , one should pick partners carefully, preferring those with clout to bring enough improvement to a bill's chances to compensate for the loss of S_f .

The discussion on coalitions in Section 1 identifies factions able to significantly boost the chances of legislation and derive testable predictions. We focus on factions belonging in a majority cabinet first. If cabinet partners are rewarded with policy, then these factions must be counted among those with clout: the coalition has the votes to seize Chamber institutions and bend structure and process in their favour. We therefore expect factions in this position to be able to secure passage of bills they sponsor, regardless of whether they do this alone or with partners. Factions out of a majority cabinet, on the contrary, are helpless in their ability to legislate: bills they co-sponsor among themselves should fare as badly as those they sponsor solo. It is only those they co-sponsor with a cabinet faction that should do better.

Table 2 states these claims in probabilistic terms as testable hypotheses (ignore for now the bottom portion of the table). The first row of the table considers the case of a faction in a majority cabinet, the second a faction out of it. Columns identify the choice of partner this faction opts to co-sponsor with: one out of the cabinet, or in it, or the president's faction. Cell entries compare the odds of passing a bill co-sponsored with the partner of choice to those of the same bill proposed solo. Entries report whether we expect, other things constant, the choice of partner to increase (+), decrease (-) or leave the probability of passage unchanged (=). Since a majority cabinet faction has the clout to succeed, co-sponsoring should leave the odds of passage unchanged, hence the equals signs in row 1 of the table.

Factions coalescing in a minority cabinet face a different situation. While they can count on cabinet partners' support for passage if policy rewards exist, this falls short of majority on the floor. They therefore need to secure out-of-cabinet support. So, other things constant, in minority government we expect bills co-sponsored by factions in and factions out of cabinet to fare significantly better than those sponsored solo by cabinet factions, or those co-sponsored by cabinet factions among themselves. On the other side of the table, bills co-sponsored by factions out of cabinet could a priori secure the votes needed for passage among the other out-of-cabinet factions, but this most likely requires too large a list of co-sponsors to be feasible. So the odds of passage of bills co-sponsored with out-of-cabinet partners should not be much different to those sponsored solo. But they should increase when they pick co-sponsors in the cabinet.

We treat the president's faction separately from the rest of the cabinet because it has more bargaining resources owing to its special status. First, research has established that cabinet coalitions do help a president pass his programme; his faction should presumably benefit as well, even if others in the cabinet were only paid in office currency. Second, presidents control administrative agencies, and the patronage and monetary resources that come attached to them should provide extra currency to buy some assembly support. Third, in Uruguay the president has a very strong form of veto allowing him easily to amend bills that come to his desk for signature (Alemán and Schwartz, 2006; Magar, 2010), which is another form of persuasion. So unless a faction belongs in a majority cabinet, and thus has clout of its own, we expect that bills co-sponsored with the president's faction will fare better than those sponsored solo.

Co-sponsoring patterns conform to general expectations. Figure 1 presents a typology of bills, that is, rows distinguishing whether they were sponsored alone or with partners and columns the minority or majority status of the cabinet. Each cell reports the number of bills it contains for the period, then breaks the cell total into percentages, reporting them in a Venn diagram intersecting subsets of bills sponsored by in-cabinet ('in'), by out-of-cabinet ('out') and by the president's ('p's') factions – so numbers in each diagram add up to 100 percent. Solo bills roughly double the number of co-sponsored ones, regardless of cabinet status; but controlling for cabinet status reveals interesting patterns. The bulk of solo activity falls among the 'in' crowd when a majority cabinet is in place (53 percent of bills in the cell), but among the 'out' crowd otherwise (63 percent). Amid co-sponsored bills, note how the president's faction more or less reverses relative numbers between 'in' and 'out' partners depending on cabinet status, preferring the former in majority situations (12 to 2 percent) but the latter otherwise (4 to 14 percent). And 'in' factions co-sponsor among themselves five times more with a majority cabinet than with a minority one (11 to 2 percent). In the proposal stage at least, factions behave as if policy pay-offs were available. The next sections test hypotheses, showing that passage rates follow similar patterns.

5. Data and methods

We analyse all bills initiated in the Uruguayan assembly between 15 February 1985 and 14 February 2005, inclusive, covering four full legislatures. Most information to code variables was machine-extracted from the web records (www.parlamento.gub.uy) for




Figure 1. Sponsoring profile by cabinet status, percentages 1985–2005. Numbers in each Venn diagram add to 100%. The subset sponsored solo by the president's faction excludes 1,972 executive-initiated bills.

each of the 5668 observations that comprise our dataset.⁶ To begin, an indicator of whether or not each proposal passed was coded. Table 3 is a summary of our dependent variable, broken into discrete periods corresponding to the different cabinets in the period. Ignoring interim periods when the lame-duck president briefly coexists with the new assembly, the passage rate of bills fluctuated between a minimum of 26 percent in Battle's second cabinet and a maximum of 46 percent in Lacalle's second. Over 20 years, fewer than two bills in five passed on average. Bill-level analysis will show if the cabinet status of proposers and, when present, their co-sponsors explains a substantial portion of passage variance.

Laws, if they pass at all, take time to clear the hurdles of the legislative process. Successful bills initiated by legislators took 1.3 years on average from introduction to final

Table 3. Bill passage by presidential cabinet, 1985–2005

Cabinet	start	end	Bills initiated	% passed
Pre-Sanguinetti [†]	15 Feb. 1985	28 Feb. 1985	37	16
Sanguinetti I	1 Mar. 1985	14 Feb. 1990	1348	31
Pre-Lacalle I [†]	15 Feb. 1990	28 Feb. 1990	26	23
Lacalle I	1 Mar. 1990	14 Mar. 1991	314	36
Lacalle 2	15 Mar. 1991	14 Mar. 1993	559	46
Lacalle 3	15 Mar. 1993	14 Feb. 1995	489	41
Pre-Sanguinetti 2 [†]	15 Feb. 1995	28 Feb. 1995	1	0
Sanguinetti 2	1 Mar. 1995	14 Feb. 2000	1279	43
Pre-Batlle I [†]	15 Feb. 2000	28 Feb. 2000	10	10
Batlle I	1 Mar. 2000	28 Oct. 2002	989	42
Batlle 2	29 Oct. 2002	14 Feb. 2005	617	26
Total			5669	38

[†] New assembly convenes 15 February, president inaugurated 1 March.

passage vote in the period (Magar and Moraes, 2008). For this reason, truncating the study on 14 February 2005 runs the risk of considering some proposals dead when they simply needed more time to pass – a problem of right-censoring in the data. This could raise complications for estimation, especially for proposals made late in the period. We are confident that the risk of right-censoring bias is minimal for several reasons. First, even if the study does not admit new bills after 14 February 2005, observation of the set of pending proposals nonetheless continued until 15 April 2009, four full years later, in order to detect bills that passed afterwards. Of 3532 un-passed proposals (all potentially pending), 19 passed after the last proposal was admitted in the dataset; the last one did on 11 October 2006. Second, archiving rules in Uruguay play in our favour, since all bills pending after the assembly adjourns are sent to the archive, and resurrecting them requires a proactive request of the president of either chamber (Reglamento, 1991: art. 147). The case is not as benevolent as the US Congress (where pending bills cannot be resurrected), but it is closer to it than to Mexico (where the new Congress inherits all pending matters from predecessors). Third, when the Frente Amplio inaugurated its unified party government in 2005, it displaced the Blanco–Colorado dominance that had lasted for decades and upon which the proposals we analyse were made. So while some right-censoring certainly remains in the data, it is negligible.

In order to code the sponsorship profile of bills and the cabinet status of sponsors, we needed to determine whom each bill belonged to. This was possible because every bill's record lists the names of its signatories (*firmantes*). Owners in our informal model are not private lawmakers who actually introduce a bill, but the factions they belong to. So we began by mapping the factional affiliations of signatories⁷ to see which factions sponsored the bill. Four ownership profiles and a residual were uncovered (percentage observations in parentheses): (a) owned *solo*, initiated by assembly member (37) or by president (35); (b) owned *with partners* (8); (c) two *co-owners*, 50 percent signatures each (3); (d) *Multi-owned*, all with < 50 percent signatures (11); and (e) *residual*, owned by marginal factions (6). We explain the rules of classification. Whenever signatories all

belong to the same faction (or there is a single sponsor), we coded the bill as belonging solo to the faction in question. Presidents' bills are coded as belonging solo to his faction. To deal with signatories from different factions, we proceeded as corporations with multiple shareholders do. If an absolute majority of signatories belongs to faction f , the bill was coded as belonging to f with partners, and a note was made of which faction(s) served as minority partner(s). Next, when signatories split in equal numbers between two factions, the bill was coded in the two co-owners category and a note made of who those were. And bills with signatories from three or more factions, none holding an absolute majority of signatures, were coded in the multiple owners category. Finally, bills with a majority of signatories belonging to factions other than the 17 listed in Table 1 were relegated to the residual category.

We next looked at owners' and partners' cabinet status at bill initiation time to code regressors (formal definitions and descriptive statistics of which appear in the Appendix). One battery of dummy variables controls for cabinet status. *OwnerInMaj* equals 1 if the owner, sole or with partners, or at least one of the co- or multi-owners, belonged in a cabinet with majority support. So any bill initiated by a faction with owner status and represented in *Lacalle1*, *Sanguinetti2* or *Battle1* earns a value of 1 for this variable. *OwnerInMin* is defined analogously for minority cabinets. *OwnerOutMin* equals 1 if the owner, or all co- or multi-owners, were out of a minority cabinet. A fourth dummy, *OwnerOutMaj*, which is defined analogously for the majority case, is dropped from the equation to avoid the dummy trap (it is the sum of the first three dummies). Since, according to our argument, law-making from outside a majority cabinet is the least advantageous, interpretation of regression coefficients for this battery is straightforward: they reflect how owners with better position affect a bill's odds.

The next battery controls for co-sponsoring. *PartnerOut* equals 1 if at least one out-of-cabinet faction co-sponsored the bill. *PartnerIn* and *PartnerPfac* are defined analogously when co-sponsors include at least one cabinet faction or the president's faction, respectively. Because owners can choose partners in and out of cabinet on the same bill, dummies in this trio are not mutually exclusive and all appear on the right side of the equation. We did not code the president's faction as a cabinet faction (although technically it is the only one always in the cabinet) in order to seize any differential in the effects of two kinds of cabinet partners. *Solo*, a dummy for bills sponsored by a single faction, is dropped from the equation because it equals 1 when the previous three all equal 0; this is convenient for hypotheses-testing: a positive and significant coefficient indicates an increase in the probability of passage compared to the same bill sponsored solo.

Since hypotheses involve the cabinet status of owner and partner(s), we also include the interaction (i.e. multiplication) of the two batteries just described. This completes the set of variables for hypothesis-testing, adding nine more regressors to the right side. We also include control variables. Bills owned in full or in part by the president's faction are identified by the dummy *OwnerPfac*; those initiated by the president himself are identified by the dummy *ExecutiveInitiated*. These should capture any effect from the resource asymmetry between the executive and others. We also control for the possibility of partisan effects through *PartyHasPres*, equal to 1 if owner (or one of them) shares a partisan label with the president; and with *FrenteAmplio*, defined analogously for *Frente Amplio* owners.

Table 4. Determinants of bill passage

Variable	Model 1 all bills		Model 2 MP bills only	
	Coef.	Std. err.	Coef.	Std. err.
<i>OwnerOutMin</i>	-0.487***	0.178	-0.545***	0.182
<i>OwnerInMin</i>	-0.357*	0.201	-0.276	0.224
<i>OwnerInMaj</i>	-0.140	0.183	-0.241	0.188
<i>PartnerOut</i>	-0.919***	0.291	-0.902***	0.295
<i>OwnerOutMin</i> X <i>PartnerOut</i>	0.806***	0.320	0.766**	0.320
<i>OwnerInMin</i> X <i>PartnerOut</i>	1.038**	0.438	0.929**	0.442
<i>OwnerInMaj</i> X <i>PartnerOut</i>	0.693*	0.428	0.764*	0.431
<i>PartnerIn</i>	1.413***	0.396	1.296***	0.397
<i>OwnerOutMin</i> X <i>PartnerIn</i>	-0.597	0.456	-0.583	0.453
<i>OwnerInMin</i> X <i>PartnerIn</i>	-1.085**	0.507	-1.046**	0.507
<i>OwnerInMaj</i> X <i>PartnerIn</i>	-1.163***	0.458	-0.990**	0.459
<i>PartnerPfac</i>	0.144	0.387	0.111	0.389
<i>OwnerOutMin</i> X <i>PartnerPfac</i>	0.620	0.449	0.574	0.446
<i>OwnerInMin</i> X <i>PartnerPfac</i>	0.433	0.545	0.368	0.544
<i>OwnerInMaj</i> X <i>PartnerPfac</i>	-0.092	0.506	-0.046	0.507
<i>OwnerPfac</i>	0.648***	0.151	0.597***	0.153
Executive Initiated	1.514***	0.109	-	-
Party HasPres	-0.215	0.146	-0.246*	0.150
FrenteAmplio	-0.636***	0.141	-0.644***	0.140
Size	0.011**	0.005	0.012**	0.005
Remaining Term	0.840***	0.121	0.328**	0.160
Δ gdp	0.001	0.006	-0.002	0.008
Constant	-1.650***	0.169	-1.304***	0.182
χ^2	1,395 ($p < .0001$)		267 ($p < .0001$)	
Percent correct	74		63	
Log likelihood	-3058		-1832	
N	5669		3697	

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Method of estimation: logit.

Size is another resource of law-making that our argument omits. We nonetheless include Size on the right side, equal to the percentage of assembly seats controlled by owner (excluding seats held by minority partners in case there are), or the sum of seats controlled by co- or multi-owners. RemainingTerm, the share of the term left after the bill is introduced, should capture any cyclic effects. Finally, since a growing economy generates more government revenue (to finance log-rolls, among other things), we include Δ gdp, the growth of the real per capita GDP for the year in which the bill is initiated.

6. Results and interpretation

Table 4 reports maximum-likelihood logit estimates. Coefficients for control variables confirm that the president and his faction have been *primus inter pares* in the legislative

arena, despite lacking majority status of their own in the period. Bills owned by the president's faction have, other things constant, significantly better odds, as reflected in the positive and significant (at the 0.01 level) coefficient. Since variables *OwnerInMaj* and *OwnerInMin* equal 1 when *OwnerPfac* equals 1, this effect is additional to any from the owner's cabinet status. And bills introduced personally by the executive get another significant premium in the probability of passage. Evidence of partisan effects is mixed: factions from the president's party receive no bonus in their capacity to pass legislation. If anything, the coefficient is negative, albeit indistinguishable from zero in statistical terms. This result testifies eloquently to the magnitude of intra-party tensions arising from the factional vote. Yet factions from the Frente Amplio were significantly less successful than Blanco and Colorado ones, lending credence to complaints of collusion to keep them out (Moraes et al., 2005).

Smaller factions or collections of co-sponsors are disadvantaged in comparison with larger ones, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of the *Size* variable. It certainly pays off to maintain or even increase the presence of your faction in the assembly or to add signatories in compensation for smallness. It is also easier to pass a bill at the start than at the end of the term. Consistent with Altman (2000), Buquet et al. (1998) and Morgenstern (2001), as the five years progress, electoral pressure appears to make factions less willing to cooperate with one another. Finally, the state of the economy exerts no significant effect on the odds of passage of individual bills.

We also estimated the model dropping executive-initiated bills in order to verify that the executive's much higher batting averages, common worldwide (Cheibub et al., 2004), are not driving estimates for the president's faction, especially since we coded presidents' bills as owned solo by his faction. Model 2 shows that estimates are virtually identical with this alteration. The most notable changes involve the model's predictive power (it drops to 63 percent) and the variables *RemainingTerm*, whose effect shrinks by more than half (remaining significant) and a sign change for Δ gdp (remaining far from significance). But all other results survive this important robustness check.

Owing to the large number of variables related to hypotheses, and especially the use of interactions, we do not discuss them individually. Instead, we interpret results by performing simulations. This exercise begins by conceiving alternative scenarios combining a bill owned by a faction in or out of the cabinet with the presence or not of a majority cabinet. This yields four general scenarios, portrayed in each cell of Figure 2. The bill-owner in all scenarios is a faction not from the president's party (implying, also, that it is not the president's faction and that the bill is not executive-initiated) nor from the Frente Amplio. The imaginary owner is assumed to control 10 percent of seats, which is about the average faction size excluding the president's. The timing in all is set at the middle of the term and economic growth at the average.⁸

Comparative statics analysis is then performed using the estimated model to predict the bill's expected probability of passing in each scenario. This is represented by plots showing how changes in the bill's sponsoring profile affect its odds. Plots contrast a bill sponsored solo by owner; one co-sponsored with an out-of-cabinet partner; one co-sponsored with an in-cabinet partner; and one co-sponsored with the president's faction. Figure 2 contains visual tests of the article's hypotheses.




Figure 2. Cabinet status, co-sponsorship and the probability of passage. The centre of each circular plot represents probability 0; the outer rim probability 1. The grey ring is the 95% CI of the probability that a bill sponsored solo by owner passes. The triplet of bars portrays how that CI changes if the bill were co-sponsored with an out-of-cabinet faction (bar extending south towards out); with an in-cabinet faction (north-west, towards in); or with the president's faction (north-east, towards *p*'s). Estimates of uncertainty computed with CLARIFY (Tomz et al., 2001).

Probability is pictured in polar plots: the centre represents probability 0, the outer rim probability 1. The grey ring in each scenario represents the odds that the imaginary bill will pass if sponsored solo. Reliance on Monte-Carlo simulation reveals not just the size of the effects, but also the uncertainty surrounding inferences.⁹ The width of the ring is the 95 percent confidence interval of the expected probability of passage, so the larger the ring's diameter, the bigger the odds of passage solo; the thicker the ring, the less confident the estimate. Bars extending in three directions plot the odds-of-passage differential when the owner opts to co-sponsor with a faction out of cabinet (bar extending south); with a faction in cabinet (north-west bar); or with the president's faction (north-east bar). The position of bars relative to rings shows how the model fulfils expectations.

Simulations reveal that a bill sponsored solo has a probability of passing between 0.4 and 0.6 if the owner sits in a majority cabinet, the range dropping (to 0.15, 0.2) if the cabinet has minority status. The grey ring in the latter scenario is not too different in size from those by out-of-cabinet factions. While this was not expressed as a hypothesis proper, our model expects that belonging in a majority cabinet, when policy pay-offs

exist, is a key resource for law-making. Ring comparison confirms that factions in this position can get their bills passed with substantially better probability than the rest. And because the scenario considers factions in cabinet other than the president's, this is evidence of policy clout for the president's partners.

Hypotheses posit that owners in a majority cabinet (top-right scenario in Figure 2) will effect no change from the baseline odds by collaborating with others. Co-sponsoring with another faction in cabinet slightly raises the probability that the bill will pass, as seen in the outwards slide of the 'in' bar vis-a-vis the ring. But bar and ring overlap to such an extent that we are left with little confidence that the change is not the product of pure chance alone. We therefore conclude that teaming with other majority cabinet factions makes no difference, as hypothesized. And nothing is achieved either by co-sponsoring with out-of-cabinet factions, or the president's: the 'out' bar even slides slightly inward, the other bar slightly outwards, but both overlap too much with the ring. We conclude that no real differences exist, again as hypothesized.

We now evaluate out-of-majority cabinet owners' hypotheses (bottom-right scenario). This ought to be the least advantageous position that a faction can adopt from a policy stance. Simulations show that co-sponsoring with other outsiders not only does not help towards success, as hypothesized, it shrinks the chances of succeeding below the solo ring. Collaborating with them is costly in terms of passage, possibly complicating negotiation with factions having clout. We nonetheless read this as partial confirmation of the corresponding hypothesis: the effect is not nil, as posited, but neither is it positive; the hypothesis survives a one-tailed test. And speaking of players with clout, the sizeable outwards shift of the 'in' bar supports the claim that majority cabinet factions should be counted among them. Despite the bar's width, indicative of estimate uncertainty, a clear gap separates it from the ring, the probability of passage surging from the (0.2, 0.3) range to (0.5, 0.75). And it is noteworthy that the same cannot be said for bills co-sponsored with the president's faction, whose bar remains centred at the same level as the ring, contrary to hypothesis. It thus appears that majority cabinet factions can use some of their policy advantage to become successful partners of outside factions, but somehow not the president's faction.

Next are bills owned by minority cabinet factions (the top-left scenario). Here an increase in the bill's odds results from co-sponsoring with anyone. There is overlap, yet most of the 'out' bar extends beyond the ring, so there is ground to conclude that outside collaboration shifts probability up, as expected. The same movement is manifest for the 'in' bar, although this is contrary to hypothesis. Teaming with other cabinet factions (except the president's) provides certain advantages not considered by our argument. Teaming with the president's faction brings the clearest improvement of the scenario, only the tip of the large bar touching the outside of the ring. This conforms to hypothesis. And moving to owners outside a minority cabinet (bottom-left scenario) we see that it helps to co-sponsor with cabinet factions or the president's but not with other out-of-cabinet factions, as expected.

The bottom part of Table 2 summarizes test results. Of 12 hypotheses, nine are outright accepted, one is accepted with some reservation and two are rejected. A policy approach to cabinet politics in a presidential system explains systematic patterns in bill passage. When the conditions outlined in Section 4 are met, cabinet factions other than

Table 5. Targetable and non-targetable benefits in a sample of Uruguayan bills

Bill owner (avg. partners)	Targetable		Not targ.		Total	
Executive (0)	50	.80	50	.80	100	.80
Out of minority cab. (.6)	53	.19	33	.14	100	.17
Out of majority cab. (2.5)	46	.36	47	.31	100	.33
In minority cab. (.2)	56	.18	40	.08	100	.13
In majority cab. (.3)	60	.28	34	.25	100	.27
PresFac. minority cab. (.1)	63	.32	30	.18	100	.27
PresFac. majority cab. (.2)	70	.33	26	—	100	.23

Note: Numbers in italics are row percentages, followed by passage rates. Unclassifiable bills, making rows sum 100% (N=30), omitted.

the president's have law-making clout. Office pay-offs may intervene in cabinet coalitions, but they do so along with systematic policy pay-offs. And the role played by the president's own faction in this game is very interesting, contingent upon the status of the cabinet. When the coalition lacks a majority, the president's faction takes the driver's seat in negotiations with outsiders. But when the cabinet commands a majority, the president's faction seems to take the back seat, leaving partners in control of relations with outsiders. Presidential resources seem key for success in order to pass a specific bill. But when factions have made the effort to iron out differences and established a longer coalition in cabinet, these sweeteners appear to lose importance. The common programme that cabinet coalitions present guides negotiation in the assembly.

7. Bill content

We have uncovered coalition patterns in Uruguay omitting any reference to bill and law content. We finish by presenting preliminary evidence in that direction. If the factional vote raises significant intra-party tensions then the introduction of more particularistic bills is expected (Carey and Shugart, 1995).

We took a random sample of 30 bills from each of seven ownership profiles listed in the leftmost column of Table 5. We coded content (target) from the summary file for each bill in the sample, following Taylor-Robinson and Diaz (1999) in search of the *level* of policy incidence, and collapsing their categories into two: targetable (their individual, local and sectoral levels) or non-targetable (regional and national) policy. Our somewhat crude measure reveals patterns consistent with our main argument.

The executive's sample had a 50–50 split between targetable and non-targetable bills, making the president responsible for delivering most public goods thanks to a stronger passage rate (also reported in each cell of Table 5). Yet the amount of constituency service to individual, local and sectoral levels by the executive, in the sample at least, is remarkable, suggesting that being in charge of national policy does not trump concerns for the value of the faction label. Presidents appear constantly to have played in favour of their factional interests in the legislative arena, and perhaps in favour of other factions by initiating some of their pet projects. This could explain the earlier result of no bonus for the president's party factions independent of their cabinet status.

While consistently smaller than the executive's, factions' passage rates do exhibit variance. Rates for factions excluded from majority cabinets appear anomalously high regardless of content (above 0.3) and comparable in size for targetable proposals by the president's faction. The anomaly is more apparent than real. We quantified but do not report whether bill costs are concentrated, spread or costless. Three-fifths of what out-of-majority factions passed was in fact costless (renaming public schools was an all-time favourite), indicating that they mostly played in the symbolic politics field balancing their position-taking proposals evenly between targetable and non-targetable policy. All other factions specialized, as expected, in targetable rather than public goods, with sizeable differentials. This is especially true for factions in a majority cabinet: with higher passage rates they appear to have successfully delivered benefits to distinct groups, presumably core constituents. And, importantly, most of this was *not* in the costless group. The first column reports the average number of partners that owners had in the categories. Out-of-majority-cabinet factions sought most co-sponsoring, while those in the cabinet mostly operated solo, which is optimal for credit-claiming.

This sample and the bill classification corroborate that those joining the cabinet are paid in policy currency. And they use the currency to promote targetable legislation for core constituents and also to broker support for mostly symbolic achievements by outside factions.

8. Conclusions

This article has examined sponsoring patterns and legislative success within the single case of the Uruguayan legislature in the 20 years since the return to democracy, seeking whether collaboration with factions that are participating in a cabinet coalition increases the chances that a bill becomes law. Evidence reveals that partners are policy-motivated, and not simply office-motivated, to join the cabinet. The main empirical findings are two. First, when cabinet factions jointly control a majority, bills introduced by participants (not just the president and his faction) have a good chance of passing without the need for co-sponsors. Claiming credit for delivering targetable benefits is key for electoral survival in Uruguay, hence the centrality for factions of being able to act alone in the legislature. Second, factions in other circumstances have to co-sponsor to improve the chances of bill success, and doing it with minority cabinet participants (not just the president's faction) helps most. These results have implications for several lines of research.

First, the results are important evidence that policy is one important currency of exchange in presidential coalition (otherwise only the president's faction would reveal the types of pattern just discussed). Our evidence is important given how little we actually know about the extent to which participating in coalitions in presidential systems benefits the president's coalition partners beyond the direct pay-offs they extract from the president himself. But the evidence is indirect: analysis proceeded omitting controls for the content of the bills that were proposed, co-sponsored and passed. A preliminary inspection to fill this absence performed for a small sample of bills confirms that factions appear to specialize in targetable legislation, that success rates are not markedly different between factions in and out of cabinet, but that the latter get mostly costless, symbolic

results. A systematic and careful study of bill content (cf. McCubbins and Thies, 1997) is the next obvious step for research.

Second, the policy importance of cabinet membership underlines the need to understand it better, calling for models of endogenous cabinet membership. How and under what conditions, for example, do parties and factions accept cabinet offers? And if participants acquire policy clout, is a president sometimes better off giving up on getting a majority cabinet? Why do participants often trade with outsiders?

Finally, there are concerns for the generalizability of the findings. Our study is premised on the claim that we can study factions in Uruguay meaningfully and then extend what we learn to other multiparty systems. Yet studying factions offers few points of comparison to previous scholarship because data that have long been readily available for parties are unavailable for factions. In studying coalitions, for example, it is common to look at how ideologically proximate a party was to its coalition partners, a standard control we could not perform due to the lack of data on the ideological make-up of factions for the entire period. Party-level data from the *Programa de Elites de Latinoamérica* confirms that Blanco and Colorado legislators, some of whom coalesced in the period, were consistently much closer to one another in self-placement than to the Frente Amplio as a whole in 1996, 2001 and 2006 (Martínez Barahona, 2003). But Altman (2000: 266) also showed that same-party factions were not well described by the party's average ideology in 1997. We hope that future research retrieves standard party measures from the factions that compose them for systems where these are expected to matter. In the meantime, we can verify that parties other than the president's in multiparty settings get the sort of legislative advantages that we have uncovered among Uruguay's cabinet factions.

Appendix: Variable definitions

Pass equals 1 if bill was sanctioned by the assembly; 0 otherwise. *PartnerOut* equals 1 if bill was co-sponsored with members of a faction with no cabinet representation at initiation time; 0 otherwise. *PartnerIn* equals 1 if bill was co-sponsored with members of some faction (other than the president's) with cabinet representation at initiation time; 0 otherwise. *PartnerPfac* equals 1 if bill was co-sponsored with members of the president's faction; 0 otherwise. *Solo* equals 1 if bill was sponsored exclusively by members of the same faction; 0 otherwise; dropped from the equation since $Solo = 1$ when $PartnerOut = PartnerIn = PartnerPfac = 0$, it is the baseline to interpret partner dummies. *OwnerInMaj* equals 1 if the cabinet had majority support at the bill's initiation and either (a) the owner (sole or with partners) had cabinet representation or (b) the bill is co- or multi-owned and at least one owner other than the president's faction had cabinet representation; 0 otherwise. *OwnerInMin* is defined as the previous variable when the cabinet had minority support at the bill's initiation. *OwnerOutMin* equals 1 if the cabinet had minority support at the bill's initiation and the owner (sole or with partners) or all co- or multi-owners had no cabinet representation; 0 otherwise. $OwnerOutMaj = 1 - OwnerInMaj - OwnerInMin - OwnerOutMin$; dropped from the equation, it is the baseline to interpret owners' cabinet status dummies. *OwnerPfac* equals 1 if bill is owned (solo or with partners) by the president's faction; 0 otherwise. *ExecutiveInitiated* equals 1 if bill

was sponsored by the president; 0 otherwise. *PartyHasPres* equals 1 if bill is owned (solo or with partners) by a faction whose party is in control of the presidency at initiation; 0 otherwise. *FrenteAmplio* equals 1 if bill is owned by a faction from the Frente Amplio party; 0 otherwise. *Size* is the percentage of assembly seats controlled by the bill owner (excluding seats held by minority partners in case there are), or the sum of seats controlled by co- or multi-owners. *RemainingTerm* is the share of the Legislative term remaining after the day bill is tabled. Δgdp is the annual rate of growth of the real per capita GDP for the year in which the bill is initiated (the sources are Heston et al. [2006] for 1984–2004; World Bank [2007] for 2003–5).

Table A1.

Dichotomous variables	Rel. freq.: 0		1	
Passed	0.623		0.377	
OwnerOutMin	0.744		0.256	
OwnerInMin	0.712		0.288	
OwnerInMaj	0.666		0.334	
OwnerPfac	0.564		0.436	
PartnerOut	0.808		0.192	
PartnerIn	0.921		0.079	
PartnerPfac	0.943		0.057	
ExecutiveInitiated	0.652		0.348	
PartyHasPres	0.49		0.51	
FrenteAmplio	0.829		0.171	
Continuous variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Size	18.772	12.318	0.4	90.2
RemainingTerm	0.557	0.281	0.006	1
Δgdp	1.156	5.826	-14.8	11.5

Notes

1. Bigger (a proxy for broader) cabinets in Africa are associated with smaller risk of coups (Arriola, forthcoming).
2. Policy gain in Cheibub et al.'s (2004) generalization of Austen-Smith and Banks' (1988) coalition model to presidential systems resembles this. Parties, as in the original model, value portfolios, policy and their electoral well-being, but an asymmetry is introduced so that only the president can offer portfolios to opposition parties. The president's offer consists of a share of the cabinet for each party in the coalition and a common policy programme leaving all satisfied. The programme consists of policy concessions, that is, moderation, that each party weights against the best alternative offer. The party is satisfied by the president's offer when policy concessions and office pay-offs offset the electoral penalty of governing along strangers.
3. Senate slates in general election ballots most faithfully translate faction membership in the bicameral *Parlamento del Uruguay* for each election cycle (see Moraes, 2008). Deputies elected on the same ticket are coded as belonging to the same faction. Analysis excludes minor factions without Senate representation reported in the 'other' category for each party.

4. Roll-call votes are mandated in Uruguay for veto overrides and some procedural matters, but remain optional for amendment and passage of legislation at the request of one-third of the floor (art. 93).
5. We do not assume that the reverse also holds: faction f may find value in voting favourably for bill b (i.e. $F_f > 0$) despite b not bringing net gain to constituents ($V_f \leq 0$), either because side payments were attached to the vote or because b is part of a log-roll including legislation favourable and salient to constituents.
6. We relied for this purpose on regular expressions, a powerful text-searching tool easily implemented in *R*. The procedure is described in Jackman (2006).
7. These were compiled from Unidad de Política y Relaciones Internacionales (2008).
8. That is, scenario-invariant regressors used to compute expected probabilities are set to the following values: PartyHasPres = 0, OwnerPfac = 0, ExecutiveInitiated = 0, FrenteAmplio = 0, Size = 10, RemainingTerm = 0.5 and $\Delta\text{gdp} = 1.2$.
9. We storm the estimates of each sponsoring profile in the scenario with random noise, using the approach of Tomz et al. (2001). Like trees facing a meteorological storm, estimates with robust statistical roots survive the artificial storm with little change, while those less firmly grounded manifest large oscillation, indicating less certainty.

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